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ABSTRACT 
 
The Hermeneutics of the Modern Subject 
 
Martin Heidegger was the first modern European philosopher to alert mankind to the 
dangers of modern technology.  He argued that technology is an enframing or a 
limiting perspective of the possibilities for human existence.  The philosopher Michel 
Foucault investigated the geneology of the way that the ‘care of the self’ became 
superseded by the prevailing cultural imperative to ‘have knowledge of the self’.  This 
change began in the seventeenth century and this thesis addresses the idea that the 
‘Homelessness of Being’ which Heidegger associated with modern technology, has 
been brought about, or exacerbated, by the gradual abandonment of practices 
associated with the ‘care of the self’. This thesis also examines the way that poetic 
language and modes of thinking can lead to a ‘way of life’ which is not enframed within 
a technological matrix. 
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The Hermeneutics of the Modern Subject 
Introduction 
The French philosopher Michael Foucault (1926-1984) claimed that a significant 
change in our ‘way of life’ occurred in the seventeenth century.  He claimed that the 
primacy of the ‘care of the self’ had been supplanted by the imperative to ‘know 
thyself’.  He termed this transitional period ‘The Cartesian Moment’ (Foucault, 2005, 
p 14).  This transition appears to correspond very well with Heidegger’s assertion that 
the danger from technology had arisen since the Enlightenment.  This thesis will 
explore some of the themes and the work of both Foucault and Heidegger which 
naturally arose from the idea that the primacy of the ’care of the self’ had been 
supplanted by the imperative to ’know thyself’.  Both Heidegger’s and Foucault’s 
concerns about the perceived dangers from technology are explored, particularly with 
the idea that empirical knowledge and actions based on claims related to rationality 
have become all important.   
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was the first modern European philosopher to attempt 
to alert mankind to the dangers inherent in the uncritical way in which technology was 
being developed. (Heidegger, 1977a, pp 3-35)   Heidegger made a series of important 
claims about the danger from modern technology which this study will investigate.  He 
argued that human beings are not in control of technology, in contrast to ancient 
times.  Instead, whether mankind wills it or not, technology has become established to 
be, in effect, in control of our lives.  He claimed that: “Everywhere we remain unfree, 
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and chained to technology whether we passionately affirm or deny it.”  (Heidegger, 
1977a, p 4)1 
This concern of Heidegger’s should not be confused simply with fears about the 
destructive power of the atomic age, ecological damage and so on.2   For Heidegger the 
power which holds us captive is:  “- - -the technological revolution in the atomic age 
could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle and beguile man that calculative thinking may 
sometimes come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking.” 
(Heidegger, 1969, p 56) 
Human beings, in order to dominate nature, necessarily become reduced merely to an 
object such as any other found in nature.  Perhaps, even more importantly, Man is 
today treated as a resource, as is the whole of nature.  (Heidegger, 1977a, p 24)  This 
relationship to the world in which we live, was for Heidegger, the denial of what it is to 
be a human being. (Heidegger, 1969, p 50)  In the ‘Age of the World Picture’, 
Heidegger claimed that the picture which holds us captive, is that technology enables 
man to posture as Lord of the earth.  (Heidegger, 1977c, pp 115-54)  This picture is 
resonant of the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations: “A picture held us 
captive.  And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language 
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.”  (Wittgenstein, 1967, p48, para.115) 
 
                                                          
1
 Since Rousseau’s work on the social contract in the eighteenth century the political and philosophical 
thinking in Western Europe has become associated with the idea that power should not be solely 
exercised by an omnipotent sovereign or ruling elite. (Rousseau, 1987,pp1-24) 
 
2 A consensus definition of modern technology is that it is: ‘The application of scientific or other 
knowledge to practical tasks by ordered systems that involve people and organizations, productive skills, 
living things and machines.’   (Dusek, 2006, p 35)  This definition includes social organization and value 
systems, as advocated by John Kenneth Galbraith (1909 – 2004), the political economist. However, the 
German philosopher, Martin Heidegger, argued that this is a limited perspective, because ‘technology is 
not technological’.  (Heidegger, 1977a, p 4)   
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The problem that concerned Heidegger is that technology has become so all 
encompassing, that all other modes of human living and ways of life have become 
concealed.  In the ‘Question concerning Technology’, Heidegger argued that today 
technology has come to be accepted as revealing the only kind of truth.  (Heidegger, 
1977a, pp 3-35)   Mankind nowadays could not envisage life without modern 
technology, hence he is a slave to it; technology is all pervasive.  (Krell, 1993, 
pp 308 - 10) 
The technological world view that pervades the whole of society today cannot imagine 
any other way of ‘being’.  The prevailing modern technological world view he termed 
Machenschaft.  Babette Babich described this phenomenon in terms of Nietzsche’s 
‘will to power’.  (Babich, 2003, pp 327-357)  Heidegger’s constant pre-occupation in 
the Beitrage, a compilation of hitherto unpublished work, was concern about 
technological institutions, reflecting technological world domination of mankind, 
under any type of political regime.  (Heidegger, 1999)   The important point to make 
here is that Heidegger maintained his views about the danger from modern technology 
to the end of his life.  This interest of Heidegger’s in technology was present in his 
work for his magnus opus, Being and Time, first published in German in 1927.  
(Heidegger, 1962)    
Being 
Being is the permanent ground for existence, it is not an object or a set of objects, but 
central to everything that man experiences as a being in the world. (Heidegger, 1962,  
p 23)  Heidegger’s philosophy was principally focussed upon man’s lack of concern and 
awareness of Being.  He termed this lack of concern ‘‘the oblivion of Being’’, with the 
11 
 
result that man exists in a state of ‘‘Homelessness’’. (Heidegger, 1993c, p 241) In the 
‘Letter on Humanism’, Heidegger wrote that: “Homelessness is the symptom of Being.  
Because of it the truth of Being remains unthought.” (Heidegger, 1993c, p 242) 
This homelessness represents the real danger from the essence of modern technology. 
This concept of Being has been criticized as being rather obscure.  However, in his 
‘Letter on Humanism’, Heidegger described Being in a way which is very pertinent to 
the way by which technology stultifies the possibilities for what could be a better way 
of life:  “But how – provided we really ought to ask the question at all, how does Being 
relate to ek–sistence?  Being itself is the relation to the extent that it, as the location of 
truth of Beings amid beings, gathers to itself and embraces ek–sistence in its 
existential, that is, ecstatic, essence.”  (Heidegger, 1993c, p 235) 
Heidegger believed that man should attempt to live an authentic way of life, which he 
argued was thwarted by modern technology. Steven Hicks explained this point of view:  
“Heidegger aims at a recovery of the sense of mystery of Being, which at the very least 
means a sense of power that cannot be brought under the control and mastery of 
technological humanity.”  (Hicks, 2003, p 93) 
Man as a being in the world, Heidegger termed Dasein, as a device to subvert all the 
previous philosophical and cultural beliefs as to what constitutes ‘man’. (Heidegger, 
1962, pp 52-53)  How can one attend to the possibility of living well – a better, a more 
authentic, ‘way of life’?   One possibility was language, according to Heidegger.  
(Heidegger, 1993b, p 424)  Some kind of transformation, mediated by language 
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(poiesis) is required for man to enter into a truer relationship to Being.3  This kind of 
transformation was termed by Heidegger in his essay ‘The Turning’ as Ereignis which is 
an event linked to a disclosure of some aspect of Being.  (Heidegger, 1977b, p45)  
In the ‘Question Concerning Technology’, first published in 1954, Heidegger claimed 
that technology is a certain mode of revealing. ‘‘Bringing-forth brings hither out of 
concealment into unconcealment.’’   (Heidegger, 1977a, p 11)   
Heidegger considered truth as being related to disclosedness. “Considered with 
respect to truth as disclosedness, concealment is then undisclosedness and accordingly 
the untruth that is most proper to the essence of truth.” (Heidegger, 1993b, p 130) 
Thus for Heidegger, technology is a way of revealing something which otherwise would 
have remained hidden, or have been revealed in a different way.  In our modern world, 
Heidegger claimed that ‘truth’ can only be revealed by technology.  In 1949 Heidegger 
                                                          
3 However, the exact meaning of Being, as used by Heidegger is obscure, and has been the subject of 
much debate.   For example, Herman Philipse in his book on Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being, discusses 
some of the interpretations of Being. (Philipse, 1998, pp 31-44)    He describes many of these as 
unitarian, where the commentator develops one theory about Being, which Heidegger is supposed to 
have maintained throughout his life.  An example given of this approach is that of Dreyfus.  This author 
interpreted Heidegger’s Being as the ‘’intelligibility of our everyday background practices’’. (Philipse, 
1988, p 69)    An alternative view is what Philipse termed a ‘patchwork’ interpretation.  On this reading, 
Being, as discussed by Heidegger, can be criticized as being either an empty concept, or one that is to be 
found in so many  different ways in the many works of Heidegger, that it is effectively meaningless. 
(Philipse, 1988, p 71)   Philipse disagreed with both these interpretations, and instead put forward five 
leitmotifs which are inter-related and play a part in the various expositions about Being which Heidegger 
made throughout his vast corpus.  These themes are based on Aristotle’s ideas about Being, 
Phenomenology, the transcendental theme, the neo- Hegelian theme and the post monoatheist theme. 
(Philipse, 1998, p 75-76)   These leitmotifs are to be found in Heidegger’s investigation of Being.  
(Philipse, 1988, p 76)   What science has neglected to do, is to commit any thought into these themes.  
(Heidegger, 1993a, p 94) 
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gave a lecture in Bremen entitled ‘Das Gestell’ or ‘The Enframing’.  It was on this 
lecture that his paper on the ‘Question Concerning Technology’ was based.  
(Heidegger, 2012)  In this paper, Heidegger introduces the relationship of human 
existence to technology.  Heidegger believed that poiesis is very important in the 
process of bringing something into existence. (Heidegger, 1977a, pp 29-30)   For 
example, this process could be a craft, or a poem.   Poiesis is a kind of revealing, linked 
to the pre-Socratic concept of alētheia which was considered to be a form of truth. 
(Heidegger, 2002)  The poet Rainer Rilke was one of the poets who were admired by 
Heidegger.  The poet is someone who can liberate man from ‘homelessness’ because: 
‘‘- - -what is said [in poetry] thinks the whole of beings by way of Being.’’  (Heidegger, 
1971a, p 134)    
Rainier Rilkes’s Angel in the poem Duino Elegies, is a being who can assist in opening 
up a type of reality which is normally inaccessible to man.  Heidegger claimed in his 
essay ‘What are Poets For?’ that “- - -Rilkes’s Angel, despite all difference in content, is 
metaphysically the same as the figure of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra.”  (Heidegger, 1971a, 
p 134)  
Physis is also a bringing forth of something into existence, for example a bud bursting 
into flower.  This example was considered by Heidegger to be poiesis ‘of the highest 
sense.’  (Heidegger, 1977a, p 10)  Heidegger argued that the revealing brought about 
as a consequence of modern technology, is quite distinct from the bringing forth or 
revealing associated with poiesis.   
The essence of modern technology is an enframing, or a limiting perspective of the 
possibilities of man’s existence.  As a philosopher, Heidegger was concerned with the 
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‘essence’ of technology, not this or that technical process.  In the above example, 
human beings are simply treated as a resource to be used, like any other raw material 
found in nature.  As a result of becoming enmeshed in a technological framework, 
mankind loses his freedom; the only form of ‘truth’ becomes that revealed by 
technological applications.  It was this ‘enframing’ that Heidegger saw as the danger to 
mankind, he was not opposed to technical devices being used by man for his own 
appropriate use: “It would be foolish to attack technology blindly.  It would be 
shortsighted to condemn it as the work of the devil.”  (Heidegger, 1960, p 53)  
The danger to mankind does not come from the tools and apparatus of technology.  
Instead, it is the use of man himself as a slave to technological processes, blinding him 
to the possibility of living in any other way.  This ‘enframing’ is most dangerous when 
unperceived, when mankind enters into this ‘enframing’ as a mere raw material for a 
technological process.  Because of the effect of Gestell, or enframing, man is not free 
in the modern world.  For Heidegger, freedom is a concept intimately associated with 
truth.  (Heidegger, 1993b, pp 115-138) 
The ‘Essence’ of Technology 
In his essays on the nature of truth, Heidegger developed the theme that there are two 
aspects of truth, using the ideas from Plato’s Republic, that truth may be hidden or 
undisclosed.  (Heidegger, 2002, pp 17-63)  The phenomenon of revealing of what is 
hidden is alētheia.  Instead of the essence of something being associated with a 
permanent important feature of its existence, Heidegger’s concept of ‘essence’ is 
linked to the philosophical need to have a complete understanding of what we believe 
to be true.  However, the idea of truth which dominates the present age is the 
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correspondence theory of truth which accords perfectly with the belief that science 
has the key to the understanding of the world in which we live.  In The Basic Questions 
of Philosophy, Heidegger criticized Nietzsche, for accepting the current convention of 
linking truth solely with reason.  (Heidegger, 1994, p 90)  
In the ‘Question Concerning Technology’, Heidegger contended that technē should not 
be used to denote technology, but rather a form of revealing the truth, the true 
essence of something. (Heidegger, 1977a, p 34)  In his Introduction to Metaphysics, 
Heidegger defined technē as a true understanding of what is directly observed or only 
superficially understood.  (Heidegger, 2014, pp 177-178)  The important point here is 
that Heidegger claimed that ‘technology is not technological’ because man - made 
objects disclose only a very limited aspect of the truth about technology.  (Heidegger, 
1977a, p 4)  
 Heidegger argued in  ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ that technology is a mode 
of revealing which presupposes that everything in nature, and man himself, is a 
‘standing reserve’ (Bestand) to be ordered by some form of power.  As a result, we 
have unknowingly embraced a ‘way of life’ which has a very limited horizon of the 
different ways by which we might choose to live.  As Iain Thomson has claimed, the 
greatest danger from technology is that we are:  ‘‘- - -resources to be optimized, 
ordered and enframed with maximum efficiency’’.   (Thomson, 2000a, p 207)  The 
‘essence’ of technology – the truth about technology, is a mode of revealing. 
In his essay ‘On the Essence of Truth’, Heidegger developed a series of arguments to 
show that the essence of truth is linked to freedom. (Heidegger, 1993b, pp115-142)  
Our loss of freedom in the modern world is due to the ‘enframing’ which is the cardinal 
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feature of modern technology.  (Heidegger, 1977a, p 29) Technology limits our 
freedom because its mode of revealing is carried out by a limited and distorted 
relationship to the world where ‘enframing’ is the essence of technology.  (Heidegger, 
1977a, p 29)  The real danger from modern technology is that: ‘’- - -nowhere does man 
today encounter himself, his essence.’’  (Heidegger, 1977a, p 27) 
Essentialism 
In his book Questioning Technology, Andrew Feenberg criticised Heidegger on the 
grounds that he was an ‘essentialist’.  This is because Heidegger regarded the time of 
Modernity as one where the over–arching power of technology rules our ‘way of life’.  
Feenberg argued that: “There are both theoretical and practical reasons to doubt such 
blanket distinctions between eras and types of society.”  (Feenberg, 2008, p 15) 
In early societies man had utilised and developed technological objects such as the 
wheel and weapons, materials for building and so on.  In a paper which discussed 
Heidegger’s ‘essentialism’, Thomson pointed out that the problem with technology ‘is 
not technological’, a point which Heidegger had stressed in ‘The Question Concerning 
Technology’.    (Thomson, 2000a, pp 207-208)  According to Thomson, Feenberg had 
misconstrued Heidegger’s most fundamental point about the danger from technology 
today. (Thompson, 2000b, pp429-444)  However, Feenberg had a further criticism of 
Heidegger because his philosophy of Being has ‘‘such a high level of abstraction’’, that 
it is irrelevant in any meaningful discussion about technology.  (Feenberg, 2003, pp 
661-662)  This thesis will set out to address problems with respect to our ‘way of life’ 
and hence demonstrate that Heidegger’s concerns about modern technology are 
substantive. 
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Foucault on Technology 
In the Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger argued that the rise of the problem 
of modern technology arose around the seventeenth-century.  (Heidegger, 1977a,        
p 22)  However he did not provide supporting evidence.  This evidence is needed to 
refute Feenberg’s charge of ‘essentialism’ against Heidegger.  Can evidence be found 
for the growth of scientism –the notion that only the principles and beliefs of science 
to the exclusion of any consideration of Being?  How has it come about that the 
modern state has become all powerful, utilizing technology to its maximum effect?  
Why has knowledge become all encompassing?  Is this development linked to 
scientism?   Are there any possible ways by which modern man can overcome the all 
encompassing scope of modern technology – a ‘saving power’ which Heidegger 
claimed could be found by poiesis?  
I believe that an important factor in answering these questions is the argument of the 
French philosopher, Michel Foucault (1926 – 1984) that there was a substantive 
change in the seventeenth century in man’s relationship to the world which shaped his 
existence – his essence. 4  This change has been the abandonment of the ancient 
practice to ‘take care of yourself’, the epimeleia heautou, by the modern emphasis on 
the need to ‘know yourself’, the gnōthi seaton.  I intend to argue that this ‘Cartesian 
Moment’ was related to Heidegger’s concern about modern man’s estrangement from 
Being.   
Foucault’s approach was to investigate how technology is deployed in forms of power 
which are exercised on the body.  By studying how power has been exercised in the 
                                                          
4
 The book Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, (2003) edited by Milchman and Rosenberg, is an 
anthology of some essays by a number of philosophers who have ideas related to Heidegger’s influence 
on Foucault.   
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past, Foucault thought that we could better understand the ‘history of the present’. 
(Foucault, 1991, p 31)    Foucault also shared Heidegger’s concerns that nearly 
everyone accepts the validity of technology determining the way that we should live. It 
is to the transformation of the ‘self’ that Foucault, devoted an entire Lecture Course in 
1981 – 1982, at the Collège de France on The Hermeneutics of the Subject. (Foucault, 
2005)  The relevance of Foucault’s work on The Hermeneutics of the Subject is that it 
was all:  ‘‘- - -reflected on from the side of Heidegger and starting with Heidegger.’’  
(Foucault, 2005, p 189)  This thesis will explore this work of Foucault in terms of 
addressing Heidegger’s concerns about modern technology.5    
 As a result of his work on the increasing power of technology, Foucault stated that:         
‘‘- - -the West lost touch with Being’’.   (Foucault, 2007c, p 152)   He argued that this 
perspective limited a better understanding of the philosophy of technology.  Foucault 
wrote in his essay ’Subjectivity and Truth’: 
Let’s turn the question round and ask which techniques and practices constitute 
the Western concept of the subject, giving it its characteristic split of truth and 
error, freedom and constraint.  I think that it is here that we will find the real 
possibility of constructing a history both of what we have done, and at the same 
time a diagnosis of what we are, - - - in sum it is a question of searching for 
another kind of critical philosophy.  Foucault, 2007c, p 152) 
 
Foucault claimed that there are four aspects to the philosophy of technology.  The first 
three include technologies of production, power relationships, and sign systems and 
symbols.  The fourth aspect is a new one introduced by Foucault: “technologies of the 
self”. (Foucault, 1988b)  Most modern theories about the philosophy of technology 
                                                          
5 Hubert Dreyfus has argued in ’Being and Power’ that ‘‘The heart of Heidegger’s thought is the notion 
of Being, and the same could be said of the works of Foucault. Foucault analyzes several regimes of 
power, culminating in Bio – power, to help us free ourselves from understanding ourselves as 
autonomous subjects and disciplined bodies.’’  (Dreyfus, 2003, p 30) 
 
19 
 
had only concentrated on the first three major types of technique.  Foucault developed 
the idea that what is lacking in the modern theories about the philosophy of 
technology are concepts related to ‘techniques of the self’.  I intend to investigate the 
proposition that these ‘’techniques of the self’’ concern factors which are related to 
Heidegger’s belief that man’s existence is shaped and moulded by his relationship to 
technology.  
Foucault defined these “techniques of the self” as:  “Reflected and voluntary practices 
by which men only not only fix rules of conduct for themselves, but seek to transform 
themselves, to change themselves in their particular being, and to make their life an 
oeuvre.”  (Foucault, 2005, p 61) 
These practices associated with the care of the self, which could lead to some kind of 
transformation were termed askēsis.  They were connected to the notion that the 
need to be concerned with the care of the self (epimeleia heautou) was of primary 
importance.  As Foucault argued in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, the ‘care of the 
self’ is related to both political and ethical questions: “- - -power relations, 
governmentality, the government of the self and others, and the relationship of the 
self to the self constitute a chain, a thread, and I think it is around these notions that 
we should be able to connect together the question of politics and the question of 
ethics.” (Foucault, 2005, p. 252) 
This thesis sets out to examine the profound change in ‘our way of life’ which has been 
brought about the modern emphasis and credence given to the gnōthi seauton. I 
intend to show that Foucault’s work on the formation of the modern subject has led 
modern man to adopt a ‘way of life’ which is very different from that of the past.  The 
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work of Foucault addressed some of the concerns of Heidegger’s about abandonment 
of any thought about Being by man today.  Heidegger’s work on poetics in the final 
chapter addresses the question of how man’s estrangement from Being can be 
overcome.  
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Outline of the Thesis 
In chapter 1   
A brief survey is given of Heidegger’s philosophy, particularly with respect to 
technology, including poiesis as a possible way of man overcoming way of reaching a 
way of life which brings man closer to Being. 
 
In chapter 2   
An account is given of Foucault’s work on the hermeneutics of the subject of 
technology; an account which provides some evidence that his philosophical work had 
been driven by ‘confronting’ Heidegger’s philosophical ideas.   
In chapter 3   
This thesis sets out to investigate the possibility that the almost complete 
abandonment of the practice of epimeleia heautou is a major factor for the 
estrangement of Being brought about from modern technology, as described by 
Heidegger.  Heidegger claimed in ‘The Question Concerning Technology ’ that the 
essence of modern technology developed at a time which was historically earlier than 
the 18th century. (Heidegger, 1977a, p 22)  Could this historical period in the 
development of modern technology correspond to Foucault’s ‘Cartesian moment’ 
when the practice of epimeleia heautou became discarded?  Related to this enquiry, is 
the investigation into the possibility that the epimeleia heautou represented a practice 
whereby man had a closer relationship to Being – a concept which Heidegger’s critics 
such as Feenberg have claimed to be too abstract to be of any value in the philosophy 
of technology?  Spinoza (1632-1677) claimed in his Treatise on the Improvement of 
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Understanding, that various practices concerned with the spiritual life of the self were 
related to freedom.   As part of this investigation into this area of study of the 
epimeleia heautou it will be relevant to determine to what extent these practices are 
now obsolete, and could help explain the homelessness of Being.   
 
In chapter 4 
A study will be made of Foucault’s genealogy of the changing practices of Salvation 
since the ‘Cartesian Moment’.   A key concept of the ancient principle ‘to take care of 
oneself’ was to seek Salvation – a personal journey.  This journey was initiated by 
oneself, and the responsibility for this journey was not shared with others, although 
other people could assist the process.  Salvation now has become accepted as a way of 
life to simply follow technological imperatives.  Today, both the state and various 
religions require abdication of one’s dominion over oneself in order to obey juridical 
edicts.  How are the modern practices associated with Salvation related to Heidegger’s 
notions of freedom?  The practice of confession was an important example of a 
‘technology of the self.’ 
In chapter 5  
According to both Heidegger and Foucault, Descartes was a pivotal figure in the 
development of what today is known as ‘Cartesianism’.  This has been instrumental in 
the ascendency of the gnōthi seauton (know oneself) over the epimeleia heautou (care 
of the self). 
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In chapter 6  
Heidegger’s criticisms of modern science and its link to the oblivion of Being are 
discussed in the context that science has a limited understanding of what is truly 
important to man’s existence.   
 
In chapter 7  
Foucault’s critique of science is discussed in terms of the primary importance given to 
the gnōthi seauton today and the impact on our modern ‘way of life’.  
In chapter 8 
Foucault’s work on Governmentality and what he termed ‘Biopolitics’ will be discussed 
and both the material and spiritual aspects of government actions examined. Because 
modern technology governs our ‘way of life’, it is in a real sense a source of power 
which shapes human existence.  I intend to examine Foucault’s work on 
Governmentality and power relations with respect to modern political and ethical 
imperatives for our modern ‘way of life’. These ‘form a chain’, which may explain to 
some extent, how we have become, in Heidegger’s opinion, ‘enframed’ by technology, 
as a result of the demise of the practices associated with the epimeleia heautou. 
In chapter 9 
This concluding chapter discusses Foucault’s work on the hermeneutics of the subject 
in terms of Heidegger’s poetics.  This discussion is linked to the central arguments and 
concepts which were examined in the earlier chapters.  The chapter is arranged as 
follows: 
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Introduction 
Part one - Heidegger’s Poetics 
Part two - Man’s state of homelessness 
Part three - Homecoming 
Part four - The Importance of the Cartesian Moment 
Part five - Care of the Self and the Oblivion of Being 
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CHAPTER 1 
Heidegger and his Essays on the Danger from Technology 
Introduction 
There are a number of key features about Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of 
technology expressed in his essays: ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ (Heidegger, 
1977a), ‘The Turning’ (Heidegger, 1977b) and the ‘Letter on Humanism.’ (Heidegger, 
1993c)  First of all, Heidegger rejected the anthropocentric views which had dominated 
philosophy in the Christian era, and even in the more recent humanistic age since the 
‘Enlightenment’.6  Instead, Heidegger developed ideas related to man’s existence in 
the world (Dasein).  Existence was related to a relationship with Being, which is a 
changing pattern of existence, rather than a thing.  An early account of Heidegger’s 
thoughts can be found in his masterpiece, Being and Time. (Heidegger, 1962) 
Secondly, Heidegger challenged the view that truth was only granted by reason. He 
claimed that this was a legacy from the time of Plato, and was accepted by Kant.  
(Heidegger, 1962, p 16)  The over-emphasis on reason had obscured the importance of 
the pre-Socratic ideas on truth, concepts related to disclosure and revealing. 
(Heidegger, 1962, p 173)  These disclosures are related to notions of freedom and 
Heidegger felt that freedom and truth are intimately bound up together.  Central to his 
philosophy is the idea that freedom is the essence of truth itself. (Heidegger, 1993, 
p 123) 
                                                          
6 The French Philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 – 78) had similar concerns to Heidegger about 
the supposed beneficial results of Enlightenment thinking.  In his ‘Essay on the Sciences and the Arts’, he 
developed the theme that mankind had become corrupted since the Enlightenment.  (Rousseau, 1987) 
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Thirdly, Heidegger developed Nietzsche’s ideas on approaches to history. He claimed 
that the investigation of truth, requires an historical confrontation (geschichtlich), 
rather than an historiographical, (historisch) account of the past. (1994, p 12)  This type 
of questioning, Heidegger thought, was important in order to understand where we 
are and how we should seek to address the future. 
Fourthly, in his confrontation with modern technology, Heidegger introduced new 
terms into philosophical discourse.  Gestell, or en-framing, is the essence of modern 
technology, where Being reveals itself as a ‘standing reserve’. (Heidegger, 1977a, p 17)  
This enframing’ encompasses both nature as a standing reserve, and of man himself.   
In ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, Heidegger argued that the modern practice 
of building Hydro – Electric Dams, had traduced the landscape, whereas the bridges 
built over the river Rhine had produced minimal impact on the river.  (Heidegger, 
1977a, p 16)  The danger that Heidegger perceived with modern technology is that 
technology has the power to transform human beings to the status of a ‘thing’, to be 
used and transformed like any other object found in nature.  As part of this world 
transforming process, language loses its poetic and imaginative character, as all oral 
and written disclosure becomes information to be used in a ‘rational’ world.   
The New Danger from Modern Technology 
Although Heidegger had criticized modern technology for reducing man to an object 
for control, in his later work he said that the danger from modern technology 
represented a new phenomenon.  In ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, Heidegger 
described the disappearance of the object into: ‘‘- - -the objectionless of the standing 
reserve.’’  (Heidegger, 1977a, p 19)  Albert Borgmann is a philosopher who has written 
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about this development.  In the age of computer technology natural objects disappear 
into a virtual world which superficially appears to be under the total control of the 
subject.   (Borgmann, 2003, pp 571-577)  The subject may have total control over the 
information held in a computer system, yet the object of control has no physical reality 
in the sense that man has been accustomed.  The software in a computer is a good 
example of modern technology’s operation of Heidegger’s ‘standing reserve’.  The 
formal subject–object relationship of Cartesianism is disappearing from many aspects 
of modern life.  As a result, we are in the process of losing any concept of what it is 
that shapes our existence.  This perspective of Heidegger’s also counters Feenberg’s 
charge of essentialism, which he levelled against Heidegger – what confronts man 
today is something quite new. 
In the ‘Letter on Humanism’, Heidegger explored the idea that the fundamental 
orientation of a human being is not simply to everyday mundane concerns, but also 
towards the possibilities of existence which are only open to a human being.  He 
wrote:   “But man is not only a living creature who possesses language – language is 
the house of Being.”  (Heidegger, 1993c, p 237)  
For Heidegger the forgetting of Being, is the supreme danger for mankind.  Towards 
the end of the ‘Letter on Humanism’, Heidegger again attacked the belief that logic 
alone should be considered to be the only way of discovering truth:  “The fittingness of 
the saving of Being, as the destiny of truth, is the first law of thinkingnot the rules of 
logic, which can become rules only on the basis of the law of Being.”  (Heidegger, 
1993c, p 264) 
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The question posed by Heidegger in his essay What is a thing? is a way of confronting 
the question ‘What is a man?’   (Heidegger, 1968)   Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason puts 
man as the foundation of all truth and freedom – not Being, as Heidegger maintained 
throughout his life.  (Kant, 1993a) Thus Heidegger’s philosophy is firmly opposed to 
Kant’s anthropocentric project which he followed in ‘The Critiques’, and the whole 
belief that Modernity represents progress.  Heidegger had serious reservations about 
the whole Modernity project initiated by Kant, and wanted philosophers to repudiate 
the concept that empirical data and reason should be the only way of revealing the 
truth.  It has been claimed that Heidegger viewed the whole of Western philosophy as 
a commitment to the ‘oblivion of Being’ (Seinsvergessenheit).  (Engelland, 2008, 
pp 17-41)  
Michael Zimmerman has written an extensive account of Heidegger’s confrontation 
with Modernity.  (Zimmerman, 1990) He argued that Heidegger considered Modernity 
to be the final stage in the decline of Western Civilization due to the technological 
nihilism of the twentieth century.  However, Zimmerman pointed out that Heidegger 
saw the possibility of hope for the future.   Zimmerman wrote: “If we could take a ‘step 
back’ from the constant purposiveness demanded by modern technology, we could 
suddenly encounter the purposelessness of it- - -Heidegger owed this insight, at least 
in part to Jüngen, as well as to Nietzsche and Hölderlin.”  (Zimmerman, 1990, p 235)  
Heidegger’s concern about technology has led to a vast literature about the 
domination of mankind by technology.  Jacques  Ellul, a pupil of Heidegger’s, believed 
that there is a single core property unique to modern technology, which is the notion 
that it has become autonomous – outside human control. (Ellul, 2003, pp 386-397)  
Technology has, in effect, moved beyond systems and technical objects, but has 
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become an ideology, a theme which has been pursued by the modern German 
philosopher, Jürgen Häbermas.7 (Häbermas, 2003, pp 530-535)  Scientism has been 
defined as follows “The view that the characteristic inductive methods of the natural 
scientist are the only source of genuine factual knowledge, and in particular, that they 
alone can yield true knowledge about man and society.” (Bullock and Trombley, 1999,     
p 775) 
Many modern accounts about technology therefore proceed from the perspective of 
scientists, technologists, politicians and the debates are conducted within a social 
science and political framework.  This limited perspective perhaps, one could argue, is 
a type of en-framing.   
The English philosopher Mary Midgley has argued that many philosophers now agree 
science, so that this whole question of the roles and value of science, technology and 
philosophy is the matter of some continuing debate. (Midgley, 1985)   Heidegger’s 
concern about technology was that it renounced mankind’s attention and relationship 
to Being.  Both Midgley’s and Häbermas’ views are consistent with Heidegger’s claim 
that the philosophy of technology is associated with scientism.  As well as the question 
of scientism which he linked to the development of Cartesianism, later chapters will 
discuss Heidegger’s concept of an authentic mode of human existence. 
                                                          
7
  In an elaboration of the ‘technology is an idealogy’ critique, pupils of Heidegger such as Adorno 
and Horkheimer and, connected the problems which they associated with technology to 
Modernity i.e. aspects of modern social and economic organization; capitalism, liberalism, 
communism etc. (Adorno and Horkheimer,2008)  Although they had differences in their approach 
and ideas about technology, many of their views gained a wide audience when they were forcibly 
put forward by Herbet Marcuse, in his famous book One Dimensional Man.  (Marcuse,2002)  
Essentially, these theories incorporate the idea that technology is deterministic and/or 
autonomous.  Technology which is autonomous is outside the control of any human agency.  
(Dusek, 2006, pp 84-111)  Technological determinism is the theory that technology causes or 
determines the nature of society and its culture.  Autonomous technology is usually associated 
with the notion of technological determinism. (Dusek, 2006, p 84) 
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Man’s Estrangement from Being 
The problems for a displaced population are  not simply associated with people losing 
their homes and lands; their culture and relationship to the earth is irrevocably 
disrupted.  However, Heidegger went further in his philosophy to argue that all 
mankind lives in a state of ‘Homelessness’, because of man’s estrangement from 
Being.   In his essay ’Building, Dwelling, Thinking’, Heidegger claimed that for man to 
dwell properly on earth he has to live in “- - -the basic character of Being in keeping 
with which mortals exist.”  (Heidegger, 1971b, p 160) 
To live properly man should live at peace with nature rather than to simply regard it as 
a resource to be used as directed by the framework of technology.  The fundamental 
relationship which man should have with nature is one of sparing and preserving.  
(Heidegger, 1971b, p 149)  Real life examples of this “sparing and preserving” are 
preserving a natural forest as a National Park, or seeking to protect animals or plants 
threatened with extinction.  (Young, 2002, p 106)  
In the ‘Question Concerning Technology’, Heidegger was not discussing social science, 
he was posing fundamental questions about the metaphysics of Being.  He does end on 
a positive note by providing some hope that man could break free from the 
‘enframing’ of technology.  He quoted the German poet Friedrich  Hölderlin as an artist 
whose work could help re-connect man with Being.  (Heidegger, 1977a, p 34)  Artists 
such as the poets can break out of the enframing of technology by poiesis – the 
revealing due to artistic creativity and imagination, unshackled from the restraints of 
imperatives determined solely by the invocation of the power of ‘reason’.  Only by 
poiesis can man break free. 
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In ‘The Turning’, Heidegger claimed that in order to live in a manner rather closer to 
Being, to ‘dwell’ properly, one would need to live within a ‘fourfold’ mode of existence.  
(Heidegger, 1977b, p 49)  The fourfold encompasses the earth, the sky, mortals and 
the divine.  Although we live within a world ‘enframed’ by technology, Heidegger 
thought that poetry allows us to imagine a way of ‘dwelling’ properly because it opens 
up the possibility of overcoming man’s oblivion of Being.  (Heidegger, 1971a, pp 91-
142)  
Also, in ‘The Turning’, Heidegger described the process called Ereignis.  (Heidegger, 
1977b, p 45) It has been translated as appropiation, emergence, or an event.  In the 
proper state of Dasein’s relationship to Being,  Eregnis could be interpreted as the 
power to dwell at the centre of the fourfold.   As a result of Gestell, man does not have 
the ability to dwell in a proper relationship to the world; man therefore dwells in a 
state of homelessness.  An important feature of Heidegger’s concept of the fourfold is 
that man is displaced as the fundamental single focus of philosophical investigation. 
‘Poetically Man Dwells’,  a quotation from a poem by the German poet Hölderlin, is the 
title of an essay by Heidegger on the ability of Poetry to lift man out of his existence as 
a mere ‘standing reserve’; to become aware of other modes of existence.  (Heidegger, 
1971b, pp 213-229)  The ‘enframing’ produced by the effect of modern technology, is 
not an inevitable condition for our ‘way of life’.  
The value of poetry, language and thought, was of course an important historical 
feature of the practices associated with the ‘care of the self’ – the epimeleia heautou.   
The final chapter of this thesis sets out to demonstrate that Heidegger’s claims about 
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the possibility of poetic thinking to completely change the nature of our existence and 
relationship to Being, is important.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Foucault and Technology 
Foucault’s Encounter with Heidegger’s Philosophy 
The French philosopher, Michel Foucault (1926-1984) declared in an interview ‘Truth, 
Power and Self’ that his whole philosophical development had been moulded by his 
reading of Heidegger.   (Foucault, 1988a, pp 12-13)  According to Samuel Ijssling, 
Foucault’s principal engagement with Heidegger’s philosophy was with the essay ‘The 
Age of the World Picture,’ which of course was a description of a world which is 
‘enframed’ by technology.  (Ijssling, 1986, p 416)  
It is conceivable that this interest was concerned with Heidegger’s philosophy of Being.  
Jean Zoungrara wrote that Heidegger’s influence on Foucault was profound, not simply 
as a pupil or disciple, but as an inspiration to take his philosophy forward: “- - -an 
invitation to think with Heidegger, but beyond Heidegger.”  (Zoungrana, 1994, p 290)   
Foucault made little direct reference to Heidegger in his work.  This seems surprising, 
as usually philosophers make it clear about whom they are writing, and also their 
influences.  However, by seeking to avoid entering into existing debates, Foucault was 
free to adopt a unique approach in order to address issues about philosophy which 
had been raised by Heidegger.  Issues about power and domination Foucault thought, 
could be more fully explained by investigations into the nature of ‘self’.   
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Foucault’s Approach to Philosophy 
 Foucault developed three modes of objectification of human beings in order to study 
the human subject.  The first mode is what he termed archaeology, which he described 
in The Archaeology of Knowledge, shows how the human sciences see man as an 
object, simply a thing, to study. (Foucault, 2002, pp 44 - 54)   He defined this approach 
as follows:  ‘’- - -the discovery of truth is really a certain modality of the production of 
truth; putting what is given as the truth of observation or demonstration back on the 
practice of rituals, of the qualification of the knowing individual, of the truth–event 
system, this is what I would call the archaeology of knowledge.’’  (Foucault, 2006,          
p 238) 
The second part of Foucault’s work he called ‘genealogy’.  This method of study 
describes historical social practices and forms of life that locate and shape the human 
subject.  An example of this kind of approach is his book Discipline and Punish which 
described the development of the prison system in detail.  (Foucault, 1991)  Foucault 
regarded this kind of historical approach as a method of finding out where mankind 
places himself in the world in order that we can seek to shape the future.  Rather like 
Heidegger, Foucault regarded genealogy as an historical confrontation with the past. It 
is an examination of how various power relationships have come to establish what we 
accept to be ‘true’, in all our aspects of life including science, economics, and political 
systems.  Foucault described genealogy as an approach to uncovering truth: 
 - - -in the course of our history, of our civilization, and in an increasingly 
accelerated way since the Renaissance, truth knowledge assumed its present, 
familiar dimensions; to show how it colonized and took over the truth – event 
and ended up exercising a relationship if power over this truth - - -We could call 
this the genealogy of knowledge, the indispensible historical side to the 
archaeology of knowledge.  (Foucault, 2006, p 238-239) 
35 
 
 
Beatrice Han has characterized both archaeology and genealogy, as practiced by 
Foucault, as complementary techniques which seek to determine ‘‘the conditions of 
the acceptability of truth’’.  (Han, 1998, p 103)   
Much of Foucault’s early work was on the theme of power relations, so much so, that 
he became known as ‘the philosopher of power’.  At an interview in 1984 ‘The Ethics of 
Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom’ he said that: ‘‘I do not believe that there can 
be a society without relations of power - - -‘’.     (Foucault, 1988c, p 18)  
However, as a result of his well known works on technological systems and apparatus 
used at prisons and hospitals, Foucault became aware that the previous approaches to 
his studies were deficient because they had not paid sufficient attention to the ability 
of human beings to transform themselves.  These studies had been prompted and 
directed by Heidegger’s influence on Foucault.  We know from Heidegger’s work that 
he was concerned with concepts relating to the self, power and domination, truth, and 
the dangers of technology to mankind.  Studies on his work on power are given in later 
chapters of this thesis. 
The third phase of Foucault’s work was when he studied the ways of life by which a 
human being transforms or is transformed into a subject–‘’technologies of the self’’.  A 
detailed and comprehensive study of the subject from the time of the ancient Greeks 
to the 18C was published posthumously in English in 2005 as The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject.  (Foucault, 2005)  This book is based on a series of Lectures presented at the 
Collège de France between 1981 -1982.   During the course of his series of lectures on 
the Hermeneutics of the Subject Foucault claimed that his work on the self had been 
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initiated by Heidegger: ‘’- - -I have tried to reflect on all this from the side of Heidegger 
and starting from Heidegger.’’   (Foucault, 2005, p 189) 
In an essay ‘The Subject and Power’ the ‘self’ is according to Foucault, an invention.  
(Foucault, 2000c, pp 326-348) The modern subject is, according to Foucault, a 
relatively recent construct, whose existence as a being in the world is subject to 
various regimes of power which conduct ‘games of truth’. (Foucault, 1988c, p 16)  
Martin Saar has encapsulated Foucault’s critical philosophy with regard to the subject: 
‘’ It was Foucault’s spectacular (and possibly, Heideggerian) thesis in The Order of 
Things that this constitution is a rather recent phenomenon and that man is a rather 
recent invention.’’  (Saar, 2002, p 234)         
 As Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg have pointed out, Foucault shifted the focus 
away from Heidegger’s work of the way by which nature and man relate to one 
another, but to the way in which the subject is constituted and ‘technologies of the 
self’.  (Milchman,  and Rosenberg,  (2003, p 15) 
Nietzsche’s Influence on Foucault 
Nietzsche had a profound influence on both Heidegger and Foucault. (Megill, 1987, 
pp 339-352)  Foucault in an interview ‘Return of Morality’ claimed that  “- - -I try as far 
as possible, on a certain number of issues, to see with the help of Nietzsche’s texts – 
but also with anti–Nietzschean theses (which are nevertheless Nietzschean) - what can 
be done in this or that domain.”  (Foucault, 1996, p 471) 
Babette Babich has argued that the influence on Foucault from Nietzsche was rather 
complex, and that the relationship was rather more than merely one of adapting 
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Nietzsche’s approach to genealogy.  (Babich, 2009, p 19)  According to Babich, Foucault 
used some of Nietzsche’s ideas when he was attempting to answer some of the 
questions which Heidegger had posed, particularly in respect of technology.  (Babich, 
2009, p 28)  In The Order of Things, Foucault discussed Nietzsche’s concept of the 
eternal return, in the context of Heidegger and the poet Hölderlin.  (Foucault, 1994c,   
p 384)  The origin of man is at the same time near and far away related to finitude. 
In the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche developed the concept that mankind is subject to 
two related aspects of human existence, the Apollonian and the Dionysian. (Nietzsche, 
2003)   The Apollonian influence is related to reason, logic and self control; the 
Dionysian influence is related to imagination, originality and poiesis.  Nietzsche 
challenged the idea that the Apollonian concentration on reason and science was the 
only sure means to the truth.  (Nietzsche, 2003, p 4)  In Beyond Good and Evil, 
Nietzsche pointed out the danger of reason being the only foundation for a particular 
way of life. (Nietzsche, 1990, p 114)    Both Foucault and Heidegger shared Nietzsche’s 
concerns that reason alone should not dominate man’s existence.  Allan Megill has 
argued that the terms ‘Apollonian’ and ‘Dionysian’, are symbolic in nature rather than 
specific concepts.  (Megill, 1987, p 38)  However, he argued that the 
Apollonian/Dionysian opposition is a useful one in terms of aesthetic considerations.  
(Megill, 1987, p 42)  Surely, one can link this concept to Heidegger’s promotion of 
poetry to reveal a new kind of truth, and Foucault’s idea of reviving the ancient 
practice of askēsis to constitute a new relationship to oneself and the world.  The 
history of these former practices as conducted by Foucault is a version of history called 
genealogy which Martin Saar termed  ‘‘- - -a different and radicalized historicism of the 
self’’.  (Saar, 2002, p 234)   In the Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche proposed that there 
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should be a ‘‘re-evaluation of all values’’.  (Nietzsche, 2008b, p 81)  I would claim that 
Foucault’s project on the Hermeneutics of the Subject was to embark on this task. 
Foucault’s thesis in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, was that the ancient philosophy 
of ‘take care of yourself ’, has become in the modern age obscured and forgotten by 
the prevailing cultural imperatives to ‘know yourself’.  (Davidson, 2005, pp 1-19)  This 
injunction to ‘know yourself’, was famously pronounced by the priests at the ancient 
Delphic Oracle.   In our modern age, Foucault’s work embraced Nietzsche’s wish for 
more emphasis to be given to the Dionysian aspect of our existence.  In this context, 
one can perhaps understand how Foucault came to call his work ‘fiction’.  Foucault  
explained that his work was not an invented version of history, but set out to disrupt 
an Apollonian ‘world picture’ or in Heidegger’s view a world dominated by technology.  
In ‘Interview with Michel Foucault’ he explained his position: “But my problem is not to 
satisfy professional historians; my problem is to construct myself, and to invite others 
to share an experience of what we are, not only in the past, but in the present, an 
experience of our modernity in such a way that we might come out of it transformed.”  
(Foucault, 2000b, p 242)  A Dionysian project in terms of Nietzsche’s philosophy is an 
“affirmation of life” (Megill, 1987, p 46).  Foucault’s work on the hermeneutics of the 
subject is surely a Dionysian project, as Megill has claimed. (Megill, 1987, p 231) 
The Primacy of the gnōthi seauton and its Overcoming 
The kind of knowledge gained by science and applied in technology has become the 
goal of not only science, but society and philosophy as well.  As Heidegger complained 
in The Question Concerning Technology, man can only conceive of living in thrall to 
technology.  The theme that Heidegger pursued in respect of the problems of 
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technology, was that fundamentally, man had lost contact with his Being.  Foucault 
posited a similar idea, that by abdicating a search to ‘take care of oneself’, one denied 
oneself the opportunity to discover the truth.  He wrote: “We will call ‘philosophy’ the 
form of thought that enables the subject to have access to the truth, - - -we will call 
‘spirituality’, then the set of practices, and experience through which the subject 
carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the 
truth.”  (Foucault, 2005, p 15)    
Foucault did not mean that we should accept truth as an objective set of immutable 
‘facts’ in the scientific meaning of the term.  In an interview he said that: “Truth is to 
be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, 
distribution, circulation and operation of statements.  “Truth is linked in a circular 
relation with systems of power that produce and sustain it.’’ (Foucault, 2000a, p 132) 
For Foucault, the truth is only found if the subject’s ‘being’ is sought by a series of 
practices which he denoted as being spiritual in nature as opposed to a simple act of 
knowledge (connaissance).  This ‘being’ should not be thought of as a term used to 
denote Heidegger’s ‘Being’, but both thought that man’s spiritual nature had become 
lost or abandoned in modern times;  we have already found that Foucault was 
profoundly influenced by Heidegger. 
Man’s spirituality, according to Foucault, has three features.  First, spirituality infers 
that access to the truth is never given to a subject by right.  The second feature 
therefore, is that in order for the truth to be given to a subject there must be some 
kind of transformation of the subject.  The two major ways by which this 
transformation can occur are by love, and by undertaking some kind of work, or 
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practice such as meditation.  Thirdly, access to the truth gives the subject some kind of 
fulfilment.    (Foucault, 2005, p 15)  
The idea that access to the truth is only possible by virtue of knowledge alone, 
resonates with scientism, and Heidegger’s concerns with the widespread belief that 
only science and technology can reveal the truth.  Heidegger claimed in The Question 
Concerning Technology that technology is not merely fabrication:  “Technology is 
therefore no mere means.  Technology is a way of revealing.  If we give heed to this 
then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open up to us.  It is the 
realm of revealing, i.e. of truth.”  (Heidegger, 1977a, p 12)  
It is important to consider if Heidegger’s concerns about modern technology are 
related to the current emphasis on ‘know yourself’ that has become all important, and 
‘take care of yourself’ has become forgotten as an important method of revealing the 
truth.  Foucault gave several reasons why this has happened.  Today, we are more 
inclined to see taking care of oneself as immoral; instead, we should follow the rules 
which have been laid down by religious authorities, and/or the legal apparatus of the 
modern state.  In contrast to the early days of Christianity, the modern Church 
hierarchy requires that self-renunciation must be carried out as a necessary step on 
the way to Salvation.  To ‘know oneself ’, is the path to self-renunciation, today 
following the precepts of the Church or State is the only route to Salvation.  As well as 
these religious pressures which have led to the renunciation of ‘care of the self ’, 
modern philosophy from Descartes to Husserl has given primary importance to the 
thinking subject, promoting the cultural belief that to ‘know thyself’ is the important 
first step in the theory of knowledge.  In time, gnosis became the only route to 
knowledge, and to some extent became conflated with scientism.   As a result, 
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Foucault claimed that in modern times there has been a complete inversion between 
the two principles of knowledge, a re-evaluation of values.   
What did this ‘care of the self’ entail, the practice termed epimeleia heautou?  
Foucault described three main features, related to these practices.  These included 
concepts related to personal relationships; secondly, thinking for oneself rather than 
blindly accepting the predominant mores of society; and thirdly carrying out spiritual 
exercises such as meditation.  Foucault explained the three elements of the epimeleia 
heautou as follows:   
First, the theme of a general stand point, of a certain way of considering things, 
of behaving in the world, undertaking actions, and having relations with other 
people.  The epimeleia heautou is an attitude towards the self, others, and the 
world.  Second, the epimeleia heautou is also a certain form of attention, of 
looking.  Being concerned about oneself implies that we look away from outside 
to - - - - - I was going to say “inside”.  The care of the self implies a certain way of 
attending to what we think and what takes place in our thought.  The word 
epimelaiais related to melete, which means both exercise and meditation.  Third, 
the notion of epimeleia  also always designates a number of actions exercised on 
the self, actions by which one takes responsibility for oneself, and by which one 
changes, purifies and transfigures oneself.  It involves a series of practices most 
of which are exercised that will have a very long destiny in the history of Western 
culture, philosophy, morality and spirituality.  These are, for example, techniques 
of meditation, or memorization of the past, of examination of conscience, of 
checking representations which appear in the mind and so on.  (Foucault, 2005, 
pp 10-11) 
 
It is intriguing to consider the possibility that the renunciation of these kinds of cultural 
practice is linked in some way to the perceived dangers of modern technology.  In 
many of his studies, on prisons, hospital asylums and psychiatry, Foucault studied how 
man has become an object, like any other found in nature, to be used in modern 
industrial processes as an appendage to the machine in modern technology as Marx 
described in the nineteenth century. 
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This chapter has established the relationship between Foucault’s ideas on ‘’the 
technologies of the self’’ and Heidegger’s concerns about technology.  Both 
philosophers explored the idea that the danger from technology is associated with 
Being and Homelessness.  A fuller account of Foucault’s work on the aetiology of the 
epimeleia heautou  (care of the self) is given in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Foucault’s  Hermeneutics of the Subject - the genealogy of the epimeleia  
heautou. 
Introduction 
In this chapter we will investigate the various practices of the epimeleia heautou.  
Foucault argued that not only have they been lost to human conduct, but they also not 
been accorded a proper place in the historical record. (Foucault, 2005, p 3)  In his 
lecture course at the Collège de France in 1982, Foucault described a series of ancient 
practices which were termed the epimeleia heautou8.  His thesis in the Hermeneutics 
of the Subject was that the ancient practice of ‘to take care of oneself,’ had been 
obscured and displaced by the prevailing cultural imperative to ‘know yourself’. 
(Foucault, 2005, p 2) 
Heidegger believed that the history of mankind since the time of Plato had been an 
inglorious descent towards nihilism.  He felt that in the modern age we have become 
subject to technology controlling all aspects of our existence, including ethics.  
I believe that by placing such great emphasis on the abandonment of the epimeleia 
heautou after the Cartesian Moment around the time of Descartes, Foucault wanted to 
uncover how some of the early involvement with the spiritual aspects of life had 
                                                          
8
 It may be helpful to note here the definition of the epimeleia heautou. Foucault defined these 
‘techniques of the self’ as:  ‘Reflected and voluntary practices by which men not only fix rules of conduct 
for themselves, but seek to transform themselves in their particular being, and to make their life an 
oeuvre.’ (Foucault, 2005, p 61) 
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become lost.  Foucault wanted to construct a genealogy of the subject so that we can 
ascertain how this had come about.9 
By doing this, Foucault hoped to construct a new critical philosophy, a philosophy 
which included ‘techniques of the self’.  This ‘technique of the self’ would be added to 
the accepted techniques of production, signification and techniques of domination.  
The stakes for Foucault were high.  If this approach bore fruit, then Foucault would at 
the very least have found a basis for developing an explanation of how technology and 
empiricism have come to dominate all our lives. 
The gnōthi seaton (know yourself) was found by Foucault to be only one aspect of 
those ancient practices contained within the general framework of the epimeleia 
heautou.  He claimed that the gnōthi seauton, has only recently acquired the over-
riding importance which it has today. The primary goal in ancient times was to utilise 
and develop spiritual qualities in order to have access to the truth.  This culture of the 
self included a set of practices generally denoted by the term, askēsis.  In his lecture 
course at the Collège de France, Foucault claimed that the gnōthi seauton has reached 
such a privileged status that the practice of askēsis has been forgotten.  The 
movement towards the art of knowledge (connaissance ) being granted sovereignty 
over the practice of askēsis in gaining access to the truth, came about according  to 
Foucault in the seventeenth century. (Foucault, 2005, p 17) Let us therefore review the 
earlier practices associated with epimeleia heautou as set out by Foucault.                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                          
9 In ‘Subjectivity and Truth’ Foucault wrote: ‘‘In sum the aim of my project is to construct a genealogy of 
the subject- - -For Heidegger, it was through an increasing obsession with technē as the only way to 
arrive at an understanding of objects, that the West lost touch with Being.  Let’s turn the question round 
and ask which techniques and practices constitute the Western constitution of the subject, giving it its 
characteristic split of truth and error, freedom and constraint.  I think that it is here that we will find the 
real possibility of constructing a history of what we have done, and at the same time, a diagnosis of 
what we are.’’ (Foucault, 2007c, p 152) 
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Foucault’s Hermeneutics of the Subject 
Foucault’s aim in his work on the hermeneutics of the subject was to construct a 
genealogy.  This subject, concerned with ‘care of the self ’, had become lost to history.  
Throughout antiquity, the Pythagoreans, Plato, the Stoics, Cynics, and the Epicureans 
had all followed the same philosophical theme, access to the truth.  For these differing 
groups, the question of spirituality in relation to a transformation of the being of the 
subject was never separate from the quest for truth. 
The culture of care of the self included a set of practices designated by the term 
askēsis.  In its original Greek form, askēsis denoted a set of exercises, perfecting 
oneself; becoming who one is by a process of self-transformation mediated by 
thought.  As Christianity developed, askēsis came to be regarded as a form of self 
renunciation.  Originally, the practice of care for the self was, Foucault argued, a 
response to the problems associated with the proper running of the Greek city-state.  
The principle to ‘care for oneself’ became so widespread that it became a universal 
phenomenon in Hellenistic and Roman society.  However, these practices were 
followed by only a relatively small elite, and of course women and slaves were 
excluded from this particular ‘way of life’.   
Foucault argued that the early formulations of epimeleia heautou were started in the 
fifth century B.C. and continued for a thousand years, when Christianity came to the 
fore.  During the next thousand years the practices associated with epimeleia heautou 
were either discarded or transformed in order to meet the requirements of the new 
religion.   
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The Time of the Pre-Socratics 
Foucault gave two examples of what he termed ‘technologies of the self’ associated 
with Pythagoreanism. (Foucault, 2005, pp 48-49)   The first example which Foucault 
gave was the state of dreaming.  For the Pythagoreans, in order to prepare oneself for 
the divine world, one had to prepare oneself for the dream.  These preparations 
included listening to music, inhalation of perfumes and the examination of conscience.  
The principal function of the examination of conscience was the purification of thought 
before sleep.  It was not done in the modern sense of determining if one should enter 
a state of remorse.  It was carried out in order to purify thought before sleep.   This 
examination of conscience was carried out twice a day, a morning examination of 
conscience, and an evening examination. (Foucault, 2005, p 480)  
 The important point which Foucault wanted to make was that many of the practices 
which were written about by Plato, had been well established years before.  A 
fundamental theme of Platonism and Pythagoreanism was associated with the 
question:  “What work must I carry out on myself, what fashioning of myself, must I 
undertake, what modifications of being must I carry out to be able to have access to 
the truth?” (Foucault, 2005, pp 47-48) 
Without purification there could not be access to the truth possessed by gods.  This 
theme of purification was well known throughout ancient Greece and the Roman 
Empire.  The second technique was the search for methods to purify the soul.  The soul 
needed to be guarded from danger or dispersal, so that the soul would endure at the 
point of death.   
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Another technique was the technique of withdrawal, anakhōrōsis.  This practice was 
such that one had to disengage from the external world, so that all sensation is lost.  A 
fourth example, linked to the concentration of the soul, and withdrawal into oneself, is 
the practice of endurance e.g. of extremes of cold, or some kind of resistance to 
temptation.  According to Foucault, all these practices were, to some degree, in place 
before Plato’s time, although there is no contemporaneous written record of their 
work by the philosophers of the school of Pythagoras.   
James Luchte has made an interesting claim about the teachings of Pythagoras in 
respect of their spiritual practices searching for a path to the divine transmigration.  He 
linked this practice to Heidegger’s concept of man searching for a place to ‘dwell’. 
(Luchte, 2009, p 14) The search for ‘homecoming’, while existing in a state of 
homelessness and the search for a proper place to dwell, were all leitmotifs in 
Heidegger’s later writings. (Mugeraurer, 2008, pp 3-5)   Heidegger’s principal objection 
to modern technology was his belief that it has brought about the ‘Homelessness of 
Being’. (Heidegger, 1977b, pp 36-49)   Another important theme for Heidegger and 
‘Homecoming’ is that of remembrance, which had played a major feature in the 
philosophy of Pythagoras.  Heidegger called upon us to listen to poets such as 
Hölderlin and Rilke to help to overcome our homelessness, and facilitate 
‘remembrance’. (Heidegger, 1949, p 282)   For Heidegger, to ‘dwell poetically’ meant 
to stand in the presence of the divine and to be involved in the essence of all things.  It 
is obvious that poetry is written to be spoken aloud, which is in the tradition of the 
Pythagoreans.  Heidegger, by invoking the poets, was in actual fact recalling an ancient 
philosophical tradition.   One can now more clearly understand Foucault’s interest in 
the epimeleia heautou as an attempt to remember ancient practices concerned with 
‘homecoming’ in a Heideggerian sense.   His work on the ‘Hermeneutics of the Subject’ 
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was, after all, inspired by Heidegger.  Using this perspective of ‘homecoming ’, 
‘remembrance’ and ‘self –transformation’ as leitmotifs throughout a changing pattern 
of spiritual exercises in ancient philosophy, we can continue to explore Foucault’s work 
on The Hermeneutics of the Subject.  
 
The text which Foucault referred to in order to discuss the time of Plato was the 
Alcibiades.  Foucault felt that this work was important, because it was the first account 
of the practice of the epimeleia heautou.   
Alcibiades 
In the Apology, Socrates appears as a person who encourages others to care for 
themselves and put other people’s interests before his own. (Foucault, 2005, p 37)   
Socrates regarded his role in the practice of epimeleia heautou as fundamentally to act 
as a person who awakens others to the need to seek the truth by undergoing a 
transformation of the self.  Care of the self was clearly important to Plato, and 
Foucault argued that in the Alcibiades, Plato explored the link between epimleia 
heautou and potential action.  One should not govern, however powerful, 
knowledgeable or privileged one might be, if one does not practice epimeleia heautou. 
In the dialogue between Alcibiades and Socrates, it is pointed out that Alcibiades does 
not yet have the ability, a technē to govern the city state well.  Socrates points out that 
although privileged, Alcibiades has to remedy his educational deficiencies in order to 
promote action which is both sensible and just. (Foucault, 2005, pp 43-60)   The 
necessary education must be sought whilst Alcibiades is still young.   Later on, in both 
Epicurean and Stoic philosophy, the care of the self becomes a life-long obligation both 
to oneself, and to the community. 
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The education which Alcibiades lacks is two-fold.  First of all Alcibiades does not know 
what would constitute good government, and secondly, Alcibiades does not know how 
to ‘take care of himself’.  Alcibiades must therefore attend to a set of practices to 
transform his mode of being.  What is this ‘heauton’?  Foucault answers this question 
as ‘’psukhēs epimelēton’’ (one must take care of one’s soul).  (Foucault, 2005, p 53)   
This is found in many of Plato’s texts e.g. The  Apology, and the Phaedo, and even 
earlier, in fragments of the philosophy of the pre- Socratic philosopher, Heraclitus.  
There is now such an important claim made by Foucault that it is probably worth 
quoting:   
 
- - -when Plato (or Socrates) employs this notion of khrēsthai/khrēsis in order to 
identify what this heauton is  (and what is subject to it ) in the expression ‘’taking 
care of oneself’’ in actual fact he does not want to designate an instrumental 
relationship of the soul to the body , but rather the subject’s singular 
transcendental position, as it were, with regard to what surrounds him, to the 
objects available to him, but also to other people, to his body itself, and finally to 
himself.  (Foucault, 2005, pp 56-57)  
 
 
Foucault wanted to emphasize the point that when Plato refers to this notion of 
khrēsis, it is not a material substance under discussion, but rather the soul-subject. 
This notion of khrēsis is important as it was a key feature of the care of the self, even 
as it changed over the centuries; it was an important concept to both the Stoics and to 
the Epicureans.  For Foucault, the important feature of this practice was that the 
responsibility for khrēsis lay upon oneself alone.  It was not something that could be 
accomplished by simply following some rule of law or juridical precepts.   
Another example of ancient spiritual practices discussed by Foucault was the oral 
practice called parrhēsia.  (Foucault, 2005, pp 366-368)   This was the art of spiritual 
direction of a pupil, towards the truth, by a master or spiritual guide.  It involved 
frankness and truth-telling from the guide, and silence and concentration by the pupil.  
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The aptitude for spiritual development which someone had developed for this art of 
parrhēsia, distinguished one individual from another in terms of their ability to discern 
truth.  (McGushin, 2007, p 166)   This aspect of the ‘care of the self’ involved the care 
of others.10  Heidegger made continual references to listen to poetic guides such as 
Hölderlin and Rilke.  Could this exhortation to listen to the poets, to be silent and 
become receptive to truth, be regarded as a modern possible form of parrhēsia?   
The Golden Age of the Epimeleia Heautou 
The practice of care of the self flourished in the period of Roman Stoicism until the rise 
of Christianity.   (Foucault, 2005, p 81)   Foucault stressed the important changes which 
took place in the practice of epimeleia heautou from the time of the ancient Greeks to 
the time of first and second centuries A.D.  The care of others as the primary aim of 
epimeleia heautou as described by Plato in the Apology, became less important.   A 
practice developed of one’s own self becoming the focus of ethical concern.  From the 
post Socratics to the Stoics the art of living well became to be regarded as: “How must 
I transform myself so as to have access to the truth?” Plutarch, Epictetus, Seneca and 
Marcus Aurelius, taught and practiced the idea of ‘’turning your gaze upon yourself”.  
(Foucault, 2005, p 218)  This activity was a very different approach from the time of 
Socrates.  This inward gaze incorporated three areas of activity, studying nature, 
reading history and enjoying nature.  Plutarch recommended euthumia, tranquillity of 
the soul, by walking without taking an interest in the surroundings and suppressing any 
impulse to be curious.  One’s attention should be focussed solely on oneself.  
(Foucault, 2005, p 362)  However, this practice was quite different from the modern 
practice of regarding the self as an object for analysis or study. 
                                                          
10
 Foucault’s work on sexuality is an aspect of the ‘care of the self’ which could be a topic for further 
study.  (Foucault, 1988d) 
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The Stoics developed three techniques for looking after oneself, letters to friends, 
examination of oneself and conscience and the practice of askēsis. (Foucault, 2005, 
p 34)   The practice of askēsis was a process of seeking to recover the truth, a kind of 
remembering.  The Stoic practice of askēsis meant the development of mastery of 
oneself, by the acquisition and understanding of truth. (Foucault, 2005, p 34)  The 
ancient Greek word for this is paraskeuē, a form of preparation. (Foucault, 2005, 
pp 320-327)   Only as a result of askēsis can one find the truth which guides action.  As 
Foucault argued, alētheia, a hidden aspect of truth in Heidegger’s philosophy, became 
to be revealed by actions performed in the practice of askesis. 
The whole subject of care of the self for the Stoics was to prepare and be capable of 
sound action, rather than for the self being examined as an object of knowledge.  For 
askēsis to be practiced two poles of existence were present.  The first pole is one of 
meditation, one judge’s how one should act in an hypothetical situation.  Foucault 
claimed that the Stoics developed different types of meditations about the possibility 
of future mishaps. These meditations were called praemeditatio malorum 
(premeditations of misfortunes and evils).  
The praemeditatio malorum was an exercise to help equip somebody to cope with 
unexpected and unwelcome events. (Foucault, 2005, pp 468-472)    The first aspect of 
the exercise was to assume that if anything unfortunate could occur, then it will.  
Secondly, one should not think in terms of probabilities, or assess possible degrees of 
risk. The object of the exercise was just to consider an adverse event happening in the 
future as a matter of fact.  Finally, one should not think of these adverse events 
happening at some far off time in the future, rather, one anticipated that these events 
would occur without delay.  Foucault argued that the praemeditatio malorum was not 
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a training or exercise to prepare one for the future.  Instead, the effect was to seal off 
the future, a nullification of the future.  The praemeditatio malorum was a form of 
paraskeuē, by robbing the future of any fear that it might hold for us, its uncertainty 
becomes nullified, and one is in a better condition to cope with whatever fate might 
befall one.11 
For the Stoics, the opposite pole to the meditation the gymnasia was an exercise in a 
real life situation. (Foucault, 2005, p 37)  This kind of training might involve sexual 
abstinence, physical hardships, and other rituals of purification.  Between the poles of 
melete and gymnasia were a whole series of other exercises practiced by the Stoics.  
Epictetus provided two examples.  He employed the metaphor of the night watchmen 
over one’s own thinking, and the metaphor of the money changer, who verifies the 
authenticity of thought.  One would have to evaluate the rules of the age in which one 
lived and conform to cultural norms.  For the Stoics, the money changer metaphor 
meant something quite different from the Epicureans.  The evaluation in terms of 
finance meant that one try to ensure that one did not have a base motive when 
evaluating one’s thinking before making decisions and embarking on some kind of 
action.   
In addition to letter writing to friends, examination of oneself and askēsis, we must 
add a fourth.  This was the interpretation of dreams.  We have seen that dreams were 
very important to the Pythagoreans.   The dream was the test for a soul’s purity.  The 
state of dreaming was a separation of the soul from the body.  An example of the way 
by which dreams were interpreted is Cicero’s ‘Dream of Scipio’. 
                                                          
11 Interestingly, Foucault described the value of the praemeditatio malorum as follows: ‘’I think the 
objective of the praemeditatio malorum is to seal off the future through the simulation of actuality, to 
reduce its reality by stripping it down in imagination.’’ (Foucault, 2005, p473) 
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This evolution in the practice of care of the self by the Stoics, resulted in a number of 
features in place at the time of Alcibiades had disappeared, or had been relegated to 
being of minor importance.  At the time of Alcibiades, those concerned with the 
practice of epimeleia heautou were young aristocrats, destined to assume power.  The 
real focus of concern had been the maintenance of a successful city-state.   
At the time of the Stoics, being concerned about the self had become a general 
principle.  It was not confined to those of high status.  After the second century A.D., 
the practice of turning the gaze upon oneself involved spiritual exercises, with the 
subject looking inwardly to search for the truth.  This shift in the subject’s position 
gave the possibility of finding the value and true reality of nature and the world.  The 
goal was for spiritual knowledge being developed so that the subject could be able to 
see himself clearly in this reality.  Finally, the effect of this knowledge was to find 
freedom, and to find a mode of existence, or ‘way of life’, which is one of happiness 
and personal fulfilment.  Foucault’s thesis was that in the sixteenth-century and the 
seventeenth-century, this desire for spiritual knowledge (le savoir de spiritualite), 
became supplanted by an aspiration for intellectual knowledge (le savoir de 
connaissance), so that consequently new techniques were promoted and praised in 
order to reach new goals.   
What if one did not practice epimeleia heautou?  Seneca described such a person as a 
‘’stultus’’. (Foucault, 2005, p 131) Such a person would not attempt to instil a sense of 
unity in his life, to direct it and to take responsibility for it.  The ‘’stultus’’ type of 
person is open to all the vicissitudes of life, instead of trying to predict and prepare for 
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events or trying to will how one could live. The development of the ability to will 
properly is the important feature of epimeleia heautou. 
 
The genealogical approach of Foucault did not strive for a scholarly historical account 
of the past, which the great French authority on ancient philosophy, Pierre Hadot, had 
done.  Foucault had taken Pierre Hadot’s work as his inspiration for his work on the 
epimeleia heatutou.  The feature of Hadot’s work which Foucault pursued in his lecture 
course on the Hermeneutics of the Subject was Hadot’s characterisation of philosophy 
as a ‘way of life’ (Hadot, 1995)   Hadot’s interest was, in many ways similar to that of 
Foucault, to develop a concern for establishing a richer spiritual aspect of life for man 
in the modern age.   As Hadot was the acknowledged expert in France on ancient 
philosophy, it is relevant to investigate how his views might differ from those of 
Foucault.   
Hadot’s work on ‘Philosophy as a Way Of Life’ 
Arnold Davidson pointed out that Foucault owed a large debt to Hadot, because he 
had appropriated his framework of methodology when he prepared for the lecture 
course Hermeneutics of the Subject.(Davidson, 2005, pxxix, note 21)  It was Foucault’s 
encounter with Hadot’s work which led to Foucault embarking on a major project on 
the ‘care of the self’.   Hadot’s interpretation of much of the ancient world’s practices 
could be viewed as a kind of spiritual activity.  The practice of askēsis during the 
Roman era, corresponded to the time when the spiritual elements of life were 
foremost.  
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For Hadot, in ancient times there were two main poles of existence.  These were joy 
and conscience.  The pull of conscience is a pole of existence which drives one toward 
some kind of action, whilst joy is an embrace of life.  ‘Techniques of the self’ were 
directed towards enhancing both of these poles, so that one could function as a citizen 
in a particular form of life.  For Hadot, these two poles were present in many of the 
ancient ‘ways of life’,  but one pole would be emphasised  in some at the expense of 
the other e.g. The Stoics emphasised conscience and fortitude rather than pleasure 
and joy.  Hadot wanted to re – connect with the need for a Divine or Universal to help 
to direct the life of an individual and place it in a proper context.   
For Foucault, studies of the past could help with the process of self – transformation, 
which was one of the recurrent themes in Heidegger’s philosophy.  Hadot was rather 
scathing about Foucault’s attempt to establish a new spiritual aspect to existence - a 
new aesthetic.  He termed Foucault’s efforts as a ‘‘new kind of Dandyism – twentieth 
century style.’’  (Hadot, 1995, p 211)   However, in spite of these types of comments, 
both Hadot and Foucault were concerned about the neglect of the spiritual side of 
man’s nature in modern forms of life.  Hadot argued that philosophers in earlier times 
had practiced philosophy as a way of life; today it is a theoretical activity, practiced 
within universities. (Hadot, 1995, p 271)    Foucault instead concentrated on the notion 
that codes of behaviour have become methods of denoting a particular form of 
subject, required by those in power.   His interest in this process has led many to 
accuse him of only being concerned with power relationships, whereas in fact the 
pressures, histories, power relationships and what he termed ‘‘truth games ‘’ coloured 
his work throughout his life.  The Cartesian moment for him, represented the time 
when the imperative to ‘look after yourself’ became eclipsed by the imperative to 
‘know yourself’. (Foucault, 2005, p 14) 
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However, Hadot argued that Foucault was too concerned with aspects related to 
pleasure and introspection in his readings of ancient philosophy.  Edward McGushin 
pointed out that Hadot’s criticism was based on early works by Foucault such as The 
Use of Pleasure.  (McGushin, 2007, p 104)   Foucault effectively answered Hadot’s 
criticisms, in his lecture course on the Hermeneutics of the Subject.   In this work he 
showed that the care of the self in ancient philosophy did not mean pre-occupation 
with oneself.  The practice of the epimeieia heautou invoked care of others, concern 
and respect for nature and was a prelude to action.   
Hadot had devoted a chapter in his book, Philosophy as a Way of Life, on the methods 
of cultivation of the self discussed by Foucault. (Hadot, 1995, pp 206 - 213)    Hadot 
emphasized the importance that spiritual exercises had been in the past to one’s 
relationship to the community, nature, or the Divine.  The emphasis which Foucault 
placed on the self, Hadot felt was too narcissistic.  Secondly, Hadot queried the 
importance allocated by Foucault to the searching of memory, and analysis of past 
events.  In his view, the ancient ways of life were very much concerned with the 
present, and not so much worried about dwelling on past events.  However, Hadot in 
his book, Philosophy as a Way of Life, had not discussed the era of Pythagoras.  Luchte 
has made the point that remembrance was an important part of the philosophy of the 
Pythagoreans.  (Luchte, 2009, p 176)   Thirdly, Hadot argued that Foucault was wrong 
to develop the notion that a spiritual identity was developed by writing e. g. the 
Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, but instead the ‘techniques of the self’ were 
fundamentally concerned about changing oneself in order to be a proper and ethical 
citizen in one’s own social group who had developed a particular way of life. 
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Nevertheless, Hadot agreed with much of Foucault’s work that ancient practices were 
concerned very much with techniques of self-transformation, for which one took sole 
responsibility.  This ethical duty could not be set aside for others or the state to direct 
or impose.  The aim was to become an appropriate being in the world, acknowledging 
one’s place in nature with reason playing an important part in the processes of self – 
transformation.  Hadot wrote: “Thus all spiritual exercises are, fundamentally, a return 
to the self, in which the self is liberated from the state of alienation into which has 
been plunged by worries, passions, and desires.  The ‘’self’’ liberated in this way is no 
longer our egoistic, passionate individuality, it is our moral person, open to universality 
and objectivity, and participating in universal nature or thought.” (Hadot, 1995, p103) 
This view surely is very much in the tenor of Foucault’s thinking and conclusions in The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject.  The aim of the spiritual exercises, were to connect with, 
and accept, the mystery and wonder on the universe.  Hadot therefore traced the 
spiritual exercises as methods to help to bring about within a person a sense of the 
universal.    
Because Hadot was the accepted authority in France on the ancient world and its 
philosophical practices, it is important to draw to a conclusion what he felt about 
Foucault’s approach in The Hermeneutics of the Subject Hadot wrote:  “What Foucault 
calls ‘’practices’’ of the self do indeed correspond, for the Platonists as well as for the 
Stoics, to a movement of conversion toward the self.   One seeks to be one’s own 
master, to possess oneself and find one’s happiness and freedom and inner 
independence.  I concur on all these points.” (Hadot, 1995, p 211) 
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Hadot did express surprise, however, that Foucault had concentrated far more 
attention on the Stoics than the Epicureans.  The interest of the Stoics for Foucault, 
rather than that of the Epicureans, may have been because with the emergence of 
Christianity in the third and fourth centuries.  This new religion assimilated or modified 
many of the Stoic practices into Christian asceticism.   Foucault considered that this 
incorporation of the epimeliea heautou into the practice of Christianity was important 
and is the subject of chapter Four in this thesis.  
Stoics, Rules and Moral Behaviour  
Foucault stressed in his work on the epimeleia heautou the responsibility each person 
had to care for himself.  If in fact the Stoics followed inflexible rules of conduct and 
ethical judgement, then does not Foucault’s argument that the epimeieia heautou 
represented a completely different way of life from today, fall apart?  We need to 
examine if the reliance on rules guided decisions far too much for a claim to be 
sustained that the Stoics practiced techniques of the self which enjoyed independent 
rights to decide on what was the correct action to follow.  Brad Inwood has reviewed 
the whole topic of rules and moral behaviour in the Stoic society. (Inwood, 1999, 
pp 95-127)  Some modern philosophers have argued that the praecepta should be 
understood as rules and were meant to be interpreted for action by means of reason 
alone.  The issue to explore is, were these rules applied rigidly?  Inwood argued that 
The Stoic model of moral reasoning was dissimilar from what he termed: ‘’rule based 
deduction’’.  (Inwood, 1999, p 97)   
Inwood argued that the Stoics had a flexible practice of moral reasoning.  The Stoics 
distinguished between the wise man, and the ordinary individual.  The need for 
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someone to be able to make correct, independent decisions, depending on the 
particular circumstances pertaining at the time, was recognised by Ariston of Chios.  
The philosopher Julia Annas called the Stoic philosophy ‘‘the only explicitly intuitionist 
theory in ancient ethics ‘’. (Annas, 1993, p 102)   What the agent for moral reasoning 
needed to know was a set of tools for moral reasoning, for someone to use when 
trying to decide what course of action to follow.  This was the role of the praeceptae 
e.g . Cicero’s ‘Deofficiis ’discussed the theory of virtues in relation to action. 
As a result of a comprehensive examination of the rules in decision making in moral 
philosophy of the Stoics, Inwood came to the following conclusion:  The rules set out a 
theory of typology which described the kind of things which should be of moral 
concern, e.g. our relationship with other human beings.    The general rules provided 
the moral agent a framework in which to find a balance between an abstract theory 
and the demands of a practical situation.  So, Inwood’s work does not conflict with 
Foucault’s claim that the epimeliea heautou was concerned very much with spiritual 
values which strongly influenced how one responded to ethical rules and cultural 
norms.     
The Importance of The Hermeneutics of the Subject 
The opposition between the ancient and modern ways of life, was discussed by 
Foucault in terms of the interplay and relative importance of ‘care of the self’ as 
compared with ‘know yourself’.   Why did he do this?  He was engaging with 
Heidegger’s ideas on truth and Being.  He made this very clear at a lecture on 3rd 
February 1982:  “Not that many people have posed the question: what is involved in 
the case of the subject and the truth? - - - What is the subject of truth, what is the 
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subject who speaks the truth- - -I have tried to reflect on all this from the side of 
Heidegger and starting with Heidegger.”  (Foucault, 2005, p 189) 
 
Let us briefly review our understanding of the epimeleia heautou and where it might 
lead us.  First of all, Foucault has clearly established that there were ancient practices 
devoted to ‘care of the self’ in spiritual terms.  I believe that we can regard the various 
spiritual practices described by Foucault as ways of returning to Being, a kind of 
homecoming, a retreat from homelessness, a recurrent theme in Heidegger’s later 
writings. (Heidegger, 1993c, p 242)   In his description of the demise of the practices 
associated with the epimeleia heautou, Foucault seemed to be addressing Heidegger’s 
concerns about nihilism and the problems of metaphysics.  For Heidegger, metaphysics 
has forgotton that it is ‘homeless’, which resonates with Foucault’s description of the 
demise of the epimeleia heautou.    To recover from homelessness, Heidegger argued 
that we need to go back in history to discover the abandonment of Being.  (Heidegger, 
1999, p 51)   This surely is what Foucault set out to do.  
Frédérick Gros pointed out that Foucault did not present his lecture course on The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject as a new conception, but as the on- going principle of his 
entire work. (Gros, 2005, p 515)    Through his work on Stoicism in particular, Foucault 
wanted to learn about practices when the emphasis on knowledge, the gnōthi seauton 
was merely an integral part of the practice of epimeleia heautou.  Spiritual values have 
become lost with the increasing inexorable weight and emphasis placed on reason 
since the time of Spinoza.   
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CHAPTER 4 
Governmentality, Politics and Power 
Introduction 
In this chapter we will explore the role of the practices of confession and ideas on 
salvation in the development of ‘techniques of the self’ in the middle ages in Christian 
ideology.  This is important because salvation was pivotal in the process by which the 
epimeleia heautou became replaced by the gnōthi seauton as the most important 
characteristic of the ‘care of the self ’.  Foucault argued that the medieval promise of 
eternal life after death was a crucial factor in the development of modern versions of 
subjectivity and the modern types of power relations. (Foucault, 2005, pp 353–356)  
Foucault’s approach of discussing Christianity in the context of power relationships 
brings the important idea of salvation to the foreground of this discussion. (Foucault, 
2009, pp 165-185)  As the doctrines of the Catholic Church developed, salvation was 
portrayed as the route from the passage from the world of the corporeal body, to the 
life after death; in effect salvation held out the promise of spiritual journey.  Salvation 
as it developed became a new form of power.12 (Foucault, 2009, p 183)   These themes 
of the pastorate and salvation are important, because Foucault believed that they are 
the key to our understanding how the modern state came into being, and has become 
dependent on technology to sustain its power.    
Michael Zimmerman discussed Foucault’s point of view that Christianity had paved the 
way for current political ideas about security and the production of subjectivity.                              
(Zimmerman, 1990, pp 202-203)  Likewise, modern technological systems, in 
                                                          
12
 Foucault said that: ‘‘I will end by saying that with the Christian Pastorate we see the birth of an 
absolutely new form of power.’’ (Foucault, 2009, p 183) 
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Heidegger’s view, treat human beings as objects to be controlled.  However, 
Zimmerman pointed out that Heidegger himself had argued that the development of 
religious introspection had been responsible for the modern ‘will to power ’.13   
(Zimmerman, 1990, pp 168-182)   Thus Christianity had facilitated the development of 
modern technology with its power to determine the characterization of the modern 
subject. (Zimmerman, 1990, p 180) McGushin also agreed with Foucault, that the 
changes in the notion of salvation after the sixteenth century underlie the 
development of modern political power and the development of modern technology. 
(McGushin, 2007, p 213)   Salvation changed its nature, instead of being concerned 
only with the after- life, salvation in the modern age has become concerned with the 
material needs and security of a subject here on earth.   
Foucault pointed out that salvation has developed into an objective of philosophical 
analysis; it is not today regarded as a subject for the sole concern of religion. (Foucault, 
2005, p 182)   In this context, the philosopher Mary Midgley has written two books, 
Science as Salvation (Midgley, 1992) and Evolution as Religion. (Midgley, 1985).  Her 
argument was that today, science and technology have come to be accepted as being 
necessary for a subject’s salvation with respect to both security and power whilst living 
on earth. 
However in the medieval world, the Church regarded the corporeal body as being 
beset with sin and temptations, so that the path to the next life could only be granted 
if one had successfully followed the doctrines of the Church.  Confessional practice 
                                                          
13 See, for example Zimmerman’s interpretation of Heidegger’s views on Christianity and Technology:  
‘’Christendom could be of no avail in halting the technological Will to Power, because Christendom had 
helped to promote it.  By defining a ‘’true man’’ as one who was self-certain about his own 
righteousness and justification, Christendom had paved the way for the modern concept of security and 
salvation.’’  As we shall see, these views of Heidegger’s are very similar to the themes which Foucault 
developed in his later work on the ‘’technologies of the self’’. (Zimmerman, 1990, p 180) 
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played an important part in the enabling of a subject to make a successful passage 
from one world to the next.  This development of Christian doctrine in the medieval 
age, according to Foucault, was very different from that of Hellenistic and Roman 
times.  His work in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, and Technologies of the Self, 
referred to salvation in the ancient world as an activity, a way of life, rather than the 
medieval doctrine of promising the possibility of eternal life.  Salvation at the time of 
antiquity was a kind of training for living a life where one could obtain a mastery over 
oneself, and therefore be in a better position to cope with all the challenges and 
vicissitudes of fortune inevitable in any life.   One learnt how to could cope with the 
routine of the everyday, but also with unfamiliar challenging situations; there was no 
pre-occupation with the medieval fear of death.14 (Foucault, 2005, p 184) 
Christianity developed the doctrine of salvation to the idea of a boundary to be 
overcome, so the Christian who wanted to save his soul had to submit to some kind of 
examination (askēsis) where another person, the other, was needed.  This other 
person became the custodian of pastoral care.  We are now so used to this idea of 
salvation, that Foucault claimed we accept it philosophically.  It has become a cultural 
reality in the history of philosophy.   
Foucault explored the contention that salvation in antiquity was very different from 
the meaning accepted today.  One of the senses in which the term was used was to 
preserve oneself or perhaps others from danger.  This danger might be concerned with 
ethical practices of the society of the time.  Another concept was the idea of 
                                                          
14 Foucault wote: ‘’The person saved is the person in a state of alert, in a state of resistance and 
mystery, and  sovereignty  over the self- - -There is no reference to anything like death, immutability, or 
another world in the notion of salvation, found in the Hellenistic and Roman texts.” (Foucault, 2005, 
p184) 
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preservation, perhaps of the body itself, or ideas related to honour and one’s standing 
in the community.  Foucault’s fundamental point which he continually emphasized in 
his writing and lectures was that both the object and the means of salvation was 
oneself.  For salvation in antiquity, “you needed nothing and no one but oneself”.15 
(Foucault, 2005, p 184) 
Foucault in a conference paper at the University of Tokyo in 1978 gave a detailed 
description of the Christian development of salvation. (Foucault, 1999, p 115)   First of 
all, every Christian was expected to seek and prepare for salvation, it was not a matter 
of choice. (Foucault, 1999, pp 124-125)   Without salvation, punishment would become 
inevitable in the life after death.   Those who were thought to have rejected salvation 
along the terms set out by the church, or were deemed to be unworthy, might suffer 
punishment of the body here on earth e.g. the persecution of those deemed to be 
heretics during the Inquisition and the burning of witches.  The obligation to seek 
salvation and follow the teachings of the pastor gave the Church tremendous spiritual 
and moral authority.  The fact that everyone had to conform to the same kind of 
techniques for the operation of power meant that there was not only a curtailment of 
freedom, but the notion of a group of subjects who had to submit to authority of the 
Church – ‘the flock’.   
Secondly, the pastor was placed in a position to conduct surveillance and continuous 
control in order to ensure that no member of the Church could escape from the 
obligation to seek salvation.    
                                                          
15 Foucault claimed that ‘’ In what I will call this salvation of Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy- - - the 
self is the agent, object, instrument and end of salvation.’’ (Foucault, 2005, p185) 
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Thirdly, the pastor could command absolute obedience.  In Roman Times, although a 
person was subject to autocratic rule a Freeman would have repudiated the idea of 
total and absolute obedience to someone else.  In contrast, Foucault claimed that the 
absolute obligation for a Christian was to be obedient to the authority of someone 
else.  Foucault claimed that the Christian notion of humility as a virtue, was simply, 
surrendering all idea of ‘taking care of oneself’. The practice of epimelia heautou 
became discarded, instead virtue became the practice of unthinking obedience.  This 
obedience was claimed vicariously to be the will of God, the ground of everything.  
Finally, the pastor became the agent for the practice of a variety of various techniques 
for the elucidation the truth about a Christian subject.  A major technique which was 
developed, and still practiced today, is the practice of confession.  The examination of 
one’s owns conscience, became not a responsibility for oneself, but the responsibility 
of another Christian subject invested with some kind of authority from the Church.  
The pastor thus had the right to wield power as a result of what Foucault called 
‘‘games of truth’’.16 (Foucault, 1988c, p 16) 
The ancient philosophers were concerned with the nature of truth, but did not 
principally seek to determine the most intimate secrets, desires, passions of each and 
every human subject.  Salvation in the ancient world was concerned with the human 
body, instead of a means of salvation to another world.  In order to understand how 
the whole concept of salvation was promulgated, we need to consider the role of the 
confession as a mechanism to make a ‘subject’ obey God’s laws.  For Foucault the role 
                                                          
16 In this passage, Foucault explained what he understood by the notion of the word truth. In effect, 
Foucault argued that truth is political in nature:  ‘’The word ‘’game’’ can lead to error: when I say game, I 
mean an ensemble of rules, for the production of the truth.  It is not a game in the sense of imitating or 
entertaining---it is an ensemble of procedures which lead to a certain result, which can be considered in 
formation of its principles and its rules or procedures, as valid or not, as winner or loser.’’ 
(Foucault,1988c, p16) 
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of the pastor was the model of authority and power which was appropriated as the 
state evolved during modernity.  The work of the pastor in the evolution of Christianity 
will now be discussed in the light of Foucault’s philosophy.   
The Pastor 
The practices of confession and salvation were concerned very much with notions of 
examination in order to determine whether or not a Christian subject had been 
obedient.  The examination was the responsibility of the pastor.  The scope, nature 
and temporality of the examination resulted in the practice of surveillance - the 
shepherd was responsible for looking after the flock.   
The other important feature of ‘care of the self’ during this period was the dualistic 
nature of man, a corporeal body with a soul which ultimately belonged to God.  The 
‘body’ became an object to be ordered, regulated and observed as the body was the 
origin of sinful desires which were held to offend God.  As Zimmerman pointed out, 
the body came to be regarded as an object, the subject of knowledge. (Zimmerman, 
1986, pp 47-48)  The practice of gnōthi seaton came to be the principle which enabled 
access to truth, not the ancient practice of epimelia heautou.   The theme of obedience 
was highly developed as integral to seeking God’s approval, but these themes were 
present in the Hebrew tradition, even in the Old Testament.  Zimmerman argued that 
by understanding ourselves as objects, which is true of mankind today, we repudiate 
any possibility of what Heidegger termed an authentic mode of existence. 
(Zimmerman, 1986, pp 198-228)  
The practice of Christianity hindered the possibility of an authentic nature of human 
existence.  For a subject to be able to capable of an authentic existence, then he must 
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be able to make his own decisions about his life, he must be free.    Foucault in turn 
traced in the development of Christianity a gradual loss of freedom.  This loss of 
freedom has been of profound importance because it has been unperceived, and 
therefore dangerous.  If one wishes to challenge the notion of Foucault’s that 
Christianity was concerned with power, then the teachings of Paul of Tarsus in the 
Corinthians leaves one in no doubt that the early Christians were very much concerned 
with power. (Castelli, 2004, pp 19-38)   Let us consider the confession as a modern way 
of wielding such power.   
Confession as a Form of Parrhēsia 
In his early works such as The Birth of the Clinic and Discipline and Punish, Foucault 
showed, according to Edward McGushin, that the modern forms of the examination of 
a subject constitute a major technology for producing pliable individuals as objects of 
knowledge.  These subjects are willing and co-operative in the various types of control 
wielded by society.  As Heidegger pointed out in The Question Concerning Technology, 
‘‘everwhere we remain unfree’’. (Heidegger, 1977a, p 4)  McGushin agreed with 
Foucault’s thesis that these modern forms of examination have been derived from 
confessional practice as developed by Christianity. (McGushin, 2007, p 172) 
As opposed to the ancient Greek and Roman practices, when parrhēsia was a method 
when one discovered truth for oneself, Christianity subverted the earlier practices, 
whereby the subject had to be told what to believe and have to account for various 
sins and ‘passions of the flesh’.  Parrhēsia thus developed into a kind of juridical 
practice.   To be a true Christian one had to accept that no one was free from sin, and 
the pastor had the power to forgive sins and give guidance as to how salvation might 
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be attained.  With the strengthening of the exercise of pastoral power by the Christian 
church, McGushin argued that the practice of confession had resulted in a permanent 
renunciation of oneself; as a result one’s own freedom had to be surrendered. 
(McGushin, 2007, pp 164-172)    For Foucault, this development has led to the 
foundation of the modern disciplinary forms of power which we take for granted; as 
Heidegger pointed out, today we cannot conceive of living in any other way.17 
(Heidegger, 1977a, p 24)    
 As Jeremy Carette has pointed out, Foucault’s interest in Christianity was primarily its 
metamorphosis into the forms of political technology which have been accepted by 
the subject of today. (Carrette, 1999, p 4)  John Caputo claimed that Foucault’s work 
on theology was concerned with the question of how man has lost his freedom. 
(Caputo, 2004, pp117 – 139)  This loss of freedom was a topic which Heidegger had 
addressed in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’.  
As opposed to the time of Socrates when parrhēsia was a method of arriving at the 
truth by giving an account of actions, possibilities and events to oneself; the practice of 
confession became transformed where one had to give an account of the truth to 
someone else- the pastor.  The Christian penitent had during confession to produce a 
history of sins committed and desired, and have his future actions guided by spiritual 
values coming from God.  Parrhēsia thus became both a form of juridical practice but 
linked with guidance as to one’s future conduct.  The powerful motivation to submit to 
this type of parrhēsia was the promise or assurance of salvation.   
                                                          
17
 The relevant passage is: ‘‘The essence of modern technology starts man upon the way of that 
revealing through which the real everywhere , more or less distinctly, becomes standing reserve’’.   
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James Bernauer argued that Foucault in his various writings and lectures described 
three quite distinct phases in the way by which ancient practices of parrhēsia were 
incorporated into Christianity. ( Bernauer, 2004, pp 77 – 97)  The first phase was the 
time of Judaism.  In the same way that the Greeks practiced parrhēsia, it was a 
willingness to have the courage to tell the truth and to be open and honest both with 
oneself, and with others.  However, in Judaism, parrhēsia also meant that one had to 
open to the word of God, and be prepared to be guided in one’s actions in life. The 
practice of parrhēsia in time became to be classed as a form of communication 
between God and man, in many of the ancient biblical texts, e.g. descriptions of such 
encounters with God by Moses, or Abraham. 
The second phase of the practice of parrhēsia took place during the time of Christ and 
the period when the Gospels were written.   In the New Testament, parrhēsia is not 
spoken of as divine revelation, rather it became to be a way of life which embraced an 
unspoken confidence in God’s will – thus the beginnings of the human subject realising 
that obedience was an essential requirement for salvation.18 (Foucault, 2009, p 207-
208)  Parrhēsia as a way of subjecting oneself to God’s will was not without danger.  
Foucault termed parrhēsia   ‘Fearless Speech’. (Foucault, 2001)  The early Christians 
were prepared to sacrifice their lives to the opposition of the Roman Empire.  Bernauer 
pointed out that this willingness to tell the truth as one saw it, during this time, was 
very similar to the notions and practice of the Greek parrhēsia. 
                                                          
18 Foucault developed the surprising argument that Christianity is not an ascetic religion.  For example, 
Foucault claimed that: ‘‘Asceticism is a sort of exasperated and reversed obedience that has become 
egoistic self-mastery.  Let’s say that in asceticism there is a specific aspect that denies access to an 
external power’’.   Throughout the history of Christianity he argued that there has been a tension 
between asceticism and the pastoral requirement for a true Christian to always remain obedient to the 
source of power. (Foucault, 2009, pp 207-208) 
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The third phase was developed during the period of Christian asceticism.  The positive 
meaning of parrhēsia embraced the notion that one could oneself encounter God and 
therefore had a responsibility to believe that one could be heard by God e.g. by prayer.  
As time went on, the principle of obedience to God’s pastors and representatives here 
on earth became more and more important.  Rather than for a good Christian seeking 
to be open and truthful by trying to communicate with oneself by self-examination, or 
trying to communicate with God, the religious authorities encouraged the practice of 
parrhēsia to cease.  The absolute ideal in this respect was for one to be totally silent.   
Christianity as it developed in the middle ages had two poles which created various 
tensions, some of these of course led to the Reformation.  One pole represented the 
love of God and the power of prayer − a form of parrhēsia.  The other pole which 
developed was the ascetic tradition.19 (Carrette, 1999, p 38)   Truth could only be 
found by someone promising to be odedient to God.   Access to this truth was 
facilitated by the pastorate, and one had to submit oneself to various kinds of 
examination; of these, confession became the most important practice.   
To sum up, pastoral power was described by Foucault as a power that was introduced 
into the West by Christianity.  This form of power took on an institutional form in the 
ecclesiastical pastorate.   The salvation of each and everyone concerned the saving of 
each member’s soul in the pastorate. This salvation depended on knowledge of each 
person, so spiritual concerns were occupied with regard to a human being as an object 
of knowledge.  Jeremy Carette argued that what Foucault was trying to do was to 
                                                          
19 Carrette argued that: ‘‘Foucault sees religion, alongside ideologies, philosophies and systems of 
metaphysics, as part of the mechanisms for controlling the functions of human life.  These ideas would 
later develop into Foucault’s conceptualization of religion as a political power and a ‘technology of self’. 
It shows how Foucault is interested not so much in religious beliefs, as in the practice or function of 
religion.’’ (Carrette,1999, p 38) 
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argue that in medieval times religion developed into a mechanism and model for 
political governance.  The practice of confession had to involve the permanent 
renunciation of oneself, of one’s own subjectivity.  As a result, this laid the foundation 
for modern disciplinary power and the development of modern technology to exercise 
this power in the most efficient way. (Foucault, 1997a pp 177 - 178)  Foucault was 
surely here addressing the problem of which Heidegger wrote about in ‘The Question 
Concerning Technology’, what is the essence of modern technology, and how did it 
arise?20  In 1979, the theme of religious power as a ‘technique of the self’ was the topic 
of the Tanner Lectures given by Foucault at the University of Stanford.   It was at these 
lectures that Foucault put forward his ideas on pastoral power and political rationality 
–how the modern state orders the truth for its subjects.  It was by introducing the idea 
of governmentality, that Foucault linked the production of the modern subject who 
accepts that he is to be told what is be taken as true and what is false, as a natural 
development of the Christian pastorate.  He had developed this theme in his lecture 
course Security, Territory and Population which he delivered in 1977 at the Collège de 
France. (Foucault, 2009, pp 163-185)  Foucault in his analysis of modern political power 
detailed a complete change in the practice of parrhēsia.   He described this 
development as due to the development of Christianity. (Foucault, 2009, pp 163 – 185)  
This is such an important strand in Foucault’s work on the technology of the self that it 
needs to be explored in some detail.  
 
                                                          
20 Foucault said: ‘’I will end by saying that with the Christian pastorate we see the birth of an absolutely 
new form of power. - - -It is  also a prelude to governmentality through the constitution of a specific 
subject, of a subject whose merits are analytically identified, who is subjected to continuous networks of 
obedience, and who is subjectified through the compulsory extraction of truth.’’  (Foucault, 2009, p 183-
185) 
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Security,Territory, Population – the Pastorate to Governmentality 
Foucault devoted much of this lecture course at the Collège de France to the 
development of the pastorate by the Church and its role in developing the perception 
of the human subject as an obedient object.   The development of the obligation to tell 
the truth to the pastor, an official of the Church, became more and more highly 
developed in the medieval period.  By means of the refinement of existing practices, 
the process of confession became to be used as a means to examine a subject’s 
conscience.  A new technology of the self was created, and a new kind of subjectivity 
was formed. 
Foucault’s goal was to uncover the origins of the operations of power of the modern 
state, and the source of the authority to wield such power. In his earlier works such as 
The Birth of the Clinic, and Discipline and Punish, Foucault had investigated the 
development of the ways by which power had come about in modern medical practice 
and prisons.  In order to gain a more fundamental understanding of the development 
of power relations, Foucault wanted to draw out the more general themes of power 
relations by means of a strategic analysis.   A major theme which he developed in 
Security, Territory, Population, was that the way in which modern political power had 
developed had been profoundly influenced by Christianity.  (Foucault, 2009) 
The pastorate was based on the metaphor of a shepherd-flock relationship.  Pastoral 
power as an important factor in the renunciation of the self was outlined in his lecture 
course ‘Society, Territory and Population’. Foucault wrote:  “This form of power so 
typical of the West, and unique, I think, in the entire history of civilizations, was born, 
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or at least took its model from the fold, from politics seen as a matter of the sheep-
fold.” (Foucault, 2009, p 130)  
The shepherd was responsible for the guidance and protection of the flock. This theme 
of the shepherd was a recurrent theme in the biblical tradition.  In respect of the 
development of governmentality, Foucault identified what he considered to be a 
number of important features of the pastorate.   
The first important feature is that the power exercised by the shepherd was meant to 
be beneficial to the members of the flock, and the responsibility was not territorial in 
nature. (Foucault, 2009, p 125)   Wherever a Christian subject chooses to go, the good 
shepherd still has a responsibility for him.  The beneficial power adopted by the pastor 
is exercised not for his own self-aggrandisement, but for the salvation of the flock, 
God’s subjects.   One of the duties of the good shepherd is to keep watch over his 
flock. The better the surveillance technique could be carried out, then the more 
chance that the lost sheep could be found again.  If necessary, the good shepherd had 
to be prepared to sacrifice his own welfare, in order to save a soul from eternal 
damnation.  Pastoral power was not developed as a role requiring strength and the 
ability to dominate others; rather the task required devotion to God and the ability to 
maintain an all-encompassing vigilance.    
The second theme which Foucault developed was that the Christian Church, as it 
developed, presented itself as a pastoral organization which exercised a type of 
beneficial power for its members. (Foucault, 2009, p 126)   The pastorate developed 
over several centuries.  The overwhelming interest for Foucault was the emphasis put 
on absolute obedience to the pastorate as an essential requirement for the salvation 
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of the soul.  Christian obedience did not mean obedience to the law, but subordination 
to a cleric who was God’s official here on earth.  Commensurate with the requirement 
for a true Christian to be subordinate, was the principle of humility.  To be humble was 
a virtue which would facilitate the possibility of salvation.  As a corollary to humility 
was the suppression of one’s own will, one’s whole way of life now had to be directed 
by another.  Foucault contrasted the Christian need to be humble with the Stoics 
practice of apatheia, which meant that one had obtained mastery of oneself - a goal 
throughout life. (Foucault, 2009, p 178)   Instead, Christianity embraced the notion of 
pathē, a renunciation of egoism, the wish to command oneself.  In the earthly life this 
humility was not expected to lead to any benefit, or reward. 
This practice of subordination was such an integral aspect of the pastorate, that the 
pastor became obligated to his flock.  The role of the pastor as it developed was one of 
providing a service to others.  This was a completely different principle from the 
ancient Greek and Roman concepts of office, where one exercised power as an official 
from above.  The pastor himself had a whole variety of duties, including the teaching 
of the scriptures. The inability of the pastor to exercise his mind freely to ideas of his 
own meant that he too, was subordinate, through a hierarchy, to the will of God.  
For a humble Christian subject, the requirement was for one to be willing to accept 
spiritual direction, for the whole of one’s life.  For this spiritual direction to take place 
one had to renounce the idea of examining one’s conscience for oneself.  The truth 
about oneself and the ethical value put on them had to come from the pastor.  Hence 
the examination of conscience was changed into a technique of subordination. In 
terms of the development of modern forms of government, and various types of 
power relations, Foucault emphasized the increasing requirement for absolute 
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obedience.  This requirement for subordination had, in Foucault’s view, three 
important outcomes for the development of governmentality, the exercise of power 
by a global, totalizing institution, namely the modern state. (Foucault, 2009, 
pp 108-109) 
The first point is that the subject freely agrees to be obedient, it was not a legal 
obligation backed up by various legal sanctions.  As Foucault claimed “Christian 
obedience is not an obedience to a law, a principle, or any rational element 
whatsoever, but subordination to someone because he is someone.”   (Foucault, 2009, 
p 175)  
The second interesting point which Foucault made is that the relationship is never 
finalised, at least in the world of the corporeal body. (Foucault, 2009, p 183)  The result 
of the complete subordination to the pastor in this life here on earth, was the 
inculcation of absolute humility, and the agreement that the route to truth was under 
the jurisdiction of the pastorate.  Pastoral power, in Foucault’s view, denied any 
possibility of an affirmation of the self, but instead the destruction of one’s 
opportunities for self-determination.  
Thirdly, the pastor had to deal with the problem of truth.  There was a need for the 
pastor to guide and teach the flock.  This teaching involved two new important 
principles.  The first mode of teaching required the subject to give an account to the 
pastor of one’s daily conduct.  The subject had to agree to submit all aspects of one’s 
life to examination, be prepared for continual surveillance and to undergo rigorous 
cross examination during the process of confession.  Everything that a subject might 
want to do, or wish to do, was subject to scrutiny. 
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The second principle of teaching was that the pastor was expected to direct the 
subject’s conscience.   This practice of the examination of conscience was very 
different from that in antiquity.  The Stoics, for example, had developed techniques of 
self-mastery and to enable one to cope with the circumstances of daily life.  The 
Christian pastorate insisted upon the subject being willing to accept spiritual direction.  
The examination of conscience became a process of subordinating oneself to someone 
else’s will.   
So, surprisingly, the Christian pastorate according to Foucault is not of interest 
‘‘because of its relationship to the law, salvation or truth’’.  (Foucault, 2009, p 183)   
Instead, the importance of Christianity resides in the way that modern forms of power 
were developed and exercised in the production of absolute obedience and the 
recognition that the truth and access to it lay not in the mind of the human subject but 
in a form of power which would remain hidden from them.  Thus the pastorate 
developed a new form of power which was the prelude to the way that power is 
exercised by the modern state.  (Foucault, 2009, pp 181-185)  The ancient imperative 
to ‘take care of yourself’, was gradually being supplanted be a form of authority which 
was nurtured on the imperative to ‘know yourself’.   
 McGushin pointed out that Foucault’s work pursued the thesis that salvation, after the 
sixteenth century, evolved into a new meaning: the well being of life.  The focus of 
salvation became the well being of the body of a human subject, its health, 
productivity and material well-being. (McGushin, 2007, p 221)   Before moving on to 
discuss governmentality and technology, the role of the body in philosophical 
discourse which describes a subject is pertinent. 
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The Body 
In the course ‘Abnormal’ at the Collège de France, Foucault argued that the body was 
the focus of opposition to the dogma of Christianity.  He argued that our bodies are 
constituted by culture. (Foucault, 2004, pp 212 -213)   here is no such thing as a 
‘natural body’; it is changed from one era to another as a result of changes which have 
occurred as a resulted of altered power relationships.  St. Augustine regarded the body 
as the centre of the threat of forces to disrupt the control of the soul by the pastorate. 
(St. Augustine, 1961, p 164)  He was concerned that the body was the focus of lust and 
disease5)   Of course, women have traditionally been regarded as agents of lust and 
danger and therefore have been vilified throughout Christianity.  (Winguaards, 2001, 
p 85) 
The Christian ideas about morality developed on the basis of the practice of confession 
and the repudiation of the body.  The result was a negation of freedom.  Rules had to 
be obeyed as the codes of obedience became more highly developed.  At times in the 
history of the Church refusal to obey the rules led to overt expressions of a powerful 
response in the form of the Inquisition. Joseph Perez described the great importance 
that the Holy Office of the Roman Catholic Church placed on public confessions and 
repentance. (Perez, 2006, p 165)    Those who refused to obey the rules were deemed 
to be heretics, and worthy of punishment to the corporeal body.  What is important to 
realise is that the burning of heretics and similar punishments, were carried out in 
order to ensure the subject’s salvation.  The concern was the saving of souls from 
damnation, not for the benefit of those wielding the power to destroy the earthly 
body.  Incorporated into the practice of the Inquisition were methods to detect magic 
and witchcraft.  The supposed evil practices of witchcraft were deemed to be 
78 
 
perpetrated solely by women, who were consistently denied the opportunity to 
become priests, act in the role of confessor, or take part in any major way in the 
activities of the Catholic Church.  About 1000 years after Christianity had developed, 
priests were not allowed to marry, have children and engage in any sexual activity 
whatsoever.  Women are still denied the priesthood in the Catholic Church.  The words 
‘‘silent and invisible’’ have been used by Susan White to describe the history of women 
in Christian worship. (White, 2003, p 9) 
Priests in the eighth-century were allowed to marry, although the Bishops had to be 
celibate.  It was in the eleventh century, that the drive for the repudiation of the body 
really began in earnest.  It was in 1123 that the First Lateran Council forbade every 
cleric of the order of Sub-dean or above, to marry.  Women’s bodies have been more 
vulnerable to extremes of cultural pressures than men, as a result of beliefs associated 
with temptation, pleasures of the flesh, magic and witchcraft.  Women were also held 
responsible for diverting attention away from spiritual values and the salvation of the 
soul.  Christianity, in Foucault’s view, has instituted a whole set of regulatory and 
disciplinary practices associated with the control of the body.  Foucault developed the 
concept that ethical behaviour could only be attained by what he termed ‘‘docile 
bodies’’, subjects willing to be obedient and be under supervision and surveillance. 
(Foucault, 1991, pp 135 - 169) 
The importance of the bodily dimension to Foucault’s philosophy was that there is not 
an ultimate truth to be found in the investigation of a subject, but rather that the 
subject has been created throughout history as a result of changing cultural practices 
and beliefs.  The ancient practice of askēsis was moulded by Christianity to produce 
compliant subjects, who renounced the body and sought to obey the direction from 
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the pastor.  Daniela Vallega-Neu pointed out that Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, is a 
being with a body and thinking always occurs within the body. (Vallega-Neu , 2006) 
Foucault approached human existence ‘from without’ and neither Foucault’s nor 
Heidegger’s   approach was rooted in the construct of a purely thinking subject.   
Although Christianity focussed attention onto the immortal soul, it was on the body 
that disciplinary practices were carried out.  In the age of modernity, governmentality 
in Foucault’s philosophy is directed at the Cartesian ego, instead of the Christian 
concept of the soul.  The work of Descartes was instrumental in the concept of the ego 
and the next chapter is directed principally how Foucault thought that it facilitated the 
formation of the modern subject.  
Govermentality and the Essence of Technology 
I would claim that Foucault’s work on the development of religious practices during 
the medieval period of history provides an account of how the practice of epimeleia 
heautou became sublimated by the practice of the gnōthi seaton.  The subjectivity 
required by the Catholic Church meant that a Christian subject became an object of 
knowledge.  As Foucault explained in ‘Return to Morality’,  “I tried to locate three 
major types of problems, the problem of truth, the problem of power and the problem 
of individual conduct. These three domains of experience can only be considered in 
relation to one another, not independently.” (Foucault, 1988e, p 243) 
 In relation to technology, Foucault proposed that ‘techniques of the self’, should be 
investigated as a possible important element in the control of technology.  The 
technologies of domination and surveillance were themes which Foucault identified 
himself in his work on the pastorate.  The topic of governmentality, according to 
80 
 
Foucault’s perspective, refers to the application of technologies of domination in 
relation to the technologies of the self. (Foucault, 1988, p 19)  It was Christianity which 
transformed the ancient practices of the care of the self, the epimeleia heautou. 
(Foucault, 1988c, p 9) 
What, then, is the essence of technology, the question raised by Heidegger?  It is not 
technological, it is not the objects and mechanical instruments of technology which are 
important. (Heidegger, 1977a, p 20)  In his work on the pastorate, Foucault identified 
two important features which surely are important in respect of the essence of 
technology.  These are obedience to a source of power, linked with the understanding 
that one always must account for one’s actions and accept, or even welcome, a life of 
continuous surveillance.  Heidegger described modern technology as enframing, a 
form of revealing the truth, and of course the pastorate was concerned with truth.   
For Heidegger, everything, including man has become a standing reserve, a resource to 
be regarded as available for domination and for study. (Heidegger, 1977a, p 24) 
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CHAPTER 5 
Descartes and the Development of Cartesianism 
Introduction 
In the Hermeneutics of the Subject Foucault claimed that the ‘Cartesian Moment’, 
represented a period of gradual change when philosophy became disconnected from 
spirituality.  The gōthni seauton gradually became more important as a ‘care of the 
self’ than the practices of epimeleia heautou, which eventually was disqualified as a 
method of discovering the truth.  Foucault made it clear that Descartes had been a 
seminal figure in the process of the development of modernity, with an increasing faith 
in science as a guide to conduct and the shape and organization of society:  “Before 
Descartes, one could not be impure, immoral and know the truth.  With Descartes, 
direct evidence is enough.  After Descartes we have a non ascetic subject of 
knowledge.  This change made possible the institutionalization of modern science.”  
(Foucault, 1997b, p 279) 
Foucault pointed out that Descartes’ work on the ego had been important in the 
rejection of spirituality by philosophy: “So the liquidation of what could be called the 
condition of spirituality for access to truth is produced with Descartes and Kant: Kant 
and Descartes seem to be the two major elements.”  (Foucault, 2005, p 190)  
As Modernity developed, Cartesianism, according to Foucault, came to be defined as 
an accepted method for gaining access to the truth, but is merely knowledge, 
(connaisance) of a set of objects. According to Foucault, as time has gone on, the 
notion of spiritual access to the truth has been lost.  The study and knowledge of 
objects has become man’s primary pre-occupation.  The knowledge and manipulation 
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of these objects (technology), has assumed primary importance, with man as merely 
another object to be studied and ordered about.  Since the time of Descartes there has 
been an enormous cultural shift in man’s relationship to nature and to himself. 
Both Foucault and Heidegger considered that the influence of Descartes and Kant had 
been profound in the genesis of modern technology. Before a summary of their views 
on this development is given, a brief account of Descartes’ philosophy of the ego is 
necessary. 
Descartes and the Ego.   
Descartes developed the notion that man is a thinking substance, hence introducing 
the concept of dualism; and the belief that matter is extension in motion. (Descartes, 
1986) To contemporary ideas of science, this dichotomy of mind and body is 
untenable, yet it has been very influential with regard to how modernity views the 
world.  Descartes’ novel idea is often encapsulated in the phrase: cogito sum, ‘‘I think, I 
exist’’.   The importance of Descartes’ work in the Meditations for Heidegger‘s work, 
was the development of the modern ideas about subjectivism and the world of nature.  
All beings, including human beings, other than the thinking, seeing subject, become 
objects.  Hence all knowledge is to be found in the form of some kind of information 
about objects.  This information about objects can only be known if it fits into a 
conceptual scheme of the knowing subject.  The ego cogitans, has become accepted in 
the modern age as the basis of all knowledge.  Heidegger saw technology as a natural 
result of a modern type of subjectivism which limits the understanding of human 
existence to be accounted for solely in the material world of objects, their 
organization, and the forces which can arrange and control objects. 
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There are a few points about the Meditations that need to be outlined before a 
discussion of both Foucault and Heidegger’s views on Cartesianism.   First of all, 
Descartes established the idea that reason based on empirical observation should be 
the authority for all knowledge, and so was instrumental in the abandonment of the 
ancient practices of ‘care of the self’, described by Foucault in The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject.   It is somewhat ironic that the Meditations, a key work in the development of 
modernity, should have been based on ancient spiritual exercises, which modernity 
has done so much to discredit. (Foucault, 1997b, p 278)  Secondly, the Meditations are 
founded very much on arguments and reasoning which assume the existence of God, 
while  the Enlightenment and modernity have placed philosophical reasoning in  a 
position of repudiating such reliance on a supreme deity. Robert Scharff has pointed 
out that many of the features of modern concepts of Cartesianism, often bear little 
relation to Descartes’ reasoning in the Meditations.21   (Scharff, 2006, p 496)  Modern 
philosophy, according to Heidegger, is very much based on a picture of the world 
which is termed ‘Cartesianism’, but which is different in many ways from Descartes’ 
original ideas. 
Thirdly, the truth rule proposed in the Fourth Meditation opened up a methodology 
for the practice of science, which is the subject of a later chapter in this thesis, as 
science and technology are very much inter-related.   Modern Cartesianism has 
become the basic stand point of analytical philosophy in its classical sense.    The 
primary focus of modern Cartesianism is the language and structure of scientific 
knowledge related to objects.   Heidegger’s concept of man as a being-in the world is a 
                                                          
21 Descartes complained that during his lifetime, his work had been misinterpreted: ‘‘I should like to 
take this opportunity of asking future generations never to believe that I am the source of opinions 
people may tell them are mine, unless I have myself published them.’’  (Descartes, 2006, p 57) 
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very different and challenging viewpoint from the typical Cartesian position.  It is 
because both Foucault and Heidegger rejected this rather limited view of life that we 
must now discuss their concerns in more detail. 
Cartesianism, and How Man Sees the World 
McGushin claimed that Foucault’s work was influenced by Descartes from his History 
of Madness to his final lectures on the ‘care of the self’. (McGushin, 2007, p 175)  The 
importance of Descartes work was the development of a new kind of subjectivity, 
based on truth and reason.  Descartes, in his Discourse on Method, repudiated the 
ancient practice of parrhēsia, and began a project which has led to a new relationship 
between the human subject and knowledge. (Descartes, 2006)  McGushin pointed out 
that part 6 of the Discourse on Method was regarded by Foucault as being crucial in 
the development of what is now termed Cartesianism.   Descartes introduced the new 
idea of man being able to understand how to obtain a mastery over nature.  
(Descartes, 2006, p 51)  Foucault claimed that:  “- - -the extraordinary thing in 
Descartes texts is that he succeeded in substituting a subject as founder of practices of 
knowledge for a subject constituted through practices of the self.” (Foucault, 1997b, 
p 278) 
McGushin argued that the effect of Descartes work was to change the whole way in 
which man sees himself in relation to nature.  The modern subject sees the world in 
the form of cogito, sum, ‘’I think, I am’’.  (McGushin, 2007, p 194)    The importance of 
Descartes for Foucault was that the concept of the cogito has led to various ways of 
accumulating power as a result of new kinds of knowledge.  Beatrice Han in her article: 
‘The Analytic of Finitude and the History of Subjectivity’ pointed out that the Cartesian 
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concept of a subject’s relationship to power and knowledge had led to three major 
consequences according to Foucault. (Han, 2005, pp 194-195)   These were detailed in 
The Hermeneutics of the Subject as a renunciation of spirituality as being fundamental 
in order to gain access to the truth; what one might regard as the move towards 
modern scientific practice; and finally the epimeleia heauton became of less 
importance than the gnōthi seauton.   The rejection of spirituality in relationship to a 
search for the truth was, in Foucault’s judgement, begun by Descartes.  (Foucault, 
1997b, p 280) 
The Cogito and the Unthought 
In his book, The Order of Things, Foucault included an essay entitled:  ‘Cogito and the 
Unthought’. (Foucault, 1994b, pp 322 - 328)  In this essay, Foucault argued that man as 
an empirical object of study cannot reasonably posture as possessing the sovereign 
power of the cogito.  This essay argued that Descartes work on the cogito was merely 
concerned with a rather limited objective to explain the sources of error and illusion 
and therefore be better placed to guard against such sources of error.  The modern 
concept of the cogito has changed radically from Descartes’ lifetime, and is still subject 
to a variety of interpretations and assumptions.  In a world of objects, man is more and 
more as just another object for study and control, and this was the theme of his 
lecture course on The Birth of Biopolitics.  (Foucault, 2008)  The modern form of 
reflection has been established in such a way that spiritual values have been excluded 
from the modern cogito.   Because modern forms of thought have no morality, the 
spiritual dimension to life has become, for Foucault, ‘‘the unthought‘’.  This is because 
the modern ideas of the cogito reflect the notion that knowledge and power do not 
rely on a moral dimension to thinking, as objective ’facts’ are held to be true 
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irrespective of spiritual values.  Foucault disputed in ‘The Cogito and the Unthought’ 
the truth of the proposition linking ‘‘I think’’ to the evident truth of ‘‘I am.’’  For 
Foucault, neither Cartesianism nor Kant’s work properly address man’s being in the 
‘unthought,’ – a whole realm of spiritual aspects of man’s being which is neglected or 
ignored by concentrating analysis on objects and a world of factual knowledge. 
In this essay on the cogito, Foucault also attacked the value of phenomenology.  
Interestingly, Heidegger is never mentioned, although Husserl figures prominently in 
the discussion.   The substance of Foucault’s problem with phenomenology is that it 
consistently resolves any analysis into an empirical view of the world and human 
existence which cannot properly address those aspects of life which Foucault termed 
‘‘the unthought.’’  The effect of Cartesianism has been to establish the relationship 
between the self and itself solely in terms of knowledge.  However, Foucault 
challenged the principle that a human subject can both be the cogito and an empirical 
subject. 
In an interview ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics’ Foucault emphasized the break with the 
practice of askēsis to seek the truth. (Foucault, 1983, p 252) Descartes effectively 
charted a path whereby scientific rationality would be divorced from ethics.  Foucault 
claimed that what Kant had attempted in part of his work was to re-introduce some 
form of ethics into philosophy by formulating a universal standard of conduct 
supposedly under the guise of rationality.  It is now appropriate to discuss Foucault’s 
views on Kant in relation to the cogito. 
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Foucault and Kant’s Philosophy 
Foucault believed that Kant had built his whole philosophical edifice on elaborating 
Descartes’ ideas on the ego.  Foucault wrote an essay entitled ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’ (Foucault, 2007b, pp 97-119)   In this paper, Foucault commented on 
Kant’s own paper which had been published in 1784 with the same title.  According to 
Foucault, Kant had described the Enlightenment as a movement which was enabling 
man to free himself from Christian authority, and the necessity to demonstrate 
obedience, because reason would be the mechanism for determining knowledge 
which would be used to guide society as it developed over the future.  Thus Kant’s 
perspective was that the Enlightenment was a continuing process of liberation.   
In his work on prisons, psychiatry, sexuality, medicine, etc., Foucault had devoted 
much of his work in seeking to investigate power relationships.  Technology had been 
used to facilitate the establishment and maintenance of power relationships, and 
Foucault did indeed address these issues in this particular article on Kant.  He pointed 
out that the result of technology had intensified the use and capacity of power by the 
state and certain elements of society, and posed an important question: how can the 
growth in this capacity for power brought about by technology properly be used?  
(Foucault, 2007b, pp 115-116)   The era of the Enlightenment had given way to that of 
modernity, by which time these issues of power and technology had intensified. 
 Foucault also directed his attention to the replacement of spiritual values and the 
practice of askēsis by reason and the creation of the new philosophical concept of man 
by Kant.  Foucault claimed that before the eighteenth century, ‘man’ as an object of 
philosophical enquiry did not exist. (Foucault, 1994c, pp 303 - 343)  In his book The 
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Order of Things, Foucault wrote that: ‘’man was constituted at the beginning of the 
nineteenth-century.”   (Foucault, 1994c, p330) 
 
 
Han agreed with Foucault’s proposition that Kant’s philosophical heritage rests upon 
the same basis as Cartesianism.  (Han, 1998, p 162)  Askēsis has become abandoned as 
a way of life, and as a method of conducting a search for the truth.  Philosophy has 
become an academic activity principally devoted to epistemology and the knowing 
subject, with empiricism based on the concept of the cogito guiding any search for 
truth. 
Kant’s three critiques (The Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason and 
The Critique of Judgement) have been a powerful force in the development of the 
modern critical attitude to philosophy which Foucault termed ‘the ontology of the 
present’.    McGushin summarized in his book, Foucault’s Askēsis, Foucault’s attitude to 
Kant.  (McGushin, 2007, pp 253-255)  As a major philosopher, Kant had been the prime 
mover in the development of a whole new set of power relations, what society 
became to regard as normal or acceptable conduct, and a new relationship of the self 
to the self.  In Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant developed the idea of 
the ‘‘categorical imperative,’’ a universal rule or moral edict which should be followed 
by everyone. (Kant, 1993b, p 30)    One can see how such a principle would lend itself 
to legal force and be a powerful tool for those exercising power, with technology being 
a useful tool to ensure compliance.   This type of development did not seem to have 
been anticipated by Kant.   
In an interview, Foucault was challenged by Dreyfus and Rabinow to respond to the 
view that the classical nature of the self had been lost, or possibly transformed. 
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(Foucault, 1997b, p 277 - 280)    Foucault replied that there had been a problem of 
how to forge a relationship between ethics and the modern theories of knowledge 
which had developed after the work of Descartes.    The major figure who had 
attempted this had been Kant, with his Critique of Practical Reason. (Foucault, 1997b, 
p 279)  Kant had tried to re-interpret old ideas into a new format, based on practical 
reason.  The ‘self’ is not given, but has to be constituted in relationship to itself as a 
subject. (Foucault, 1997b, pp 279-280)    In this respect, Han has pointed out the fact 
that Foucault did have quite different views from Kant.  At the time of the Ancient 
Greeks, action or intention did not in itself, constitute morality; the constitution of the 
subject was also important:  “Thus Foucault doubly takes the opposing perspective to 
Kant by affirming the impossibility that the Greeks would have understood morality 
independent of the quality of the moral subject and have defined this quality 
independent of his actions.’’(Han, 1998, p 159)  
Heidegger and Descartes 
Descartes was important for Heidegger because he is the foundation of our scientific 
view of the world and is the basis of modern Cartesianism, which underpins our view 
of how things really are and how events come about.  Heidegger repudiated such 
common sense views which underpin the perspective that human existence is solely 
one of a subject/object relationship.  Descartes understood the world as a 
metaphysical concept based on the idea of extension, which is fundamentally a spatial 
property, therefore Being is associated with the concept of permanence.  Heidegger 
asserted in The Introduction to Metaphysics that “spirituality” is an important aspect of 
man’s existence. 
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 He wrote:  “Spirit is neither empty acuity, nor the concommittal play of wit- - -nor 
even reason, but rather spirit is originally attuned, knowing resolution to the essence 
of Being.” (Heidegger, 2014, p 54) 
 Jacques Derrida claimed in his book Of Spirit that spirituality was a central feature of 
Heidegger’s philosophy.  (Derrida, 1994, p 79)  Descartes’ assumptions determined the 
appearance of phenomena, rather than letting them appear as they really are.  For 
Heidegger, the world is grounded in the way that Dasein exists. 
In his essay, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, Heidegger linked the metaphysics of 
Descartes to the idea of man as a rational being. (Heidegger, 1977d, p 152)   He 
complained that man conceives of everything in terms of technology, controlling and 
dominating everything, including man.   Cultural values have become associated with 
objects, and, Heidegger argued, it is only a short step to values becoming only 
appreciated or understood if represented as objects. (Heidegger, 1977d, p 142)     
Heidegger described how our thinking about Being and beings has been transformed 
by Descartes into representing driving everything into the unity of a particular object. 
(Heidegger, 1977d, pp 150-151)    The connection with technology is fundamental, as 
Heidegger claimed that:  “Machine technology remains up to now the most visible 
outgrowth of the essence of modern technology, which is identical with the essence of 
modern metaphysics.” (Heidegger, 1977d, p 116)  
The fundamental problem of the modern age for Heidegger is that human existence is 
governed by a very limited view of the world. Because of the emphasis on a world 
depicted as a picture, thinking can only be driven and guided by representation.     
Heidegger’s contrary view was that we cannot define Dasein’s ontological constitution 
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with the aid of self-consciousness, but instead he built a philosophy around a structure 
of existence. (Heidegger, 1982, p 174)    Heidegger emphasized in Being and Time, that 
man in the world, Dasein, is constituted not simply by self consciousness, but by 
engagement with other beings.  He wrote: “Proximally, it is not ‘I’ in the sense of my 
own self that ‘am’, but rather, the Others, whose way is that of ’’they’’.  In terms of the 
‘’they’’ and as ‘’they’’, I am ‘given’ proximally to myself.” (Heidegger, 1962, p 167)  
For Heidegger, existence includes a world of other beings, imagination, and 
temporality.   The problem created by Descartes is that he concentrates everything 
onto the all seeing ‘’I’’. (Heidegger, 1962, p 167) Michael Zimmerman summarized 
Heidegger’s position:  “The self validating subject (the ego is sure of its own existence), 
which is permanently present because it accompanies all its representations, now 
becomes the ground and standard for everything.  Man assumes God’s place in the 
great chain of Being.”  (Zimmerman, 1981, p 209)  
Heidegger also criticized the depiction of self as a form of unified awareness, which 
can accompany the representations in ‘I think’; he had no doubt that human beings are 
conscious, but he refused to make such self-consciousness the ground for selfhood.  
My ‘self’ is always my openness and involvement with other beings in the world. 
(Heidegger, 1962, pp 317-325)  Western man, as the centre of all representations, has 
come to look upon existence as necessarily anthropocentric, and naturally, has set 
about mastering it. (Heidegger, 1962, p 211) 
Charles Guignon, pointed out that the crucial decision made by Descartes was to 
determine the ground of understanding as lying in the self-certainty of the knowing 
subject.  With this shift in the conception of Being, the anthropocentrism and 
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subjectivism of the modern age began to dominate how man perceives human 
existence.  This is the essence of the technology of the modern age. (Guignon, 1983, 
pp 11–38) 
 
Kant and the Problem of Technology 
Laurent Verseyni argued that Heidegger’s critique of Kant was centred on the fact that 
the self, the thinking subject, becomes the ground for all thought. (Verseyni, 1965, p 
66)  As a result of Kant’s influence, Being has become to be construed as an object for 
a thinking subject, so that objectivity is now established in the modern age as the 
ground for Being, certainty and truth.  It is in his later work that the important role 
which Kant’s tremendous influence on philosophy and culture has led to the problem 
of Modern technology.  In his book, What is called Thinking, Heidegger argued that 
without Being, then:  “Kant’s thinking would have no place in which to make even a 
single statement of his ‘Critique of Pure Reason’.”   (Heidegger, 2004, p 234) 
Heidegger here also makes the important point that our pre-occupation with the 
nature of human existence as being thought of as the control and ordering of nature is 
the hidden essence of technology. Taylor  Carman argued that Heidegger’s thinking 
with respect to his rejection of empiricism as the basis of human existence, was not so 
much neo- Kantian, but rather ‘‘Anti-Kantian through and through’’.  (Carman, 2010, 
pp 131-127) 
In the ‘Question Concerning Technology’, Heidegger used an example of a silver chalice 
to illustrate the fallacy of the belief that simple empirical observation will reveal all 
that is meaningful about such an apparently straightforward object. (Heidegger, 1977a, 
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pp 6–10)   Both the shape and the silver material, are necessary for the construction of 
the vessel.  However, also important are ideas associated with consecration and 
bestowal, with the silversmith being the agent to fashion the object into the required 
form.  In, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, Heidegger developed his theme that the 
structured image of the world is one of man producing and dominating nature, which 
is only thought of in terms of empirical  objects.  (Heidegger, 1977, pp 115–151)   
Cultural values having become debased, human values are transformed into objects 
themselves:  “Value is the objectification of needs as goals, wrought by a representing 
self-establishing within the world as a picture.”  (Heidegger, 1977d, p 142) 
Heidegger’s concern is that ‘’The essence of consciousness is self consciousness.’’  
(Heidegger, 1977c, p 100)  Nature appears everywhere to be present as merely a series 
of objects for technological domination. The whole world is perceived as a result of 
objectifying nature as a resource to be utilised and man’s nature set on dominating all 
that exists. In his essay on Nietzsche, Heidegger claimed that:  “Nature appears 
everywhere – because willed from out of the essence of Being – as the object of 
technology.”  (Heidegger, 1977, p 100) 
Foucault in his work on The Hermeneutics of the Subject, argued that at the ‘Cartesian 
Moment’, at the time of Descartes the ideas pertaining to the ‘care of the self’ were 
gradually superseded by the overriding importance granted to knowledge and 
empiricism.  The building of Kant’s monumental work on metaphysics has according to 
arguments presented by Heidegger resulted in a distorted world view.  This is because 
of the reliance on empiricism to determine the limits of possible experience.  Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason was not a treatise on knowledge, rather a study of how 
knowledge could be made possible.  (Kant, 1993a)  It has facilitated an empirical and 
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limited view of existence, with the result is that we live in a technological age, 
enframed by technology, yet seemingly oblivious of that fact.  The greater our ability to 
dominate nature, the more it appears that knowledge based on empiricism is not only 
productive and useful but the only possible way by which we should conduct our lives.  
According to Heidegger, scientific practice is to a major extent subservient to a 
technological world-view and it is to science that we now direct our attention in the 
next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Heidegger, Science and Philosophy 
The Nature of Thinking 
Perhaps Heidegger’s attitude to science can be encapsulated by his remark ‘‘science 
does not think’’. 22  (Heidegger, 1993, p 373)   In his lecture series entitled: What is 
Called Thinking, Heidegger made it clear that we need to learn to think in order to 
establish the essence of modern technology, which keeps itself hidden.23    (Heidegger, 
1976, p 26)   He argued that science cannot properly reveal the truth about the major 
elements of what shapes man’s existence, such as history, art, poetry, man, language, 
or God.  (Heidegger, 1976, p 33)   These subjects are what thinking should really be 
concerned about.    
In his work, Being and Time, Heidegger introduces us to the concept of Dasein – a 
being in the world.  (Heidegger, 1962, p 32)    In the discussion of Heidegger’s views on 
science, the interpretation which I will employ is one that is due to Einar Øverenget, 
Dasein refers to a human being, whose life in the world is shaped and determined by 
existence.  (Øverenget, 1998, pp 105-107)  The concept of Dasein as a being in the 
                                                          
22  Heidegger wrote: ‘’ ‘This situation is grounded in the fact that science itself does not think, and 
cannot think - which is its good fortune, here meaning  the assurance of its own appointed course.  
Science does not think.  This is a sobering statement.’’ (Heidegger, 1976, p 373) 
 
23
 Heidegger argued that: ‘‘This one – track thinking, which is becoming ever more widespread in various 
shapes, is one of those unsuspected and inconspicuous forms, mentioned earlier, in which the essence 
of technology assumes dominion – because that essence wills and therefore needs absolute univocity.’’ 
(Heidegger, 1976, p 26) 
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world is important, as Heidegger developed the concept of two modes of existence, 
authentic or inauthentic. 
 Heidegger posed the question: ‘’- - -what is it that commands us to think?’’  
(Heidegger, 1976, p 122) His answer was being thoughtful, which is an engagement 
with Being, rather than a process of intellectual activity often associated with 
calculation.  Thinking as a call to becoming closer to Being – an abandonment of 
homelessness, or estrangement from Being as a manifestation of meaning, requires 
one to be receptive to new ideas, rather than to engage in attempts to gain 
knowledge.  (Mugerauer, 2008)   The problem of homelessness, the modern condition 
of man, is the real danger from the activities of modern science and technology. The 
emphasis on knowledge, which dominates the present age, was castigated by 
Heidegger.  The explanation, in Heidegger’s view, lies in the lack of immediate practical 
usefulness, of an ability to exploit technology:  “Thinking does not bring knowledge as 
do the sciences.  Thinking does not produce usable practical wisdom. Thinking solves 
no cosmic riddles. Thinking does not endow us directly with the power to act.” 
(Heidegger, 1976, p 159) 
In total opposition to Kant, Jarava Mehta agreed with Heidegger’s view that reason is 
the most pernicious opponent of thinking.24  (Mehta, 1976, p 247)   A scientist of 
course, claims to be a rigorous exponent of the practice of reason, in order to 
understand the world of nature.  However, Trish Glazebrook argued that there is an 
ordering principle which determines the way in which scientific experiments are 
                                                          
24
 Here, Mehta quotes Heidegger’s comment from the Holzwege , p247: ‘‘Thinking only begins when we 
have realized that reason, elevated for centuries into a position of supremacy, is the most pertinacious 
opponent of thinking’’. (Mehta, 1976, p 247) 
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organized. (Glazebrook, 1994, p 250)    Nature is projected as behaving in such a way 
that repeatability and ordering can be observed, it is an artificial and contrived 
experience. (Glazebrook, 1994, p 242)   In Being and Time, Heidegger claimed that 
there are ‘no bare facts’ to be uncovered.   He wrote:  “In the mathematical projection 
of nature, moreover, what is decisive is not primarily the mathematical as such; what is 
decisive is that this discloses something a priori.”   (Heidegger, 1962, p 414) 
In his essay, Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics, Heidegger pursued these 
ideas. (Heidegger, 1993d, pp 271-305)   However, the important conclusion which 
Heidegger argued in this essay was that a decisive change had occurred in the way that 
the ordering principle lay behind the various representations in which nature was 
conceived.  Instead of nature and its organization and revealing being within the 
power of God, Descartes had initiated the development of reason coming to be 
regarded as having the highest ground.  Although a devout Christian himself, Descartes 
work subsequently displaced God as the foundation of all things, by a Cartesian ‘self’.   
Heidegger concluded in ‘The Age of the World Picture:  ‘’We first arrive at science as 
research when and only when truth has been transformed into the certainty of 
representation. What it is to be is for the first time defined as the objectiveness of 
representing, and truth is for the first time defined as the certainty of representing, in 
the metaphysics of Descartes.’’ (Heidegger, 1977d, p 127)  
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Heidegger and the importance of Being for Science 
The fundamental ontology for Heidegger was the question of Being, and this is a 
necessary first step before empirical statements can be made about science.  
Heidegger’s Being and Time contains many of his early ideas on the limitations of 
science, although its primary focus is the whole question of Being.  Heidegger 
distinguished between the study of being, which is ontological enquiry, and ontical 
knowledge brought about by the study of entities.  The fundamental difference 
between these two quite different types of study was termed by Heidegger the 
ontological difference. (Heidegger, 1982, p 319)   The understanding of this existence 
requires an attempt to come to a better relationship to Being.   Science, as practiced 
today, is primarily focussed on objects and their relationships; it is merely a type of 
secondary, or ontic knowledge.  In section 7 of Being and Time, Heidegger wrote:  
“Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities; yet it pertains 
to every entity.- - -Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every 
possible character.”  (Heidegger, 1962, p 62) 
Modern science ignores the concept of Being as advocated by philosophers such as 
Heidegger.  The pre-Socratic philosopher, Parmenides, was Heidegger’s source of 
inspiration for his work on Being.  (Heidegger, 1992, pp 1-6)    Heidegger developed the 
idea that, instead of regarding thinking and Being as essentially the same, instead 
thought and Being belong together, because the essence of thought is the disclosure 
of Being. (Heidegger, 1968, pp 199-207)    In the Introduction to Metaphysics, 
Heidegger explained that:  “All scientific thinking is just a derivative and rigidified form 
of philosophical thinking.  Philosophy never arises from or through science. - - -only 
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poetry is of the same order as philosophical thinking, although thinking and poetry are 
not identical.” (Heidegger, 2014, p 29) 
What Heidegger developed in his philosophy of Being was the view that it could not be 
regarded simply as a way of presenting, appearance, empirical knowledge, or thinking.  
Vick in his discussion of Heidegger’s rehabilitation of Parmenides ‘’Being’’ argued that 
Heidegger in his account of physis, or standing forth, developed the concept that 
becoming, appearance and thinking are methods by which Being might present itself. 
(Vick, 1971, p 149)    In ‘What Calls for Thinking’, Heidegger answered the question: 
‘‘What is it that calls us into thought?’’ as the disclosure of Being, entrusted to us as 
our essence, by the call of Being.  (Heidegger, 1993e, pp 369-391) 
Heidegger helpfully clarified what Being is not, in his book, Basic Concepts. (Heidegger, 
1998, p 57)  It is not a person, or an object, rather it seems to denote in Heidegger’s 
philosophy some kind of relationship between man and the world, which influences 
human existence – man’s essence. This emphasis on what one might term ‘spiritual 
qualities’, is reminiscent of the epimeleia heautou described by Foucault in The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject.   
Heidegger in his essay  ‘What is Metaphysics?’  deplored the fact that science does not 
want to be involved with Being.  He wrote: “Science wants to know nothing of the 
nothing.  But even so it is certain that when science tries to express its proper essence 
it calls upon the nothing for help.  It has recourse to what it rejects.”  (Heidegger, 
1993a, p 96) 
Heidegger’s ideas on nothing were surely stimulated by the earlier work of Nietzsche.  
For example, in The Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche wrote:  “The characteristics which 
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have been given to the ‘true Being’ of things, are the characteristics of non-Being, of 
nothingness–the real world has been constructed from the contradiction of the actual 
world: an apparent world- - -.”  (Nietzsche, 2008a, p 19) 
Jarava Mehta argued that the Aristotelian question “Why is there something, rather 
than Nothing’ enabled Heidegger to explore the question of Being, in a form of enquiry 
which repudiated an analysis based on pure reason, or scientific data.”  (Mehta, 1967, 
pp 316-319)  In his essay ‘What is Metaphysics?’ Heidegger wrote “But in our inquiry 
concerning the nothing it has by now become manifest that scientific existence is 
possible only if it holds itself out into the nothing- - -The presumed soberness of mind 
and superiority of science becomes laughable when it does not take the nothing 
seriously.” (Heidegger, 1993a, p 109) 
Heidegger’s approach to Science 
Heidegger developed a questioning attitude to science.  His concern was that since the 
Enlightenment, all aspects of human existence have become subjected to a manner of 
discourse couched in terms of reason.   In his famous ‘Letter on Humanism’, Heidegger 
rather facetiously compared the power of science to the idea of trying to determine 
the essence of a fish by examining it on dry land.  He developed the metaphor that 
science has stranded thinking onto dry land.  He wrote:  “Philosophy is hounded by the 
fear that it loses prestige and validity if it is not a science.  Not being a science is taken 
as a failing that is equivalent to being unscientific.  Being, as the element of thinking, is 
abandoned by the technical interpretation of thinking.”  (Heidegger, 1993c, p 219) 
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However, he acknowledged the power of science to reveal empirical facts:   
The sciences are fully entitled to their name, which means fields of knowledge, 
because they have infinitely more knowledge than thinking does.  And yet there 
is another side in every science which that science can never reach - - -the 
essence and essential origin of its sphere, the essence and essential nature origin 
of the manner which it cultivates, and other things besides.   (Heidegger, 1976,    
p 33) 
 
 
 As time has gone on, reason itself has gradually become to be the prerogative of 
science with scientific methodology used to substantiate claims about truth.  Moral 
and aesthetic questions are today studied under the framework of psychology or 
sociology, with these disciplines employing a ‘scientific’ methodology wherever 
possible to substantiate their claims.  (Kockelmans, 1985, p 3)    Instead, according to 
Heidegger, the correct path to pursue was to initiate an ontological inquiry, before 
ontic objectification; his entire early philosophy was the investigation of fundamental 
ontology. Heidegger claimed in the Introduction to Metaphysics that all science is in 
principle merely an aspect of philosophy. (Heidegger, 2014, p 29)  
Quite a few philosophers since Heidegger have entertained the notion that 
technological imperatives are the motivating force behind scientific advances. Don  
Ihde, for example, in his book Philosophy of Technology, argued that modern science 
was practiced very differently from the Ancient Greeks; today science is embodied in 
technologies and instruments. (Ihde, 1993, p 74)  Heidegger’s approach to science was 
to involve:  “- - -developing the pre-ontological understanding of beings (which is 
already necessarily implied by the sciences) in an investigation into and the science of 
being i.e. ontology.”  (Heidegger, 1997, p 25) 
However, there is a problem for the uncovering of an ontology, because Heidegger 
admitted that it cannot be established in a purely ontological manner: ‘‘- - - ontology 
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has an ontical foundation’’. (Heidegger, 1982, p 19)   In this way, it is Dasein as a being 
in the world that becomes the initial focus of his enquiry. Thus Dasein is the basis for 
whom being is an issue.  It follows that ontology cannot be established in a purely 
ontological way.  For Heidegger, ontology becomes arcane when an enquiry does not 
begin within the temporality of Dasein’s existence that is dispersed into the ontic field.  
The critique of Heidegger’s with respect to the dangers from science and technology, 
was based on the anthropocentric nature of human existence which has resulted, with 
nature and the world being treated as a resource  to be used as man dictated.  Yet 
Heidegger himself in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology placed man as the central 
focus for his ontology.  (Heidegger, 1982, p122) 
Heidegger’s work on science was not directed at a critique of various scientific 
methodologies.  More fundamentally, Heidegger studied how modern science has 
played a major part in shaping how man in the technological age lives, thinks and 
views the world.  (Heidegger, 1977d, pp 115-154)  In The Question Concerning 
Technology, Heidegger makes the rather bold claim that science receives its impetus 
and direction from technological imperatives. (Heidegger, 1977a, p 21)  This is contrary 
to the view that it has been scientific advances which have led to many and varied 
technological applications.  Science is the servant of technology, not its master, so in 
order to be in a position to discuss Heidegger’s views on technology we will need to 
explore his ideas on science.  In his later work, Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger 
devoted a section on ‘Propositions about Science’. (Heidegger, 1999, pp 100-110)   He 
deplored the total lack of, in terms of his own philosophy, science advancing 
appropriate questioning about existence.  Heidegger claimed that as science serves the 
imperative of technology, so that every perceived need of man is to be met, the result 
of which is an existence of total boredom. (Heidegger, 1999, p 109)  
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Heidegger disputed the notion that science and reason are sufficient to determine the 
shape of man’s existence. The substance of Heidegger’s critique was what had become 
to become accepted in the age of modernity as knowledge and truth.  The primary 
importance which science had given to rational thinking had pictured empirical 
observations into forms of representation in such a way that Being eludes its grasp.  
This theme was pursued by Heidegger in his essay, ‘The Age of the World Picture’.  He 
wrote: “the fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as a 
picture.” (Heidegger, 1977d, p 134)   He complained that as a result of the picturing of 
the world as an opportunity to secure  objective knowledge  and the power which 
could result, to be explored and become known to science, man himself has become to 
be simply another subject of knowledge.  (Heidegger, 1977d, p 128)  
Aesthetics seems to have been for Heidegger the preserve of the non-scientist.  Much 
of science has been developed because of the perceived beauty of the ideas which 
were being developed; Einstein and Dirac were two physicists who had been 
captivated by the beauty of the equations which they had developed.25   Also, 
Heidegger did not consider serendipity as an important type of event which has led to 
major scientific advances, presumably because this type of consideration would not 
have conformed with his attack on science as being solely concerned with calculation.  
Darwin’s famous theory of evolution, a major event in the development of biology, had 
little to do with calculation.   Heidegger’s philosophy of science seems to have been 
very much focussed on mathematical physics, to the exclusion of biology.  
                                                          
25 Contrary to many claims of philosophers such as Popper and Carnap, aesthetic judgements do play an 
important part in scientific endeavour.  The physicist, Roger Penrose, has described how beauty and 
elegance have been driving forces in theoretical research in science. (Penrose, 2005, p 1038)   Brian 
Greene in his book ‘The Elegant Universe’ discussed the two great theories of twentieth century. 
physics, Einstein’s Relativity theory, and Quantum Mechanics. (Greene, 2000, pp 117-131) 
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Drew Leder summarized the account of science developed by Heidegger in his various 
writings as having three main concerns.  (Leder, 1985, pp 245-256)  First of all, the way 
in which the world is portrayed, as described for example in ‘The World as a Picture’, 
restricts and limits our understanding of Being and reality.  Secondly, the approach 
taken by science is grounded in the cogito, the ‘I think’, so that everything is to be 
founded on the basis of reason alone.  Knowledge is the key to understanding, not 
spiritual or reflective thinking.  This is reminiscent of Foucault’s arguments in the 
Hermeneutics of the Subject, where the ancient practices of the epimeleia heautou, 
were gradually supplanted by the gnōthi seauton. 
Thirdly, science on its own, based on empirical knowledge gained by the power of 
reason, can determine the ground and find an explanation for everything.   The belief 
that science is capable of being able to provide a totality of understanding for 
everything, with no place for philosophy or religion, has been claimed by scientists 
such as Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion. (Dawkins, 2006)   These claims have 
been addressed more recently by the philosopher Mary Midgley, in her book Science 
as Salvation (Midgley, 1992, pp 1-16) She discusses the ‘saving power’ of science, as a 
theme of modernity.  The power of domination over nature granted by science and 
technology has been accepted as proof, that together they alone can grant access to 
truth.  This feature of modernity is of course, what Heidegger deplored.   
Philip Kitcher has provided evidence to support the claim by Heidegger that modern 
science is dependent on technology, not the other way round.  He pointed out that 
over 90% of the world’s Biomedical research is directed to only 10% of the world’s 
population.  This small proportion of the potential beneficiaries of ‘fundamental 
science’, just happen to live in the richest nations. (Kitcher, 2001, pp 51-57)   
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Heidegger’s Confrontation with Heisenberg 
Werner Heisenberg was a famous German scientist of the early twentieth-century.  He 
was a leading theoretical physicist who discovered the famous ‘Uncertainty Principle’. 
This scientific ‘truth’ established that one could not determine at the same time both 
the position and momentum of an elementary particle (such as an electron) at the 
same time.  Advances in experimental science would make no difference to this result, 
as it was theoretically impossible for this principle to be violated.  Heisenberg’s physics 
was accepted by the scientific community and it is an integral belief to the modern 
understanding of Quantum Mechanics.  As a result of this new viewpoint or 
representation of the fundamental particles of matter, the subject/object conjunction 
of science, became blurred.  The behaviour of fundamental particles defies ’common 
sense’ and the whole way by which scientists approached their subject in particle 
physics became subject to a heated debate.   Albert Einstein, he who had shocked the 
whole world with his contention that matter and energy are manifestations of the 
same being, could not accept this new way of looking at the world.  He had a long 
running dispute with Niels Bohr, one of the founders of Quantum Mechanics, about 
the nature of reality.   (Kumar, 2008, pp 261-299) 
Heidegger’s views on science were now subjected to a new kind of challenge.  The 
relegation of science to empiricism and dominated by a blinkered view of reality, now 
had to accommodate the results of scientific endeavour which had forged an abrupt 
break with the past.  Heisenberg was very much a reflective scientist, who engaged in 
discussions and arguments with Heidegger.  In his book entitled What is a Thing?  
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Heidegger claimed that Heisenberg thought about scientific problems in a 
philosophical way.  (Heidegger, 1968, p 67)  
 A confrontation between Heisenberg and Heidegger was arranged at a meeting in 
Munich in 1954, which Cathryn Carson described in ‘Science as Instrumental Reason’.  
(Carson, 2010a, pp 483-496)   At his lecture, ‘The Picture of Nature of Modern Physics’, 
Heisenberg claimed that the recent developments in particle physics had blurred the 
distinction between science and philosophy.  He claimed that the way in which 
scientists picture the world, had resulted in man simply encountering himself.  Carson 
summarized Heisenberg’s position: 
 
- - -Modern physics had already made plain the impossibility of abstracting from 
human activity.  It had gone beyond the Cartesian separation of subject and 
object, no longer occupying itself with particle and motions in themselves.  
Rather than nature on its own, its object too, was nature as exposed to human 
posing of questions.  And these changes pointed, finally, to the appropriate 
course of action to take with respect to technology.  (Carson, 2010a, p 494)  
 
 
Heisenberg went on to claim that although the familiar foundations of science had 
been undermined, it was in a stronger position than before.  The implication for 
philosophy was to recognise that the foundation of technology had changed with that 
of science, and philosophers needed to address the new set of circumstances which 
faced them.   
Before moving on to discuss Heidegger’s response, it is appropriate to note some 
points about Heisenberg’s position.  What is remarkable is how much of Heisenberg’s 
views appeared to resonate with Heidegger’s ideas.  Both of them had communicated 
freely over the years.  Heisenberg included in his address notions about questioning, 
the unity of science and philosophy, and the view that man imposes his representation 
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of the world on science, according to pre-conceived theories.  What the challenge was 
for Heidegger to respond to was the abandonment by physics, science at its most 
fundamental level, of the Cartesian picture of the world.  Hans Seigfried explained the 
profound repudiation of Cartesianism as follows:  “The Cartesian dichotomy of res 
extensa and res cogitans – the clear separation of objective processes in space and 
time - - - and the mind, serves no useful purpose in modern physics.”  (Seigfried, 1990, 
p 629) 
Previously, much of Heidegger’s attack on science and technology had been mounted 
against Cartesianism, and much of the philosophical deference to the power of science 
to explain the world of nature, which had come about since the work of Descartes.  
Because the physicist was no longer simply an observer, but a participant, Heisenberg 
remarked that: ‘‘we encounter only ourselves’’.  In the ‘atomic age’ science had 
become the servant of an all pervading world view which was dominated by 
technology.  
How would Heidegger respond? Carson described the scene:  
 
When Heidegger entered the auditorium the evening after the physicist the 
stage was perfectly set’.  He took up the idea that science had become 
transformed by the new relationship between mass, or objects of some kind, and 
energy.  Just as the Cartesian picture of a simple subject/ object relationship had 
been superseded by the new physics, so too had the direction and power of 
modern technology.  Nature had become a form of standing-reserve (Bestand), 
as a result of a new kind of rationality and power available to man.  Heidegger 
claimed that: ‘—whatever man encounters exists only insofar as it is a human 
product.  This impression calls forth a final decisive aspect.  It appears that man 
encounters everywhere only himself.  Heisenberg has pointed out, completely 
correctly that, that the real must present itself in this way to man today.  
Nevertheless, man today in truth no longer anywhere encounters himself, that is, 
his essence.   (Carson, 2010a, p 494)  
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In Being and Time, Heidegger had argued that the essence of Dasein lies in its 
existence.  (Heidegger, 1962, p 67)  Charles Guignon has summarized quite clearly how 
Heidegger’s concept of essence evolved in his various writings.  It is Dasein’s place in 
the world which embraces the totality of existence, it is ‘‘his actual place within a total 
context’’.  (Guignon, 1983, pp 99-100)  
In his essay ‘’The Question Concerning Technology’, Heidegger had claimed that: ‘‘- - -
nowhere does man encounter himself, in his essence.’’ (Heidegger, 1977a, p 27)  This 
statement is of course, in agreement with his position in the debate with Heisenberg.  
Seigfried argued that Heidegger’s and Heisenberg’s philosophy of science are 
incompatible.  (Seigfried, 1990, pp 619-630)  This is because Heisenberg claimed that 
today man in the world only encounters himself, whilst Heidegger had claimed that 
man today no longer encounters himself. (Heidegger, 1977a, p 27)  The crucial point 
here is that Heidegger was arguing that if man creates technology, transforms the 
natural world around us, and projects through physics a picture which he has helped to 
create, then he has no possible way of finding his essence.  
Both Heisenberg and Heidegger agreed that the world is understood by man in a 
variety of ways which he has brought about himself, principally by technology, this 
gives man a form of power which he is reluctant to forgo.  The essay ’Science and 
Reflection’, summarizes this perspective.  (Heidegger, 1977a, pp 155-182)  However, 
Carson pointed out that Heisenberg was still trapped by a picture which”- - -remained 
in the ordering attitude characteristic of modern science.”  (Carson, 2010a, p 494)  
Even though both Heidegger and Heisenberg had corresponded for some years, 
Heisenberg still seemed to be unappreciative of Heidegger’s concerns about the 
danger from technology.   
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Trish Glazebrook pointed out that Heidegger’s philosophy had not been undermined 
by the advent of Quantum physics. (Glazebrook, 2000, p 250) Nature is still subject to 
some kind of mathematical projection and measurement which is arranged in advance 
by the experimental scientist.  As early as the preparation of Being and Time, 
Heidegger had claimed that science depended for much of its power on mathematical 
ideas.  (Heidegger, 1962, p 195) The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in fact set out 
the idea that there must be limits to scientific knowledge. 
In her book Heisenberg and the Atomic Age, Carson discussed Heisenberg’s beliefs in 
relation to the public sphere.  (Carson, 2010b)   She claimed that Heisenberg ‘‘held on 
to the notion of disinterested contemplation.’’  (Carson, 2010b, p 454)   How can one 
be disinterested when one has actually set up an experiment?  How can one be 
disinterested if you have projected your own transcendental understanding onto 
instrumental data?  In a section on value judgements Carson referred to a lecture by 
Heisenberg at which he stated that values cannot come from science.  (Carson, 2010b, 
p 456)    As he had previously worked on the production of the atom bomb during 
World War Two, Heisenberg had time to reflect on the fact that technology could be 
used for evil purposes. 
Both Heisenberg and Heidegger agreed that nature was being treated as a resource to 
be exploited.  This aspect of human existence which treated both man and nature as a 
standing reserve was termed Bestand by Heidegger in his essay ‘The Question 
Concerning Technology’.  (Heidegger, 1977a, p 17)  The apparent power of science and 
technology to shape the way in which man in the world chooses to live limits the 
horizon of possibilities for human existence.  This aspect of modernity was termed  
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‘Gestell’ by Heidegger.  (Heidegger, 1977a, p 21)  Science cannot explain or govern how 
Dasein should live in the world.   
Heidegger, Politics and Technology 
Heidegger’s critique of the way in which political decisions are influenced by the ability 
of technology to offer unbridled power for politicians to dominate both man and 
nature, is encapsulated by the following quotation from a lecture on Gestell in 1949: 
“Agriculture is now a motorized food industry in essence, the same as the 
manufacturing of corpses in gas chambers and the extermination camps , the same as 
the blockading and starving of nations, the same as the manufacture of atom bombs.”  
(Caputo, 1993, p 132) 
John Caputo quotes this comment in a chapter in his book Demythologizing Heidegger 
which portrays Heidegger’s views on technology as a scandal. In the ‘Question 
Concerning Technology’, Heidegger makes it clear that technology is all encompassing.  
Both man and nature are a resource to be used as required by those in power.  The 
extermination of the Jews was a political act to serve the interests of the Nazi state.  
Caputo argued that the development of modern agriculture is benign and cannot be 
included in a reference to the Holocaust:  “It is possible to understand what Heidegger 
is saying, but I do not believe that it is possible to remove the scandal.”  (Caputo, 1993, 
p 142) 
I disagree with Caputo’s claim that Heidegger’s philosophy is scandalous.  There are 
two aspects to Heidegger’s wish to raise concerns over modern agricultural practice.  
He was actually stating a position with respect to his philosophy; it would have been 
ridiculous if he had argued that technology was ‘all encompassing’ and then allowed 
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for exceptions.  His claim, which was repeated again and again in different essays apart 
from ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, was that both man and nature become 
simply resources to be used by those in power.  The most important aspect to 
Heidegger’s remarks is that nature itself has no function other than to be exploited for 
man’s own use in a calculative way. 26  
Let us also consider Caputo’s criticisms in terms of modern history. His point is related 
to the assumption that modern agriculture is beneficial. This surely can be called into 
question.  In North America the native population was subjugated and put into 
’reservations’ in the nineteenth-century.  The justification for this was that the new 
white settlers could feed an immigrant population only by using the land in ways which 
were practiced in Europe.  In the nineteenth-century Britain arranged for the Highland 
Clearances in order to farm sheep, and in 1876 in Tasmania the last native Aborigine 
was hanged by the British, the disappearance of the native population is rarely spoken 
of as ‘genocide’.  The island was now subjected to the import of European farming 
methods.  In the Amazonian Basin, deforestation has led to many people having their 
lives disrupted and great hardship.  The slave trade in the West Indies was required for 
the cultivation of sugar.  The majority of these slaves died an early death. The historian 
Patricia Fara said of those people who had been displaced as:  “Subordinated at the 
time, indigenous people have been further suppressed by being silenced in the 
historical record.”  (Fara, 2012, p 18)   
To describe these events as benign is plainly questionable-people were displaced and 
sometimes even killed for the benefit of those in power.   Because one particular group 
might benefit oneself from modern agriculture does not make it right.  I think this 
                                                          
26
 Today, there is more concern about the environment, for example the Norwegian philosopher, Arne 
Naess, is a leading member of the ‘Deep Ecology’ movement.  (Naess, 2006, pp 466-470)   
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reaction to Heidegger’s philosophy illustrates his lament that we cannot think in any 
other way than living under the framework of technology. 
Paul Feyerabend, in his book Farewell to Reason, argued that: “- - -the sciences of 
today are business enterprises, run on business principles.  Research in large 
institutions is not guided by Truth and Reason, but by the most rewarding fashion and 
the great minds of today universally turn to where the money is - - -“ (Feyerabend, 
1987, p 102) 
Mahon O’Brien has said that Heidegger failed to ‘’- - -outline how his philosophical 
vision would result in political action’’.  (O’Brien, 2011, p 173) He did not mean this 
point as a criticism.  However, Heidegger did claim that poetry could release man from 
a technological framework.  This is explored in the final chapter of this thesis.  In his 
confrontation with Heidegger’s philosophy, Foucault explored the link between 
technology and the development of the political power.  This is discussed in the 
chapter on Governmentality and Biopolitics.  
Conclusion  
The concerns of Heidegger with respect to science and technology are fully consistent 
with the proposal by Foucault that the ‘Cartesian Moment’ has led to the world view 
that scientific and technological knowledge should solely determine how we should 
conduct ourselves in the world and relate to the world of nature. 
Many of these ideas of Heidegger’s on Being and metaphysics are so complex and 
controversial, that this account can only be perfunctory.  However, it should be clear 
that Heidegger’s views on Being, ontology and science were remarkable and 
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revolutionary and form the basis of his concerns over technology.  Many philosophers 
of technology have argued that Heidegger’s views on Being are too ambiguous and put 
forward at such a high level of abstraction to be of any value in relation to the practice 
of science and technology. The philosopher Andrew Feenberg, is a good example of 
this kind of critic.  (Feenberg, 2003, pp 662- 664)  I believe that in fact Heidegger 
described a possible way out of the ‘oblivion of Being’ through the power of poiesis, 
the use of human imagination to reveal new possibilities for human existence.  It is the 
development of new ways of representing man’s place in the world that poiesis can 
reveal new possibilities for human existence, which Heidegger termed Ereignis.   This 
aspect of Heidegger’s work will be discussed in the last chapter on Heidegger’s poetics. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Foucault, Science and Philosophy 
Heidegger’ Influence on Foucault’s Philosophy of Science 
Samuel Ijsseling made an important claim that Heidegger’s essay, the ‘Age of the 
World Picture’, raised the very questions which Foucault had addressed in all of his 
work.27 (Ijsseling, 1986, pp 413-424)  For both Foucault and Heidegger the history of 
the subjectifying and objectifying the human being are important themes.  An 
interesting point made by Ijsseling is that: “Foucault’s work is an attempt at describing 
and thinking what for Heidegger has been the task of thinking.” (Ijsseling, 1986, p 416) 
Foucault, in a similar way to Heidegger, was perfectly willing to accord science its place 
as a domain of knowledge.  What he objected to was a way of thinking which was 
dominated by calculation based primarily on knowledge–the gnōthi seauton.    This 
objection is resonant of the ‘enframing’ which Heidegger discussed in his essay on ‘The 
Question Concerning Technology’.   
 In Society Must Be Defended, Foucault challenged those who claim to have access to 
the truth, because of the claims of scientific discourse: “What types of knowledge are 
you trying to disqualify when you say that you are a science?  What speaking subject, 
what subject of experience and knowledge are you trying to minimize when you say ‘I 
                                                          
27 Ijsseling wrote: ‘I don’t think it can be denied that the text with the greatest importance on 
Foucault is the ‘Age of the World Picture’ from Holzwege.  In that essay Heidegger describes the 
modern age in which the world is re-presented.   The modern age is the time of representation.  
Reality becomes an object; this goes hand in hand with the subjectifying and objectifying of man.  
Important in this respect also is Heidegger’s claim that the modern sciences have taken on all the 
characteristics of institutions. - - - ‘’The Age of the World Picture’’ deals with the very questions that 
structure and organize the whole network of Foucault’s texts.’’  (Ijsseling, 1986, p 416) 
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speak this discourse, I am speaking a scientific discourse, I am a scientist’.”  (Foucault, 
2004,b p 10) 
Allan Megill made the point that by describing his work as ‘discourse’, Foucault felt 
free to engage in a questioning style of challenging the established way of thinking.28  
(Megill, 1987, p 231) Foucault himself defined science as a specific transformation 
within various types of discourse which has only developed since the eighteenth 
century. (Foucault, 2004b, p 182)   In terms of Foucault’s ideas of the relationship 
between various scientific and social and political practices, Hacking defined Foucault’s 
meaning of the term ‘discourse’ as a system of possibilities for a web of belief.  
(Hacking, 1984, p 48)  The practice of scientific investigation had taken place from the 
time of the ancient Greeks and before.  However, ‘science’ has emerged today as a 
totalizing discipline of knowledge which claims to possess all those elements which 
should determine our ‘way of life’.  Foucault claimed that modern science is:  “The 
disciplinarization of knowledges, and its polymorphous singularity, now leads to a 
phenomenon and a constraint that is now an integral part of our society.  We call it 
‘science’.”  (Foucault, 2004, p 182)  
Foucault’s theme was that someone who speaks with the authority of ‘science’ expects 
to have their discourse to be allowed to go unchallenged.   It has replaced religion as 
an ideology:  
The problem is now: Who is speaking, are they qualified to speak, at what level is 
the statement situated, what set can it be fitted into, and how and to what 
                                                          
28
 Megill wrote further: ‘Foucault is engaged in undermining the whole structure of thinking, a whole 
approach to ‘’reality’’, that he sees as oppressively uncreative.  By focussing on ‘’discourse’’ as the final 
end of his analysis, he aims to bypass this rigidifying mind-set, much as Nietzsche sought to do in 
declaring reality itself to be a human creation.’    (Megill, 1987, p 231)  It is interesting to note that 
Megill’s comments about Nietzsche stating that man creates reality, corresponds to some of the 
modern theories of Quantum Mechanics.   
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extent does it conform to other forms and technologies of knowledge? (Foucault, 
2004b, p 184) 
 
 
 Foucault described the importance of transformations in belief, ideas and practices, of 
which science was only an example of this kind of activity and analysis.   Foucault in 
‘The Ethics of Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom’ explained how science has 
become an ideology. (Foucault, 1988, pp 1 - 20) This has developed since the period of 
time which Foucault had termed ‘The Cartesian Moment’ in The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject. (Foucault, 2005, p 14)  In many types of discourse today, ‘science’ is often 
invoked as the sole arbiter of what is held to be true.  Foucault considered this type of 
activity a kind of game, ‘a game of truth’.  This kind of game is not one which is 
frivolous or one which is entertaining; it is a serious and important feature of modern 
discourse.  Foucault defined this kind of ‘game’ as ‘’an ensemble of procedures which 
lead to a certain result, which can be considered in function of its principles, and the 
rules of procedures, as valid or not, winner or loser.”  (Foucault, 1988b, p 16) 
Foucault’s Archaeology of Science 
 In The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault argued that science is not a privileged 
method of determining what is to be held to be true, it is merely another example of a 
domain of knowledge with rifts in beliefs, ideas and practices. (Foucault, 2002, pp 196-
215)  These rifts have occurred in all types of human existence, for example, theology, 
politics and morality. His interest in science was not one of trying to uncover its 
philosophical pre-suppositions, but rather to “investigate the system of formation of 
its objects, its types of enunciation, its concepts, it’s theoretical choices.  It is to treat it 
as one practice among others.”  (Foucault, 2002, p 205) 
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Foucault studied the various strategies and techniques for subjectification which were 
developed by the mechanisms and power of science.   As science has progressed in its 
ability to enable man to dominate and control nature, more and more emphasis has 
been placed on the ‘knowledge of the self’, as opposed to the ‘care of the self’.  As 
Heidegger pointed out in ‘The Age of the World Picture’, one needs to think beyond 
the limits which govern the Cartesian outlook of modern science.   Foucault claimed 
that with his work in The Archaeology of Knowledge, he had tried to develop a method 
of meeting this need.  This book was not an attempt to outline how science should be 
practiced.  Instead, Foucault was engaged, according to Megill, in discrediting the 
modern belief that only ‘science’ should govern human behaviour: ‘‘He is concerned 
with an essentially Dionysian project - that of smashing science altogether.’’ (Megill, 
1987, p 231)  
In his Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault distinguished three types of archaeological 
analysis with respect to science.  (Foucault, 2002, pp 208-212)  The first type he 
termed ‘formalization’, a process by which mathematicians themselves historically re-
define the position and importance of existing bodies of knowledge in the light of new 
discoveries.  An example which he quoted was the re-interpretation of the ancient 
mathematician, Diophantus.  In the light of much later work in the nineteenth-century 
by French mathematicians such as Galois, the earlier work was held to be more original 
and wide-ranging in its applications than originally thought. 
The second type of analysis is the study of how it came about that a concept has been 
granted the special status of being a ‘scientific concept’.  Many scientists and 
philosophers such as Carnup, have regarded only scientific knowledge to have any real 
value.  The investigation of the practices associated with the inclusion or exclusion of 
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certain categories of knowledge Foucault claimed, was an epistemological history of 
the sciences. 
The third type of archaeological analysis is the study of discursive practices in the 
interaction between cultural practices, and scientific knowledge.  He explained:  “One 
is trying to reveal between positivities, knowledge, epistemological figures, and 
sciences, a whole set of differences, relations, gaps, shifts, independencies, 
autonomies, and the way in which they articulate their own historicites on one 
another.”  (Foucault, 2002, p 210) 
This analysis is how Foucault formulated his concept of an episteme, in this case a 
representation of how the world is governed, or at least influenced, by science. 
The Episteme 
Foucault developed the idea of investigating his ideas in an historical fashion, by the 
way of conceiving an episteme. An episteme for Foucault was a term used to denote a 
group of ideas or concepts which led for a time to a certain unity of discursive 
practices.    In his explanation of his approaches to archaeology, Foucault wrote in his 
preface to The Order of Things:    
 
- - - what I am attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field, the 
episteme, in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference 
to its rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby 
manifests a history, not of growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of 
possibility. (Foucault, 1994b, p xxii) 
 
Foucault explained in the introduction that how an episteme became to become 
established, was an investigation of a time when a range of possibilities were available 
to a culture at a particular time. He described an episteme as a world–view, a cultural 
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perspective which is common to most of mankind. (Foucault, 2003, p 211)  For a 
particular culture, we can understand the present rather better, if we understand that 
at various times in the past, there were different ‘ways of life’ which could have been 
selected.  Of course, Foucault, as a result of these investigations, which he termed 
genealogy, has written about the different aspects of power relations, so that he has 
been categorized as a philosopher of power.  His interest always was the human 
subject; power relations were merely an important aspect of this focus for his work.   
In his essay, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, Heidegger wrote:  “From earliest 
times until Plato the word technē is linked with the word episteme.  Both words are 
names for knowing in the widest sense. They mean to be entirely at home in 
something, to understand and be expert in it.  Such knowing provides an opening up.” 
(Heidegger, 1977a, p 12)   
In ‘The Age of the World Picture’, Heidegger describes a vision of the world which 
seems to be close to Foucault’s idea of an episteme.  He wrote:  
 
Modern science simultaneously establishes itself and differentiates itself in its 
projection of object-spheres.  These projection plans are developed by means of 
a corresponding methodology, which is made secure through rigor.  Projection 
and rigor, methodology and ongoing activity, mutually requiring one another, 
constitute the essence of modern science, transform science into research.  
(Heidegger, 1977d, p 126) 
 
   
What Heidegger described here was what Foucault termed a ‘totality of relations’ 
between the sciences and their methods.  The aim of Heidegger’s questioning, was, 
accepting the fact that science exists, to try to establish what activity constituted a 
science.  This question is not one of questioning the legitimacy of science, instead 
Foucault’s approach was to how ‘science’ is culturally an accepted feature of our ‘way 
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of life’.  His interest was to explore how and why someone speaks with the authority of 
science. (Foucault, 2004, p 12) 
In an essay on Georges Canguilhem, Hans-Jorg  Rheinberger claimed that Foucault’s 
philosophy was constructed along the lines that the fruits of scientific research should 
be considered as cultural-historical beliefs which are subject to correction and change 
over time. (Rheinberger, 2005, pp 187-197)   In Canguilhem’s view the sciences are 
nurtured from the social and political environment in which the work is conducted; it is 
science that is dependent on the politics of the time, rather than everything about 
existence being dependent on science.  It is, of course, these social and political forces 
which utilized science for various ‘games of truth’. 
One of the chief topics of Canguilhem’s work on the history of science, was concerned 
with the famous dictum of the French nineteenth century doctor, Claude Bernard 
which was that  the human body does everything in its power to maintain the ‘internal 
environment’.  Thus Bernard postulated that the true functions of all the many 
manifestations of all kinds of processes within the body was to keep the internal 
environment constant and in good working order.  This principle became one of the 
fundamental guiding principles behind the subsequent development of human 
physiology.  This is surely a good example of Foucault’s notion of an over-arching idea 
which he termed an episteme.  Claude Bernard’s principle really was a great paradigm 
for the science of medicine as it provided an idea of fundamental organization which 
helped researchers to uncover details of the circulation of the blood, feed- back 
mechanisms, and an explanation as to why both the lungs and the kidneys are 
important in maintaining the constant acidity of the blood, for example.  But these 
benefits, according to Heidegger, came at a price, that of making man into an object of 
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study who had to conform to prescribed patterns of behaviour which had been 
determined by science.  This conformity which resulted as a result of the advancing 
field of science, has led to what Heidegger termed:  ‘enframing’.  This ‘enframing’ 
describes a limited picture of the possibilities for human existence.  The more 
successful a theory such as Claude Bernard’s  is subsequently found to be, the more it 
comes to be believed that science alone, can provide all that is necessary to shape 
human existence.   
Docile Bodies and Surveillance 
Foucault discussed the ways by which scientific advances had been utilised to create 
more effective forms of discipline in order to regulate, monitor and supervise what he 
termed ‘docile bodies’.    Foucault, in a chapter on Panopticism in his book, Discipline 
and Punish, described how Jeremy Bentham’s concept of an all seeing eye has become 
established as a fundamental feature of the design and operation of all prisons. 
(Foucault, 1991, pp 195-228)   He also developed the association between science as a 
field of knowledge, and the operation of power within political systems.  Bentham was 
of course, one of the early advocates of a form of ethical and political philosophy 
which has become known as Utilitarianism.   
Let us consider briefly Foucault’s own work on Panopticism.  He was engaged in his 
early work in studying the type of institution which has been developed on panoptic 
principles, such as hospitals, asylums, medicine, as well as the modern prison system.  
Foucault claimed that all these power structures: ‘‘- - -all tend, like the prison, to 
exercise a power of normalization.’’  (Foucault, 1991, p 308)  Foucault defined power 
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as:  ‘’the multiplicity of force relations in the sphere in which they operate and which 
constitute their own organization.”  (Foucault, 1978, p 92) 
Unlike Rousseau, Foucault opposed the type of society where everything is visible to 
whoever holds positions of authority and power. (Megill, 1987, p 243)  The disciplinary 
power associated with panopticism was described by Foucault: ‘‘Hence the major 
effect of the Panopticon is to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent 
visibility that assumes the automatic functioning of power’’.  (Foucault, 1991 p 201) 
Although both the prison and the nineteenth-century workhouse in Britain were built 
on Jeremy Bentham’s architectural ideas, Foucault in his work argued that modern 
disciplinary systems, both those of the state and the workplace, are exerted by 
continual surveillance without those made visible in all their actions being aware of 
what is actually being done to them. The disciplinary power is exercised by those who 
are invisible on those who are made visible. It is this continual observation which 
‘‘maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection’’. (Foucault, 1991, p 187)  In his 
essay ‘An Unmasking of the Human Sciences: Foucault’ Häbermas described Foucault’s 
critique of the human sciences as “the new, disciplinary violence that dominates 
modernity.  They owe this to the fact that the penetrating gaze of the human scientist 
can occupy that centralised space of the panopticon from which one can look without 
being seen”. (Häbermas, 1990b, p 245) 
The principle of continuous surveillance which has been developed from panopticism 
was explored by Foucault in his work on governmentality and is a major theme in the 
chapter on Governmentality and Biopolitics. 
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The Principle of ‘Ordering’ Determined by Technology 
As an example of Heidegger’s ‘ordering’, Foucault described how scientific ideas had 
led to more ‘efficient’ ways of deploying troops.  He quoted Guibert, an army 
strategist:  “In the eyes of most soldiers, tactics are only a branch of the vast science of 
war: for me, they are this science itself because they teach how to constitute troops, 
order them, move them, get them to fight.” (Foucault, 1991, pp 167 - 168)   
Foucault studied the ways by which various forms of discipline were developed in the 
most efficient manner by utilising the fruits of scientific knowledge.   He identified four 
techniques for disciplinary practices.  The first is one of drawing up tables, or 
performance schedules, work procedures which should be adhered to, and so on. The 
second technique prescribes movements or some actions which are carried out in a 
prescribed manner.  Thirdly, exercises, or training programmes are prescribed in order 
to facilitate the skill level of the individual or individuals.  Finally, there exists what 
Foucault termed ‘tactics’.  These are procedures protocols and arrangement for the 
deployment, organization, and operation of numbers of individuals in complex ways, in 
order to accomplish some task. (Foucault, 1991, p 167) 
Gutting’s Classification of Foucault’s work on Scientific Cultural Practices 
Gary Gutting identified four rules which Foucault seemed to employ in his work. 
(Gutting, 1989, p 234)   The first type are rules for the formation of subjects, a theme 
with which Heidegger had been concerned.   For example, those who are deemed to 
be mad or criminal by society, those who offend socially constructed norms, or are 
deemed to be deviant by some kind of authority e.g. a psychiatrist.  Another person 
may have symptoms of a mental illness, but have a physical condition such as 
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thyrotoxicosis, which produces mental symptoms as a result of a physical disease, 
which could be treated surgically. This kind of formation of an object for study belongs 
to different kinds of discursive practices where they meet. 
The second type of rule which Foucault studied is the right of certain individuals to 
make authoritative statements.  For example, only a properly trained scientist could be 
in a position to give authoritative estimations of the danger from radio-active fall out 
after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. (Gutting, 1989, p 235)   The third rule is 
concerned with issues concerned with transformation and presentation, e.g. rules 
concerned with the manipulation of data to be presented in an acceptable statistical 
form, or rules and conventions of translation of one language into another. (Gutting, 
1989, pp 236-7)  Finally, Foucault identified both the concepts and strategies which 
have been employed in order to establish ‘truths’ which today govern how we live.  An 
example quoted by Gutting, is the theory of evolution in biology. (Gutting, 1989, p 237)    
Scientific ideas in Foucault’s philosophy are mediated by a wide variety of different 
factors, with a complex interplay between them.  Gutting encapsulated Foucault’s 
early work as establishing that:  “- - -a science is just one, localized formation in the 
‘’epistemological site’’ that is a discursive formation.  Science neither supersedes, nor 
exhausts the discursive formation that is its background.” (Gutting, 1989, p 252) 
In the preface to The Order of Things, Foucault claimed that scientists were driven by 
unconscious desires and forces, which are random and complex.  His own work on 
science and its effects on society was aimed at revealing a truth which would 
otherwise remain hidden, (what Heidegger termed alētheia).  (Foucault, 1994d, pp 125 
- 163)  Foucault acknowledged that both Nietzsche and Heidegger were profound 
influences on the development of his philosophical thought.  One can regard 
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Foucault’s oeuvre as responding to Heidegger’s challenge about the danger to man 
from science and technology. 
In Society Must Be Defended, Foucault said that his genealogies are antisciences.  His 
purpose was to fight the claims of those who claimed to possess the sole sovereignty 
to the truth in any discourse which claims to be ‘scientific’, e.g. some Marxist theorists. 
(Foucault, 2004, p 9) Foucault did not dispute the validity of certain claims to 
knowledge along a path which involved objects, and the world of nature.  His field of 
interest was the genealogy of power associated with the growth in scientific 
knowledge and its application by technology.  (Foucault, 2004, p 178) 
Foucault made the intriguing argument that ‘science’ as we know it today, is a fairly 
recent phenomenon, he claimed that: ‘‘Science in the singular did not exist before the 
eighteenth-century.’’  (Foucault, 2004, p 182) In the same passage he stated quite 
categorically that: ‘’Philosophy no longer has any part to play within science and the 
processes of knowledge.’’ Thus a modern philosopher such as Foucault accepted the 
notion that science has taken over from philosophy as the principle, or perhaps the 
only, domain of knowledge for making sense of our existence in the world. This is 
interesting and relevant as this view is a claim which has been made by many scientists 
themselves.  Of course, Heidegger was very much opposed to modernity and the 
resulting notion that science has usurped the scope of philosophy. 
Megill argued that one can consider much of Foucault’s early work on Medicine, 
Prisons, Hospitals and psychiatry as a reaction to the political and social structures put 
in place by ‘‘scientific rationality’’. (Megill, 1987)   Foucault’s work on prisons had an 
effect on changing attitudes to the prolonged incarceration of those deemed to be 
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insane.    Megill has pointed out that Foucault’s early work could be looked upon as 
continuing Heidegger’s attack on science and technology. Heidegger’s essay: ‘Science 
and Reflection,’ corresponded in respect to its theme, on psychiatry, to Foucault’s 
whole approach to psychiatry in his History of Madness. (Megill, 1987, p 367)  
Heidegger’s concern about psychiatry discussed in ’Science and Reflection’ was that it 
treated the human patient as an object to be studied and supervised, observed and 
perhaps controlled in some way. (Heidegger, 1977e, pp 174-5) 
In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault argued that as the science of medicine developed, it 
provided a new type of knowledge, which could allow an inversion of the structure of 
human existence being dominated by finitude. (Foucault, 2007d, p 245)   What modern 
medicine offers man is health rather than the prospect of salvation after death.  The 
procedures, examinations, treatments, surgery, etc., all subject man to his finitude, but 
usually also provides the prospect of death being indefinitely delayed. 
Foucault’s Concept of Scientific Truth 
Leida Alcoff has pointed out that Foucault’s approach to the archaeology of the 
sciences is reminiscent of Thomas Kuhn’s approach to the history of science with its 
employment of paradigms which change, evolved and sometimes become discarded as 
new paradigms take their place. (Alcoff, 2005, p 211)   Three reasons were advanced 
by Alcoff to explain why Foucault has not been considered to be a philosopher of 
science. (Alcoff, 2005, p 212)   First of all, rather than the natural sciences, such as 
physics, Foucault worked mainly in the field of the human sciences, where there often 
is no experimental or statistical data to produce what are often held to be 
‘unchallengeable facts’.  Secondly, Foucault has been categorized as a member of a 
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particular French postmodern philosophy circle.   Finally, in many circles, Foucault has 
been thought of as a philosopher solely concerned with power relationships, perhaps 
because much of his later work has only recently been translated into English.  
Although someone like Heidegger conceived of technology and science as being inter-
related, with the deployment of power being regarded as a principle problem, 
scientists and their historians typically consider science to be concerned only with facts 
and rationality.  
At a meeting in Paris, Foucault was asked about the philosophy of Karl Popper (1902-
1994) with respect to the operation of power.  Published later as an essay ‘What is 
Critique?’ Foucault disputed the notion that there is ‘’good science’’, which is true and 
does not facilitate the misuse of power, and ‘‘bad science’’, which does. (Foucault, 
2007a, p 72)   Surely, Foucault is correct, as atomic power derived from Einstein’s work 
on the transformation of matter into energy, can be utilized for atomic bombs or for 
peaceful purposes.  In an essay entitled ‘Subjectivity and Truth’, Foucault made it quite 
clear that in his previous work he had not tried to carry out a history of the physical 
sciences, but rather those which purported to describe a kind of scientific knowledge 
of the subject. (Foucault, 2007c, p 151) 
In an interesting debate, Foucault challenged the idea that science has led to a pre-
ordained march towards ultimate truths.  He argued with the linguist Noam Chomsky 
that Science instead had been an activity which was concerned broadly with 
transformations, often termed ‘progress’, which was often regarded as being 
immutable if presented as a ‘science’.  Foucault questioned the immutability of 
scientific knowledge. He argued in ‘Human Nature: Justice versus Power’:   
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Take, as an example, animal and plant classifications.  How often have they not 
been rewritten since the middle ages by completely different rules: by 
symbolism, by natural history, by comparative anatomy, by the theory of 
evolution.  Each time this rewriting makes the knowledge completely different in 
its functions, in its economy, in its internal relations. (Chomsky and Foucault, 
2006, p 26) 
 
 
Chomsky was forced to agree with Foucault’s arguments.  If one thinks of physics, 
Newton’s corpuscular theory of light held sway, to be superseded by Thomas Young’s 
theory of wave projection.  Each way of regarding the behaviour of light has a certain 
degree of validity within its own sphere of internal relations, just as Foucault argued 
was true of scientific beliefs.    Chomsky said:  
 
I agree with your conception of scientific progress; that is, I don’t think that 
scientific progress is simply a matter of the new accumulated addition of new 
knowledge and new theories and so on. Rather, I think that it has this sort of 
jagged pattern that you describe, forgetting certain problems and leaping to new 
theories- - -.  (Chomsky and Foucault, 2006, p 27)   
 
Foucault claimed that the greater influence on his views on the philosophy of science 
was not Bachelard, but rather Gorges Canguihem.  (Foucault, 1998, p 465)   Both 
Bachelard and Canguihem were important philosophers of science in the early 
twentieth century.   Foucault argued in ‘Life: Experience and Science’ that the various 
stages of scientific knowledge can only be considered rigorously from the viewpoint of 
an epistemologist. (Foucault, 1988, pp 465 -78)  A historian will trace back the various 
steps along the way to the establishment of a well defined and accepted scientific 
‘truth’.  However, along the way there will have been many paradigms which were 
accepted at the time, played a part in the development of the science, but have been 
either lost to history, or more probably, ignored.  Foucault, taking inspiration from 
Canguilhem, put forward the notion that error has been an important factor in the 
accumulation of what we term to be knowledge or truth.  Rather subversively perhaps, 
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he posed the question: “Should not the whole theory of the subject be reformulated, 
seeing that knowledge, rather than opening up the truth of the world, is deeply rooted 
in the ‘’errors’’ of life?”  (Foucault, 1998, p 477) 
Foucault, Science and Art 
Without mentioning Heidegger by name, Foucault confronted the search for the 
‘saving power’ alluded to in Hölderlin’s poetry in ‘The Question Concerning 
Technology’ (Heidegger, 1977a, p 42)   Foucault argued in The Birth of the Clinic that: 
 
The importance of Bichat, Jackson and Freud in European culture does not prove 
that they were philosophers as well as doctors, but that, in this culture, medical 
thought is fully engaged in the philosophical status of man.  This medical 
experience is therefore akin even to a lyrical experience that his language 
sought, from Hölderlin to Rilke.  (Foucault, 2007d, p 245) 
 
 
This passage is clearly a reference to Heidegger’s championing of poetry. (In, for 
example his essay ‘What are Poets For?’  (Heidegger, 1971a, pp 91-142)  Hölderlin is 
mentioned in the very first paragraph of this essay, and Rilke in the last.)  Both 
Heidegger and Foucault discussed the value of art in their work; for Heidegger the 
search for truth is served by poetry, such as that of Hölderlin and Rilke.  Megill 
believed that Foucault did not share Heidegger’s confidence in looking to the poets for 
guidance. (Megill, 1987, pp 221-223)   Instead, Foucault believed that art could 
illuminate the truth, but sometimes also mislead us to a false way of thinking.  Jana 
Sawacki seems to agree that art and poetry had little part to play in Foucault’s ideas 
about the forms of power wielded in a technological society:  “Unlike Heidegger, the 
later Foucault does not find in art a source of redemption.  To the contrary, it is simply 
another arena for struggle.” (Sawacki, 2003, p 71) 
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Conclusion 
Foucault repudiated the philosophical tradition which has developed since the time of 
Plato, which has embraced reason as being the guiding principle of philosophy.  He 
instead believed that human existence is determined by chance, with reason merely 
modulating the vicissitudes of life. 
However, Foucault was an important contributor to the philosophy of science, in an 
almost unique way, because he tried to show how science was used to change and 
develop existing power relationships. e.g. his work in psychiatry. The large mental 
hospitals (asylums) where those who were deemed to be insane were often 
incarcerated for life, have almost all closed.  The scientific rationality which governed 
their establishment has been undermined, and Foucault was a leading figure who 
contributed to this change.    Foucault did not believe that power was exercised only 
from above, but also from below, often in unexpected and multi-faceted ways. 
I agree with Alcoff’s view, that what Foucault attempted to do, inspired by Heidegger, 
Nietzsche and Canguilhem, was to challenge a number of various systems of beliefs 
and practices which today are accepted as being rational, inevitable and ethical; 
because they were supposedly built on the secure foundations of ‘science’. (Alcoff, 
2005, p 222)  Foucault’s work has demonstrated many examples where the implicit 
prominence which has been given to the gnōthi seauton has resulted in the practices 
associated with the epimeleia heautou having become superseded.   
. 
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CHAPTER 8  
Biopolitics 
The Enlightenment 
We have now reached a point in this thesis where there is a need to correlate a 
number of themes together in relation to Foucault’s contention that the 
disappearance of the practice of the epimeleia heautou represented a rupture with 
previous ‘ways of life’.  Towards the end of the 1970s, Foucault gave three series of 
lectures on the themes of governmentality and biopolitics at the Collѐge de France.  
Foucault addressed issues related to topics which have already been discussed, such as 
salvation, technology, science, panopticism, ethics, power relations and economics.  So 
an account of Foucault’s work on governmentality and the nation state may illuminate 
the question which Heidegger had posed in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, 
which was ‘what is the essence of technology’? (Heidegger, 1977a, p 23) Could this 
question be related to the historical period known as the Enlightenment, a time which 
corresponded with the disappearance of the epimeleia heautou? 29 
James Bohman defined the Enlightenment as “Freedom, in which human powers and 
capacities are no longer put in the service of ‘idols’ or self-imposed tutelage, but can 
be brought to bear upon the comprehensive goal of human emancipation.”  (Bohman, 
2005, p 353)  
                                                          
29
 The Enlightenment is generally regarded as an historical period which is associated with man being 
enabled to escape from dogma and enjoy greater limits to freedom.  Yet Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer claimed that “- - -the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant.” (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 2008, p 1) 
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This ‘self-imposed tutelage’ surely corresponds to the former practice of epimeleia 
heautou, which Foucault described in The Hermeneutics of the Subject. (Foucault, 
2005)  The Enlightenment is important because it is associated with the growth of 
science and technology, which Heidegger had claimed is the greatest danger to 
mankind.  Kant, Heidegger and Foucault all had important things to say about the 
Enlightenment and its impact on our way of life.  Allan Megill has claimed that today   
“- - - the whole structure of the social sciences and humanities is based on 
Enlightenment propositions.”  (Megill, 1987, p 340) 
In his essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Foucault described the Enlightenment as an 
historical process, ‘a set of events’, rather than simply an age of modernity founded 
upon reason and freedom.  (Foucault, 1997c, p 313)  He believed that the 
Enlightenment was merely one, of a number of cultural and philosophical themes, 
which could be included within the blanket term, ‘humanism’. (Foucault, 1997c, p 314)  
Marxism and existentialism were examples of ‘humanism’ which Foucault thought 
represented too wide a range of disparate themes to ‘‘serve as an axis for reflection,’’ 
(Foucault, 1997c, p 314) 
In a lecture in 1983 ‘The Art of Telling the Truth’ Foucault had posed the following 
question ‘‘What is happening today? What is happening now?’‘  (Foucault, 1990, p 87)  
He was discussing the question in terms of a period of history which is generally 
believed to be both culturally and scientifically advanced, with most people in the 
world enjoying much a greater degree of freedom than in previous epochs.  This view 
was strongly expressed by the American philosopher and historian, Francis Fukuyama 
at the end of the 1990’s in a series of lectures, and later in a book entitled The End of 
History.  (Fukuyama, 2006)  His thesis was that a global economy, allied to the military 
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power of America, heralded a new era of prosperity and peace; in effect, the 
culmination of centuries of Enlightenment thinking.  
Foucault himself was very much aware of Kant’s influence, and as we have seen, he 
wrote an essay on the subject of the Enlightenment to discuss Kant’s views and also 
the status of the Enlightenment phenomenon in the late twentieth century.   
(Foucault, 1997c, pp 303-319)  In his essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Foucault pointed 
out that in 1784 Kant had discussed this question in an obscure periodical.  Foucault 
thought that this little known work by Kant was extremely important; in fact, Foucault 
considered that Kant’s famous three Critiques represented a monumental attempt to 
address the nature of the Enlightenment.  (Foucault, 1997c, p 309)   In his essay on 
Kant, Foucault began by stressing how important Kant had been in recognising the 
importance of the Enlightenment in our culture.  Kant believed that mankind existed in 
the eighteenth century in a state of immaturity, the age of Enlightenment had ushered 
in an opportunity to move forward to some new ‘way of life’, based on reason.   
Foucault argued that there are positive features of the Enlightenment which are to be 
welcomed.  For him, the most important features are the philosophical kind of enquiry 
developed by Kant, which examines the problems of man’s relationship to the world 
and his own constitution as an autonomous subject.  (Foucault, 1997c, p 312)  He 
concluded his essay on the Enlightenment by putting forward his opinion that we are 
still living in a state of immaturity, the positive aspects of life which had been 
promoted by the advocates of the Enlightenment, are still some way off.  Foucault 
argued that the Enlightenment should not be simply regarded as culture which merely 
accumulates knowledge, or is a superior ‘way of life’ to the past.  The true value of the 
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Enlightenment is that it embodies a cultural critique which continually questions man’s 
place in the world, a critical ontology of ourselves. (Foucault, 1997c, p 319)  
The areas of study which Foucault thought philosophy should take in the light of 
critique of the present include: knowledge, power and ethics.  (Foucault, 1997c, p 318)  
This critique should address the issues which had arisen from Kant’s questioning of the 
way out of man’s immaturity.   This immaturity is a ‘way of life’ which always forces us 
to accept someone else’s authority over our actions; reason alone, not spiritual or 
religious influences, should guide our ‘way of life’.  Foucault in his early work had 
discussed how, in some ways, mankind is entering into another state of immaturity, 
e.g. when our conscience lies at someone else’s direction, or the care of our bodies is 
surrendered completely to the medical profession.   (Foucault, 1997c, p 305)  
A more recent picture of the Enlightenment has been given by Alasdair Macintyre, a 
philosopher well known for his championing of what has come to be known as ‘Virtue 
Ethics’.  His book is one of those tracts which have become influential in the 
development of Virtue Ethics as an alternative moral theory to Utilitarianism. 
(Macintyre, 1985)   What is interesting is that he developed a series of arguments to 
justify his contention that the Enlightenment project was doomed to fail.  (Macintyre, 
1985, pp 51-62)  An example is his opposition to Kant’s moral law couched in terms of 
the categorical imperative published in Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals  “Act 
only according to the maxim whereby you can at the same time, will that it should 
become a universal law.” (Kant, 1993b, p 30)  
Macintyre questioned which person or persons should have the power to determine 
these categorical imperatives.  On what basis can one know which imperative will lead 
135 
 
to the truth and which to falsehood? One can, like Megill, characterize Macintyre’s 
views on the Enlightenment, as an epoch which has failed to advance its aims of 
promoting freedom and justice.  Megill cited the French Revolution, born to some 
degree out of Enlightenment thinking, as an example of the failure of the 
Enlightenment.  (Megill, 1987, p 6)  
Heidegger, of course, had considered the Enlightenment as a time which had come to 
be dominated by calculative thinking and technology.  Michael Zimmerman has 
summarized Heidegger’s position as one which believes that man has lost his freedom 
and ‘The Age of Reason’ has led to nihilism. (Zimmerman, 1986, p 19)   This pessimistic 
outlook is not universal. In contrast to Heidegger’s views, the modern political 
philosopher, Jürgen Häbermas, has described the Enlightenment as having enabled 
man in the modern age to have enjoyed an improved opportunities for cultural life and  
self–expression compared with previous generations (Häbermas, 1990b, p 345).  Views 
more akin to those of Heidegger’s are those of the philosophers Theodor Adorno and 
Max Horkheimer, leading philosophers of the mid - twentieth century of what became 
to be known colloquially as the Frankfurt School.  They claimed that the 
‘’Enlightenment had extinguished any trace of its own self – consciousness’’. (Adorno 
and Horkheimer, 2008, p 4)  Mankind today, accepts the widespread belief that we are 
privileged to live in the current epoch, without giving the matter any serious thought. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Adorno and Horkheimer believed that the development of 
totalitarian regimes in Europe in the mid-twentieth century was a manifestation of 
Enlightenment thinking; calculation, technology and power, which had been sought 
and deployed in the name of reason.  A major pernicious influence, in their view was 
that of Kant. (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2008, pp 81-119)  
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Horkheimer in The Eclipse of Reason, criticised the Enlightenment as the development 
of a way of life which has come to encompass mankind’s desire to dominate nature, a 
viewpoint which Heidegger shared.  (Horkheimer, 2004) As man is the superior being 
in the world, today a way of life which is predicated on ideas related to domination 
seem to be natural, virtuous and just.  Horkheimer claimed that “The disease of reason 
is that reason was born from man’s urge to dominate nature and the ‘recovery’ 
depends on insight into the nature of the original disease, not on the cure of the latest 
symptoms.”  (Horkheimer, 2004, p 119) 
However, it must be remembered that the views of both Adorno and Horkheimer were 
very much coloured by the events in Europe before and during the Second World War, 
those events surely could give little support to mankind having become more 
’enlightened’,  or having reach an age of maturity.  A central feature of the critiques of 
the Enlightenment by Adorno and Horkheimer was that the development of 
technology had concurrently produced new methods of domination.  (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 2008, pp 3-42)30   
Cultural attitudes have been so influenced by Enlightenment thinking, that it has 
become almost impossible to challenge them. Although many philosophers have based 
their criticisms about the Enlightenment in terms of concerns about science and 
technology, Bohman instead argued that the fundamental force behind the 
Enlightenment is the use of reason to determine action in political institutions such as 
                                                          
30
Robert  Pippen described the viewpoint of philosophers who are hostile to the Enlightenment.  The 
modern goal of achieving a total mastery of nature includes man, who as a result is subject to:  ‘‘- - - 
domination, control and psychological repression - - -‘‘.  (Pippin, 1995, p 48) 
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democracies.  (Bohman, 2005, p 356) 31 Technological developments and their 
widespread application have depended upon political structures.  The improved living 
standards which have been brought about by technology have been so welcomed by 
people that the concomitant erosion of freedom has been ignored.   These improved 
living standards, better health and so on, were termed by Foucault as ‘biopolitics’, and 
a major focus of attention for the state or government concerned with the population.  
As we shall see, Foucault believed that various types of governmentality had been 
developed to facilitate the technological mechanisms at its disposal with respect to 
biopolitics.  The main concerns of state officials, was not simply altruistic, but 
concerned primarily with the development and maintenance of power.  Johanna 
Oksala argued that the Enlightenment represented for Foucault  “a set of beliefs and 
assumptions, on which he could base his work on power, domination and 
governmentality.”   (Oksala, 2009, pp 184-187)  These new types of domination were 
described by Day Wong as ‘’ invisible, dispersed, secret and autonomous.’’ (Wong, 
2005, p 62)  
Foucault rejected what he termed ‘‘the blackmail of the Enlightenment’’. (Foucault, 
1997c, pp 312-313) 32  He refused to accept the principle that one should either 
                                                          
31
Bohman wrote: ’’- - -  it is surprising that few defenders of Enlightenment follow Concordcet in arguing 
that Enlightenment is brought about not by science, but by the use of reason in democratic institutions.”  
If one accepts this perspective, then the essence of technology could well lie within political power 
relationships, rather than from the accumulation of scientific knowledge, or technological 
developments. 
32
 In philosophical circles, the debate between Foucault and the German philosopher Häbermas has 
aroused controversy on many sides.  Yet this debate is peripheral to the search for the essence of 
technology in Foucault’s work.  In any case the debate is left unfinished because of Foucault’s untimely 
early death. Wong has summarized Foucault’s distinct perspective as follows:  “- - - the philosophical 
ethos of the permanent critique of our historical era implies a refusal of the blackmail of the 
Enlightenment, that is, either accept the Enlightenment and remain within its tradition, or else you try 
to escape from its principles of rationality.  One can find this blackmail of Enlightenment underlying 
Häbermas’s accusation of Foucault.  Häbermas assumes that Foucault adopts an anti-Enlightenment 
position in the earlier work by criticising the Enlightenment and trying to escape from its principles of 
rationality, whereas in his later essays on Kant, Foucault shifts to a pro-Enlightenment position and 
seeks to remain within its tradition.  Häbermas concludes that Foucault’s positions are inconsistent - - -   
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support the Enlightenment as a cultural phenomenon, or oppose it.  Instead, he saw it 
as an historical event, which our age is part of; as something endowed with cultural, 
political and philosophical aspects which are ripe for analysis.  This approach to the 
Enlightenment was novel. (Rajchman, 1985, p 79)   Rather than seeking to develop a 
critical theory to support a theoretical framework, an approach taken by Häbermas,  
Foucault started from the point of view that theories are found to be the basis of 
different ‘ways of life’ and political action. (Rajchman, 1985, p 79)  Examples of this 
approach are to be found in Foucault’s critique of Adam Smith’s economic theory of 
‘the market’, and the profound influence of utilitarianism on democratic governments. 
To develop these themes, It is now appropriate to discuss Foucault’s late work 
presented in three lecture courses at the Collѐge de France in the late 1970’s; on 
governmentality, biopolitics and the state. These lectures were based on an approach 
to historical events which he had termed archaeology and genealogy.  (Foucault, 
2004b, pp 10-11) 33 
Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collѐge de France 1975 -1976 
In this course, Foucault developed the theme that modern power was exercised along 
medieval notions of sovereignty together with a more sophisticated judicial system.  
Rather than science being regarded as the natural and inevitable source of power in 
this age of Enlightenment, Foucault argued that reason as the justification for the 
operation of power was the crucial element; science and technology had given tools to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Häbermas’s conclusion not only reveals the blackmail of the Enlightenment, but also his overlooking 
Foucault’s intention to subvert these simplistic alternatives and binary oppositions.”  (Wong, 2005, p 66) 
 
33
 Foucault had of course described both archaeology and genealogy in previous works such as The 
Archaeology of Knowledge and The Order of Things.  However he summed up these approaches quite 
succinctly as:  “Archaeology is the method specific to local discursivities, and genealogy is the tactic 
which, once it has described these local discursivities, brings into play the desubjugatedknowledges that 
have been released from them.  That just about sums up the overall project.’’  (Foucault, 2004b, pp 10-
11) 
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those in government for new forms of power to be exercised.   This new form of power 
was termed ‘‘disciplinary power’’.  (Foucault, 2004b, p 38)  Foucault gave as an 
example the practice of medicine, where the behaviour of people in society has 
become regulated by social norms of conduct which accept medical authority, and in 
many respects the allocation of medical resources is controlled or regulated by the 
state.  (Foucault, 2004b, p 39)  
Foucault’s genealogy of power relationships challenged the belief that today the 
Enlightenment and modern society have slowly but steadily advanced to an improved 
new way of life, which is founded on rationality.  It is a perspective which is radically 
different from Fukuyama’s celebration of living during a time in the final phase of the 
Enlightenment. (Fukuyama, 2006)  Foucault questioned an historical approach which 
assumes a gradual development of rationality.  (Foucault, 2004b, pp 15-19)  
Historically, the most important way in which power was applied was by the use of 
force by a state or some agency of government.  Foucault turned Clausewitz’s 
aphorism on its head by claiming that: ‘‘politics is the continuation of war by other 
means.’’ (Foucault, 2004b, p 165)  Foucault argued that war is merely an extreme 
feature of the deployment of political will by force.  A nation state does not suspend its 
application of power wherever it can, when peace comes about.  
Later in his course, Foucault sought to investigate whether forces of domination can 
explain power relationships in the age of Enlightenment.  The notion that it is only 
forces of domination which can explain all aspects of power relations, was termed by 
Foucault as the ‘repressive hypothesis.’  This concept embodies a form of power which 
is juridical in practice, with laws which have been determined on the historical basis of 
some form of sovereign authority.   What Foucault developed was the idea that after 
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the sixteenth century, around the time of ‘the Cartesian Moment’, some new 
mechanisms of power came into play.  These technologies of power were developed, 
and are still developing, to control, manipulate, and observe human beings in order to 
maximise the value of their time and labour.  (Foucault, 2004b, p 35)   The old types of 
power which had been exercised in the use or threat of force, is today embodied in the 
law.  (Foucault, 2004b, p 37) 
In Society must be Defended, Foucault introduced the idea of biopolitics as being a 
major development in our modern human ‘way of life’.  He wrote “It is these processes 
– the birth rate, the mortality rate, longevity, and so on – together with a  whole series 
of related economic and political problems, which in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, became ‘Biopolitics’ first objects of knowledge and then targets its seeks to 
control.”  (Foucault, 2004, p 243) 
The state assumed the role of being responsible to pursue any avenue which could be 
used to enhance the welfare and productivity of its citizens, and as a result, increase 
the economic wealth and political control of the population.  Thus what has developed 
is a new type of disciplinary power.  In The Birth of the Clinic, and Discipline and 
Society, Foucault had explored how some of these mechanisms of power had come 
about.  These new power relationships are not restricted to totalitarian regimes; 
democratic and religious organizations have been involved as well.  The distinction 
made between Fascism and Democratic regimes, was in Foucault’s view, exaggerated.   
In his essay: ‘The Subject and Power’, Foucault claimed that all the technological 
systems of control, surveillance, rewards, and punishment linked to productivity were 
features of both democratic and totalitarian regimes.  The distinguishing features of 
fascism and Stalinism from democratic regimes is ‘’ their own internal madness’’.   
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(Foucault, 2000c, p 328)  One of the most important beliefs which Foucault introduced 
in his 1975 -1976 Lecture Course was the idea that political theories based on juridical 
models of power and equality should be abandoned.  These have been predicated on 
the old principle of sovereign power, which science and technology have strengthened.  
However, Foucault believed that power relationships are complex, and he explored his 
ideas on governmentality in his next two Lecture courses at the Collѐge de France. 
Security, Territory, Population:  Lectures at the Collѐge de France 1977-1978 
In this course, Foucault defined the state as ‘’ a firm domination over peoples’’. 
(Foucault, 2009, p 237)  The state is not simply a country or geographical area, its 
continued existence involves some kind of governance over a population.  In a lecture 
in March 1978, Foucault developed his ideas related to the way in which the state has 
developed its power and scale of operations since the 16C.  For the modern state 
governance includes power relations with the growth of the population, its health and 
material well–being, and the occupation and leisure activities of the people, including 
those involving religion. (Foucault, 2009, p 328) Today, the modern state is concerned 
with all aspects of a citizen’s ‘form of life’; it has taken on the role of providing 
salvation for mankind, but for an existence here on earth.  The ‘form of life’ which is 
espoused by modern man is that of a sheep–fold. (Foucault, 2009, p 130) 
Foucault described a number of ways by which the power of religious authority was 
diminished.  (Foucault, 2009, pp 204-210)   He claimed that God’s pastoral government 
of the world was severely limited during the period from 1580 to 1660.  (Foucault, 
2009, p 236)  This is a very interesting observation, as it corresponds very well to the 
time of ‘The Cartesian moment’, when the epimeleia heautou was became of less 
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importance to  an individual’s ‘way of life’, as Foucault was later to argue in the 
Hermeneutics of the Subject.   Concurrent with the erosion of pastoral power, there 
came into being a new form of governmentality.  This new form of governance was 
termed by Foucault as the raison d’Etat.  (Foucault, 2009, p 238) 34   The principle of 
power enthroned in the King, began to be ceded to a new form of power which was 
more complex and determined by the intellect and the power of reason, rather than 
simply a sovereign power which had been granted by birth.  This period since the 
seventeenth century is the time when reason has been used to justify all types of 
political action and the application of the power of the state over individuals. 
Heidegger in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ had asked for the answer to the 
question ‘‘What is the essence of Technology’’?  (Heidegger, 1977a, p 4)  Foucault 
argued that ’reason’ has become to be regarded in the age of modernity as the essence 
of things.  He wrote:  
 
Reason is therefore a means of knowledge, but it is also something that allows 
the will to adjust itself to what it knows, that is to say, to adjust itself to the very 
essence of things.  So reason will be the essence of things, knowledge of the 
reason of things, and that kind of force that enables, and up to a point obliges 
[the will] to go to the very essence of things.  (Foucault, 2009, p 256) 
    
The acquisition of knowledge and the justification for the wielding of power by 
reference to the authority of ‘reason’ is utilised by politicians.  This has led, in 
Foucault’s view, to the development of the police state.   
 
  
                                                          
34
 The Raison d’Etat was defined by Foucault as “- - -the type of rationality that will allow the 
maintenance and preservation of the state once it has been founded, in its daily functioning, in its 
everyday management.”  (Foucault, 2009, p 238) 
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The Police State or the History of the Present 
What Foucault seemed to believe was that the idea of a police state does not simply 
encompass some notion of abject domination by the power of the state. Instead, man 
is the object of new kinds of knowledge, in respect of a subject’s relationship to the 
state. (Foucault, 2009, p 322)  Man in the modern age has become to be regarded 
simply as a ‘thing’. This was of course, one of Heidegger’s objections to the modern 
development and operation of technology.  However, this relationship includes many 
elements concerned with the health and security of the citizens of the state.  This 
feature of this new type of governmentality, was termed by Foucault as biopolitics.  
Because of this type of power exerted by the modern state is regarded as virtuous and 
well intentioned, the increasing surveillance of all aspects of a citizen’s life is generally 
accepted, or even welcomed as part of the measures to promote public safety or 
health.   Foucault contrasted these interests of the modern state with the old 
operation of sovereign power exercised by a King, which was principally concerned 
both with the ability to raise an army and to raise revenue. 
Foucault outlined five areas of knowledge which are of interest to a police state.  
These include the number of citizens, their material circumstances, their health, their 
social activities and the economic circumstances surrounding individuals’ goods, 
organizations; markets, trade and wealth creation.  (Foucault, 2009, p 323-325)  The 
extent to which the modern police state seeks to govern is immense, as Foucault said:  
“- - -what police has to govern, its fundamental object is all the forms of- - -men’s co-
existence with each other.” (Foucault, 2009, p 326) 
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Foucault described a number of new aspects of governmentality, which he associated 
with the development of the power of the modern state.  By concerning itself with all 
aspects of life of its citizens, the state has acquired many new responsibilities, and has 
needed to develop management responsibilities which were unknown in the time 
when a King ruled the realm.  (Foucault, 2009, pp 322-325) 
Secondly, the new methods of governance were, or claimed to be, ‘scientific’; hence a 
state could claim that any opposition to its use of power could be deemed to be 
irrational.   As science advanced, the knowledge gained could be utilised by the state 
to accomplish its aims.  A degree of legitimacy has developed between scientific 
knowledge and technology, and the operation of power conducted on behalf of its 
citizens by the officials of the state.   
Thirdly, the new practice of governmentality has to take account of how the 
population lives and seek to ameliorate any problem which might be harmful, e.g. poor 
sanitation, poor health care, etc.  Instead of a population simply existing to be ordered 
about and controlled, the state has increasingly assumed a degree of responsibility for 
the welfare of its citizens.  
The fourth objective of the new model of the state was the regulation of people’s 
activity, particularly with respect to work and perceived idleness.  Although Foucault 
does not mention Bentham’s panopticon at this point, one can see how his model of 
how society should be under constant surveillance could be developed.  In his early 
works on prisons, schools, hospitals, Foucault had explored how Bentham’s ideas were 
put into practice. 
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Finally, the object of concern for the state was to take an interest and facilitate 
economic activity.    However, what had to be accepted  was that some events which 
take place  are not subject to state control and that there exist boundaries to the 
application of state power, e.g. natural disasters. Here, Foucault also included 
economic events, which anticipate his later discussions of the theories of the 
economist Adam Smith.  An important implication for the facilitation of economic 
activity, meant that much of the business world and trade would have to be left to 
continue with the minimum of interference.  Hence, Foucault maintained that what 
emerged here as a result of this new perspective is a new kind of freedom.  He said:  
“Failing to respect freedom is not only an abuse of rights with regard to the law, it is 
above all ignorance of how to govern properly.” (Foucault, 2009, p 353) 
As a result of his work, Foucault argued that, rather than the modern state having 
grown by simply extending the power of negative forces exerted by means of 
domination, the modern practices of governments involve a limited role in economic 
management, but a major one in relation to the welfare and control of the citizens.   
The need to allow markets to function without much interference in order to allow 
wealth to be created necessitated new domains of freedom.  These new functions and 
powers of government were additional to the existing authority wielded by an army or 
the police. (Foucault, 2009, p 354)   Some of these activities of the state can be 
encapsulated in the term ’pastoral care’, thereby the salvation offered by religious 
authority has, to some degree, become supplanted by the welfare role of the modern 
state. 
The project which Foucault had been addressing in his lectures on Security, Territory, 
Population was “a matter of asking what type of practice governmentality is, inasmuch 
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as it has effects of objectification and veridiction regarding men constituting 
themselves as subjects.”  (Foucault, 2009, p 387)  
In his final lecture in the series Security, Territory, Population, Foucault developed this 
theme of how, in order to be efficient, in terms of managing the economy, an 
omnipresent governing state seeks today to manage all aspects of every citizen’s life.  
(Foucault, 2009, pp 356-357) 
Biopolitics:  Lectures at the Collѐge de France 1978 – 1979 
Perhaps rather surprisingly, rather than exploring the various facets of government 
which related to biopolitics, Foucault devoted his main discussion in these Lectures to 
the subject of the modern role of the state with respect to power. He regarded 
‘governmentality’ as a grid for examining power relations.  (Foucault, 2008, p 186)   
What Foucault claimed that he wanted to do in his investigation of governmentality, 
was to examine the topic from a completely different point of view from the usual 
approaches which had come to be accepted in political philosophy.  In this series of 
lectures, Foucault discussed how an individual subject is constituted by political action.  
One could describe his approach as one of maintaining that: ‘the personal is political’.  
He claimed that what has evolved during the Enlightenment is: “An omnipotent 
government, a government from which nothing escapes, a government which 
conforms to the rule of right, and a government which nevertheless respects the 
specificity of the economy, will be a government that manages civil society, the nation, 
society, the social.”  (Foucault, 2008, p 296) 
   
147 
 
Two main streams of power have been developed in the modern state. First of all, the 
evolution of the traditional absolute power of sovereignty which often led  to 
domination.  Secondly, a new type of power was developed which Foucault termed 
Biopolitics. This new form of disciplinary power superficially appears to be concerned 
benevolently with the health and welfare of its citizens.  However, these different 
foundations of power can be used to further both these seemingly quite different 
objectives; for example surveillance can be used to control the behaviour of the 
population along the principles which lay behind Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon.  
Towards the end of his life, Bentham had proposed that the Panopticon should be the 
basis for the operation and maintenance of the political will; ‘‘the very formula of 
government’’.  (Foucault, 2008, p 67)  At the same time as carrying out this type of 
function, active surveillance can be promulgated as benefiting the security of every 
citizen.  So, quite often the domains of power which the modern state has developed 
often share similar features such as ‘’its omnipotence, its bureaucratic development, 
the state with the seeds of fascism which it contains, the state’s inherent violence 
beneath its social welfare paternalism - - -.” (Foucault, 2008, pp 186-187) The state 
tends to seek to increase its own power, and the welfare state is an example of this 
phenomenon, just as much as that of totalitarian regimes.  (Foucault, 2008, p 187) 
Early in his career, Foucault had developed a method of philosophical enquiry to reveal 
how the regimes of truth have become established with respect to topics such as 
madness, medicine, delinquency and sexuality. (Foucault, 2008, p 19) He disputed the 
Anglo–Saxon view which regards utilitarianism as an important modern moral theory 
of philosophy. For Foucault, utilitarianism is not important as a principle of ethics, but 
instead for the modern practice of using some of the principles of utilitarianism as the 
justification for the technology of government. (Foucault, 2008, p 41) The principles 
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underlying many of the practices of a modern state rely on the principle of utility – but 
in respect of what is deemed best for the interests of the state, rather than on some 
great moral principle, whether not it was enunciated by philosophers such as 
Bentham, Mill, or Sidgwick. 35   However, the development of the principle of utility has 
had the effect of limiting the power of the apparatus of the state.  These effects are 
illustrated by the necessity for certain aspects of freedom for the principle of a market 
economy to work.  (Foucault, 2008, p 44) 
There are two distinct concepts of freedom which have evolved, according to Foucault.   
(Foucault, 2008, pp 41-50)   The first concept is contained within the juridical concept 
of freedom – one is free insofar that the action does not break the law.  The other 
notion of freedom is the independence of the governed from the power of the state. 
He does point out that these two notions of freedom have meant that there has 
become established ‘’two conceptions of freedom and law, I do not mean two 
separate, distinct , incompatible, contradictory , and mutually exclusive systems, but 
two heterogeneous procedures, forms of coherence and ways of doing things.”  
(Foucault, 2008, p 42) 
These two seemingly contradictory operations of the power of the state were chillingly 
portrayed in three iconic novels of the twentieth century.   The novels written by 
George Orwell, 1984 and Animal Farm, illustrate the aspect of power which Foucault 
termed ‘Sovereign Power’.  Technology has been used to control and supervise the 
                                                          
35
 The famous economist, J M Keynes surely anticipated Foucault’s philosophical position.  He held, that, 
notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, our lives are governed by theories which are usually, 
incomplete, ill understood, or just plain wrong.  He wrote: “Practical men, who believe themselves to be 
quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slave of some defunct economist.  
Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from a few years back.” 
(Keynes, 1957, p 383) 
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citizens.  A quite different viewpoint was of Aldous Huxley, who wrote Brave New 
World in 1932.  (Huxley, 2007)  In the type of society which he depicted, every human 
being lives in an age of safety, boredom, and with a complete rejection of spiritual 
values.  Surely, this society is one which corresponds to Foucault’s analysis of 
biopolitics?  The major factor dominating the lives of everyone is material comfort and 
well-being.   Society is concerned solely with material values, with a vision, or as 
Heidegger would have put it, a ‘world picture’, based only on empiricism.  The 
advances in science and technology, facilitates the surveillance and control of the 
citizens.    What is remarkable is that Huxley wrote Brave New World before 
Heidegger’s polemical writings about the dangers from empiricism and a society which 
he lamented was one where:  “Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to 
technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it.”  (Heidegger, 1977a, p 4) 
The Eclipse of the Epimeleia Heautou 
The most interesting aspect of Foucault’s 1978 – 1979 lecture course is the description 
of the replacement of God as the source of all authority for our modern ‘way of life’ by 
the ‘invisible hand’ of the market.    According to Foucault, since the eighteenth 
century, what has evolved is ‘‘- - -a state under the supervision of the market, rather 
than a market supervised by the state.’’  (Foucault, 2008, p 116)  This interesting 
viewpoint made by Foucault, who died in 1984, was very prescient.  At the end of 
2011, both Greece and Italy have had to bow to the power of the market, and 
democratically elected politicians have been effectively removed from office.  
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 The continuation of the sovereign use of power by the state concurrently with the 
growth of capitalism and market economies in the West, should have made the 
modern state all-powerful.  However, as a result of the new forms of power which 
have been established by market mechanisms, Foucault described how the nation 
state has had to surrender some of its power.  (Foucault, 2008, p 268)  A major agent 
of social change has been the ‘invisible hand’ of Adam Smith.  In his treatise, The 
Wealth of Nations, Smith reasoned that self – interest should be regarded as a virtue, 
because of the favourable outcomes which should ensue. Smith argued that self 
interest in a business man is a virtue in a famous passage from book iv of The Wealth 
of Nations ‘’ By preferring the support of domestick to that of foreign industry , he 
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its 
produce may be of the greater value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this as 
in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of 
his intention.”  (Smith, 1976, p 456) 
 Foucault described this state of affairs as quite bizarre, as the modern economic 
practices at work and of business leads a modern subject to “live within a totality 
which eludes him and which nevertheless founds the rationality of egoistic choices.”   
(Foucault, 2008, p 278) 
Foucault described in The Birth of Biopolitics, how the absolute belief in the efficacy 
and good will of this ‘invisible hand’ have assumed the role of Malebranche’s God. 
Nicolas Malebranche (1638 - 1715) was an important French philosopher of the 
seventeenth century.  In his philosophy, God was supreme, good and responsible for 
all things.  Foucault’s concept of likening Malebranche’s God to the invisible hand of 
Smith is compelling:  “Smith’s invisible hand would be something like Malebranche’s 
151 
 
God, whose intelligible exterior would not be occupied by lines, surfaces and bodies; 
but by merchants, ships carriages and roads.”  (Foucault, 2008 pp 278-279)  
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant described the mode of life which was based on 
deism in the eighteenth century.  He wrote: “In other words, reason does not assure us 
of the objective validity of the concept; it merely gives us the idea of something, on 
which the supreme and necessary unity of all experience is based.”  (Kant, 1993a,  
A674/B702)  This link between deism and governmentality, is an example of what 
Foucault described as the ‘Christianization of the state’.  Deism is an act of faith, upon 
which the principle of the market and ‘the invisible hand’, surely depend as well.  This 
link between deism and economic theory is not altogether new, as John Maynard 
Keynes made a similar point in the 1930’s.  (Keynes, 1957, pp 350-351) 36  This invisible 
hand is an abstract notion, metaphysical in character, yet rational human beings, 
claiming that their behaviour is solely to be guided by reason, place absolute faith in 
this abstract entity.  In an earlier chapter, we described what Foucault termed ‘The 
Christianization of the State’.  The way by which the Christian God was usurped as a 
source of spiritual authority was not fully mapped out, yet here Foucault’s reference to 
Malebranche opens up an extremely powerful explanation of the development of a 
secular society in the West. 
Adam Smith’s arguments in his work on economics included the notion that, for the 
good of all, some individuals would have to suffer.  The system could not be designed 
which would promote overall prosperity yet ensure that some individuals and their 
                                                          
36
 The link between classical economic theory and religious belief was made by Keynes in 1935.  He 
wrote in his “General Theory of Employment” a critique of the notion that economic theories should be 
accepted as a matter of faith:  “One recurs to the analogy between the sway of the classical school of 
economic theory and that of certain religions.  For it is a far greater exercise of the potency of an idea to 
exorcise the obvious, than to introduce into men’s common notions, the recondite and remote.”  
(Keynes, 1957, pp 350-351) 
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families would not have to endure real hardship.  Foucault’s point was that 
Malebranche had accepted that the Christian God knew that evil things happened on 
earth, and that God had no real choice but to allow these things to happen.  The 
benevolence of such a god is often difficult for a mere mortal to appreciate.  What 
Malebranche did was to engage in the well worn debate amongst philosophers, the 
problem of evil, and free will.  He corresponded with Leibniz and Arnaud on this topic. 
Nadler argued that both Malebranche and Leibniz believed that the God of Christianity 
allowed evil and bad things to happen on earth. (Nadler, 1994, p 578)  The measure of 
agreement between them was summed up by Nadler:  
 
They agree that God could (theoretically) diminish or even eliminate apparent 
imperfections in the world - the quantity of pain and unhappiness or 
inconvenience - but only by interfering with the laws and thus violating the 
simplicity of the divine ways (as Malebranche would put it) or by detracting from 
the overall and maximum metaphysical goodness or perfection of the world (as 
Leibniz would say).  (Nadler, 1994, p 578)   
 
Malebranche‘s approach encapsulates the idea of the simplicity of a method resulting 
in the best possible outcome.  God is not responsible for each individual action or evil 
which occurs in the world, he allows free will; but what he established was a world 
wherein the best possible outcomes could take place. This analysis by Malebranche 
enables man to be ‘free’ to make his own decisions in life, yet is subject to a power 
which is both omniscient and omnipotent. This is analogous to the ‘invisible hand’, 
which allows unfavourable outcomes for some people, for the greater good overall.   
Malebranche’s God is both omnipotent and omniscient.  It should now be clear why 
Foucault invoked the idea of Malebranche’s God to explain the blind acceptance, total 
faith, and passivity towards an impersonal, abstract source of power, a hidden entity: 
‘the invisible hand’. 
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The conduct of economic affairs under the aegis of ‘the invisible hand’, has meant that 
a modern ‘way of life’ is subject to two related requirements of Adam Smith’s theories.  
In order to benefit society as a whole, everyone is supposed to follow selfishly what 
they perceive to be in their own best interest.    As Foucault rather acidly put it: ‘’Being 
in the dark and the blindness of all the economic agents are absolutely necessary.’’  
(Foucault, 2009, p 279)  The invisibility of the process means that no individual 
economic agent in the age of Modernity, should pursue, or even consider, the 
common good.  (Foucault, 2008, p 280)  Although Foucault does not pursue the 
Christianization of the state to any great extent in The Birth of Biopolitics, he does 
make the point that one of the effects of the form of capitalism advocated by Adam 
Smith is the production of a ‘form of life’ where the power and influence of the 
Christian God is usurped and operationalised by the ‘invisible hand’ of the market. 
Adam Smith responded to some criticisms of his Wealth of Nations, by publishing a 
text on ethics – The Theory of Moral Sentiments. His treatise consisted of an historical 
analysis of actions which could be of benefit to the whole community.  Adam Smith 
criticised the principle of self-love in ‘‘any degree or duration’’.  (Smith, 2009, p 356)  
This notion is inimical to the ancient ideas of epimeleia heautou, where the necessity 
to care of oneself was a fundamental requirement before one could attend to the 
needs of others as a good citizen.  
The three main components of virtue for Adam Smith, were benevolence, propriety 
and prudence. (Smith, 2009, pp 358-359)  He argued that virtue is to be found in 
utility.  (Smith, 2009, p 359) I have found nothing in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, to 
undermine the economic ideas in The Wealth of Nations.  Indeed the following passage 
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is consistent with the operation of the ‘invisible hand’ with virtue, because of the 
possible growth in the overall prosperity for a community:  
 
In directing all our actions to promote the greatest possible good, in submitting 
all inferior affections to the desire of the general happiness of mankind, in 
regarding oneself but as one of the many, whose prosperity was to be pursued 
no further than it was consistent with, or conducive to that of the whole, 
consisted the perfection of virtue.  (Smith, 2009, p 356) 
  
Acknowledging the widespread acceptance and practice of Adam Smith’s ideas, 
Foucault argued that the modern state sets its sights upon various courses of action 
which are determined by the value placed on utility.  He claimed that the fundamental 
question of liberalism is ‘’What is the utility value of government where exchange 
determines the true value of things?’’ (Foucault, 2008a, p 46)  Rather than the 
principles of political philosophies such as utilitarianism ushering in a number of 
improved ‘ways of life’, Foucault argued that they had been usurped to serve the 
interests of those who wielded power. He claimed that ‘’The state only exists for itself 
and in relation to itself- - -‘’.  (Foucault, 2008, p 5)37 
For a market to function efficiently there must be some degree of freedom for trade 
and commerce to take place without interference.  As a result, Western nation states 
have had to accept the fact that some traditional powers of the state must be 
curtailed.   Foucault claimed that:  “We have then the conditions for the creation for a 
formidable body of legislation and an incredible range of governmental interventions 
                                                          
37
 The absence of a moral framework for a form of life which is to be determined by utility, was criticized 
by Hannah Arendt, who was a pupil of Heidegger.  In her work: The Human Condition, she claimed that: 
‘’- - -utility generates meaninglessness.’’   (Arendt, 1998, p 155)  She argued that both man and nature 
are treated as a mere means because of the notion of utility, and as a result have no value in 
themselves. (Arendt, 1988, p 155)  The philosophy behind utilitarian principles, is in Arendt’s view, 
consistent with Kant’s philosophy, because it regards nature as merely in existence to serve man.  
(Arendt, 1988, p 156)  The philosopher Eina Øverenget agreed with Arendt’s views, and stated that: ‘’- - -
it is impossible to locate the origination of meaning in a utilitarian world.’’  (Øverenget, 2001, p 203) 
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to guarantee production of freedom needed in order to govern.” (Foucault, 2008, 
pp 64-65) 
Magnus Hornqvist has argued that Foucault had not engaged sufficiently with the 
notion that it is the people themselves who demand the benefits of biopolitics.  
(Hornqvist, 2010)  The new forms of disciplinary power had been welcomed by those 
who are subjects of the state.  What politician would propose: poorer sanitation, poor 
Health Care, poorer food supplies and of inferior quality, intermittent water supplies 
etc?  On the whole, the increased power of the state through the development of 
biopolitics, utilising scientific knowledge and new technology, has been demanded by 
the population of a country as it has become industrialised.  In ‘The Question 
Concerning Technology’, Heidegger asked why man is ‘enframed’ by technology? 
(Heidegger, 1977a, p 20)  An important feature which has resulted from Foucault’s 
work is that to a degree, this ‘enframing’ has been demanded by man himself.  
Salvation in the after – life, has been superceded by the provision of a material kind of 
salvation by the development of biopolitics here on earth.  Lackey pointed out that the 
Christian subject:  ‘‘- - -conceives of itself in relation to an imagined metaphysical 
reality.’’  (Lackey, 2009, p 131 
  In his book on Heidegger, Andrew Haas argued that the essence of technology cannot 
be reduced to: ‘’a unitary essence’’.  (Haas, 2007, p 154) 38 I agree with this view, and 
would only claim that the ‘invisible hand’, a metaphysical concept due to Adam Smith, 
is merely one of a multiplicity of phenomena associated with Heidegger’s concerns 
                                                          
38
 Hass put forward an argument that the ancient Greek idea of trying to establish the essence of 
something, is irrelevant for technology which manifests itself in so many different ways.  Hass wrote:  
“The multiplicity of technology cannot be reduced to a single essence.  The smallest and largest 
difference between technology as a means-to-an-end, and an end-in-itself, between building an art or 
shelter, or the Rhine as a power source or as a source of inspiration cannot be maintained- - - “.  (Hass, 
2007, p 154) 
156 
 
about the origins of ‘enframing’ and the essence of technology.  The modern ‘way of 
life’, has to some extent, abandoned the practices associated with the ‘care of the self’ 
– the epimeleia heautou.  Foucault’s work on governmentality has, I believe, explained 
some of the major influences on our ‘way of life’ as a result of this development.  
However, ‘the market’ is an imaginary construct which has great impact on economic, 
social and political life in the West.  It has more in common with the practices 
associated with Deism, as both Foucault and Keynes have pointed out, than is 
commonly supposed.   
Foucault also pointed out two more important features of a world trying to conduct 
human affairs under the aegis of a market philosophy.  Because each actor must ignore 
the outcomes of his actions on everyone else, the outcomes of economic events which 
will result are unpredictable.  (Foucault, 2008, pp 279-290) Of course, Governments, 
individuals and companies will try to manipulate the market – a perfect market 
economy exists only in theory.   The second feature which he described was that the 
state must allow certain aspects of freedom for the market to operate properly.  The 
net result is:  “- - -economic rationality is not only surrounded by, but founded on the 
unknowability of the whole process.”  (Foucault, 2008, p 282)  
It is worth pointing out that Foucault was well aware of the economic benefits  of a 
market driven economy over an authoritarian one.  He contrasted the collapse of the 
French colonies in America with the experience of the British.  The French arrived with 
grand plans and projects which failed; the British merely set about embarking on trade 
based on the principles of self – interest and those colonies thrived.  (Foucault, 2008, 
p 281)  
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Conclusion 
Foucault’s approach to philosophy was not one which sought to uncover one over-
arching explanation for historical events.  (Foucault, 1987, p 14)  He always argued that 
there are always a multiplicity of effects, connections, and counterveilling forces in all 
of his work on the archaeology and genealogy of knowledge.  His explanations of the 
emergence of some new forms of disciplinary power based on biopolitics are original 
and compelling.  Heidegger posed the question: ‘‘what is the essence of technology?’’  
He made the point that it is nothing technological.  I believe that In The Birth of  
Biopolitics,  Foucault has uncovered one of the major factors in the essence of modern 
technology   Because so many of the features of Theodicy are common to both the 
Christian way of life and the new economic model of the market, there has been a 
gradual process of evolution so that the prospect of  salvation in the after – life has 
become superceded by the provision of a material kind of salvation by the 
development of biopolitics here on earth. 
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“Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.” (Shelley, 1994, p 661) 
CHAPTER 9 
Heidegger’s Poetics and the Hermeneutics of the Subject 
Introduction 
This concluding chapter will discuss Foucault’s work on the creation of the modern 
subject in terms of Heidegger’s poetics and will link such a discussion to the central 
arguments and ideas examined in the previous chapters.  This thesis set out to connect 
Heidegger’s lament about the modern ‘oblivion of Being’ to the ‘Cartesian Moment’ 
when the precept to ‘know yourself ’ became the predominant mode of existence 
instead of the practices associated with ‘take care of yourself ’in the                      
seventeenth-century.   This turning away from Being has, in Heidegger’s view, been 
associated with the development of man’s ‘enframing’ (Gestell) by modern technology 
since the seventeenth-century. (Heidegger, 1977a, p 22) 
This chapter contains five parts.  First of all, in Part 1 a brief account of Heidegger’s 
poetics is given.  This serves as an introduction in Part 2 to Heidegger’s philosophy of 
homelessness and its connection to a ‘way of life’ which is dominated by technology, 
and dependent on the primary importance given to knowledge (chapter 6).  Part 3 is 
concerned with Heidegger’s poetic thinking on man seeking out a ‘homecoming’ from 
the oblivion of Being.  
In Part 4 there is a discussion of the ‘Cartesian Moment’ with respect to the 
development of the modern age in which Heidegger claimed that we are ‘enframed’ by 
technology.  Finally, Part 5 considers the possible link between the virtual 
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abandonment of the ancient practices of ‘care of the self’ and Heidegger’s lament that 
in modernity man has become oblivious of any thought of Being. 
Part 1:  Heidegger’s Poetics 
Heidegger argued that we must have a poetic relationship with all that exists.  This 
theme was elaborated by Heidegger in his essay ‘Poetically Man Dwells’, which is a 
phrase quoted by him from a late poem by Hölderlin ‘In Lovely Blue’.  This dwelling is 
not related to living conditions, but instead a mode of life which embraced an 
authentic mode of existence. (Heidegger, 1971c, pp 213–229)  Heidegger regarded 
Hölderlin as the essential poet because his poetic thinking attempted to address the 
problem of Being.  (‘What are Poets For?’ Heidegger, 1971a, pp 132 - 142)  This 
concern about Being was explained further by Heidegger in his essay ‘Hölderlin and the 
Essence of Poetry’.  (Heidegger, 1949b, pp 306-307)  The essence of poetic thinking is 
that it enables thinking to break free from a mere object/subject relationship.  Poetry 
introduces imagination into a more fundamental aspect of language than the formal 
rational approach of linguistics.  Language is perceived as only to be concerned with 
rational, objective thinking which of course corresponds to  claim in The Hermeneutics 
of the Subject that ‘knowledge of the self’ has become the predominant practice in our 
‘way of life’.  In the ‘ Letter on Humanism’ Heidegger wrote: ‘’The liberation of 
language from grammar into a more original essential framework is reserved for 
thought and poetic creation.’’(Heidegger, 1993c, p 218) 
Rather than poetic thinking being a diversion from the realities of existence, Heidegger 
regarded poetry as a way of reconnecting with Being.  In his essay ‘Poetically man 
Dwells’ Heidegger wrote:  “Poetry does not fly above and surmount the earth in order 
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to escape it and hover over it.  Poetry is what first brings man onto the earth, making 
him belong to it, and thus brings him into dwelling.” (Heidegger, 1971c, p 218) 
Poetic thinking is not related to a particular ‘way of life’ but a type of thinking which 
calls for us to attend to the nature of Being.  In his work on Hölderlin’s poem ‘The Ister’  
Heidegger explained how poetic thinking can focus attention on the nature of Being: 
“What essentially prevails as being, and is never a being or something actual and 
therefore always appears to be nothing, can be said only in poetizing or thought in 
thinking.”  (Heidegger, 1996b, p 120) 
According to Jennifer Gosetti-Ferencei, Heidegger’s poetics is a counter to the 
prevailing view throughout the world which is based on knowledge, science and 
technology.   (Gosetti-Ferencei, 2004, p 144) Instead, Heidegger offers a poetic vision 
of a world which is not dominated by technology.  He drew a distinction between 
straightforward introspection and the essence of remembrance which necessitates 
thinking about Being and escaping from a state of homelessness.  In his essay 
‘Remembrance’  Heidegger wrote:  “The thinker thinks towards what is un–homelike, 
what is not like home and for him this is not a transitional phase; rather this is his 
being at home.  The poet’s questioning on the other hand is a commemorative 
questioning that puts the homelike itself into poetry”.  (Heidegger, 2000, p 151) 
Only by being open to different ‘ways of life’ can man overcome ‘’the oblivion of 
Being’’ claimed Heidegger in the ‘Letter on Humanism’. (Heidegger, 1993c, p 242) Of 
all the dangers which face man by technology, this concern about the oblivion of Being 
is the most important.  (Heidegger, 1977b, pp 36 - 38) 
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The importance of poetical truth for Heidegger lies in it being the kind of truth which 
‘’troubles the ordinary distinction between the real and the imaginary, the verifiable 
and the elusive.’’ (Gosetti-Ferencei, 2004, p 244) 
Part 2:  Man’s State of ‘’Homelessness’’  
In his essay ‘Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry’, Heidegger quoted from a poem by 
Hölderlin, ’The Voice of the People ’ the line ‘’Poetically man dwells on Earth’’.  
(Heidegger, 1949b, p 312) Heidegger explained that to ‘’dwell poetically’’, means ‘’to 
stand in the presence of gods and to be involved in the proximity of the essence of 
things.’’  (Heidegger, 1949b, p 306) Heidegger described dwelling as ‘’the basic 
character of Being in keeping with which mortals exist.’’  (Heidegger, 1971b, p 160) 
Before discussing aspects of poetics which are pertinent to Foucault’s work, it is 
appropriate to establish why Heidegger developed the notion that man lives in the age 
of modernity in a state of  ‘homelessness’.  In ‘The Letter on Humanism’, Heidegger 
describes the condition of man’s existence today as being Homeless because modern 
man is oblivious to the problem of the estrangement from Being.   (Heidegger, 1993c, 
p 242)  Heidegger believed that in the modern age man is captive to a state of 
homelessness–it is ‘’coming to be the destiny of the world.’’ (Heidegger, 1993c, p 243) 
Homelessness in Heidegger’s terms is not related to a place, building, or shelter.  It is a 
condition in which man lives where ‘’the truth of Being remains unthought.’’ 
(Heidegger, 1993c, p 242) In his essay ‘Building, Dwelling, Thinking’, Heidegger 
introduced the idea of the ‘fourfold’ for man to dwell properly on earth.  (Heidegger, 
1971b, pp 149 -151)  The fourfold comprises the earth, sky, and gods and mortals.  The 
essential feature of the fourfold however is unity. (Heidegger, 1971b, p 149)  This 
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concept of unity is important because of its relevance to Being.  However, because of 
his emphasis on the essential nature of the unity of the fourfold, Heidegger explained 
that it would be impossible for man to investigate Being by himself.   
As a result of our viewing the world as one of representation, in The Introduction to 
Metaphysics, Heidegger lamented that we have no place for any concept of Being.        
(Heidegger, 2014, p 130)  Thinking has become detached from Being and as a result, 
the condition of man today is one of homelessness. (Heidegger, 1993c, p 243) He 
refuted the subject/object way of thinking and argued that philosophy should not be 
dominated by logic and scientific calculation – what corresponds closely to ‘knowledge 
of the self’, in Foucault’s Hermeneutics of the Subject (See chapter 3).  The problem 
with language today according to Heidegger, is that it is concerned primarily with 
information.  This is the reason that poetic language, releasing imagination and 
creativity, is so important.  (Heidegger, 1993f, pp 420-425) 
In the ‘Question Concerning Technology’, Heidegger described the modern ‘way of life’ 
which consists of living in a state of ‘enframing’, a mode of existence whereby man has 
lost his freedom. (Heidegger, 1977a, pp 3-35)  This is the state of ‘homelessness’, when 
“The essence of modern technology starts man upon the way of that revealing through 
which the real - - - becomes standing reserve.”(Heidegger, 1977a, p24)   This state of 
‘homelessness’ has resulted in a situation where ‘‘nowhere does man today encounter 
himself, i.e. his essence.’’  (Heidegger, 1977a, p27)   Homelessness is concerned with 
man’s estrangement from Being and the total range of possibilities for human life. 
(Heidegger, 1993c, p 243)  Robert Mugerauer has summarized Heidegger’s position.  
‘’Man’s ‘’Homelessness’’ has two aspects to it.  First of all, we are oblivious that we 
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have foregotton Being, secondly we are oblivious to the fact that we are not at home.’’  
(Mugerauer, 2014, p61) 
 In Being and Time, Heidegger made it clear that in order to dwell properly on earth 
one must reject the modern ‘way of life’ throughout which man is treated as a 
resource to be ordered about. (Heidegger, 1962,pp 344 – 345)  This was a theme which 
Heidegger later expounded in his essays ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ 
(Heidegger, 1977a, pp 3-35) and ‘The Turning.’  (Heidegger, 1977b, pp 36-49)  Because 
our ‘way of life’ today is founded on the principles of logic and scientific rationality, 
Heidegger claimed that ‘’the gods have fled.’’  (Heidegger, 1977d, p 117)  In ‘The Age 
of the World Picture’ Heidegger made it clear that he was not referring to a god of 
organized religion. (Heidegger, 1977d)  He invoked the idea that the gods as possessing 
a higher power than man, thus seeking to displace the anthropocentric view of man in 
the age of modernity.                     
Part 3:  Homecoming 
Heidegger believed that in order to dwell properly, some kind of journey has to be 
made which he termed ‘homecoming.’ He sought in Hölderlin’s poetry a possible way 
to reach ‘home’ and dwell properly on earth. The reason for embarking on this journey 
was described by Heidegger in his essay ‘Remembrance of the Poet’ as a ‘’return into 
the proximity of the source’’.  (Heidegger, 1949a, pp 278 -9)  In this essay, Heidegger 
claimed that in order to embark on this journey the assistance of the poet is required.  
This is because in the age of modernity, all sense of seeking the truth about Being has 
been lost. The poet by stimulating the facility of imagination can reveal aspects of 
truth which is ignored in an age where the world and man himself is ‘enframed’ by 
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technology.  One can think of Martin Luther King as an example of someone who used 
language and poetic imagination to bring about a fundamental change in the way that 
the Black Americans perceived themselves and hence repudiated a culture which 
‘enframed’ them.  In Hölderlin’s poetry, the theme of ‘homecoming’   is recurrent.  In 
‘What are Poets For?’ Heidegger made it clear that the poet was essential in order to 
come somewhat closer to his notion of Being:  ‘’The Locality to which Hölderlin came is 
a manifestness of Being and which, out of that destiny, is intended for the poet.’’ 
(Heidegger, 1971a, p 95)   
In his essay ‘Remembrance of the Poet’, Heidegger challenged the straightforward, 
common sense notion that in order to approach the source – Being, we need to ‘’learn 
how to get to know it.’’ (Heidegger, 1949a, p 279) Instead, Heidegger claimed that we   
‘’ never get to know a mystery by unveiling or guarding it; we only get to know it by 
carefully guarding the mystery as mystery.’’ (Heidegger, 1949a, p 279) The mystery is 
the apparently nonsensical belief that something can be both near and far away. 
Heidegger pointed out that this claim is apparently not logical – how can something be 
both near and far away at the same time?  (Heidegger, 1949a, p 280) 
 The explanation lies in Heidegger’s Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘’The Ister.’’  Hölderlin wrote 
poems about the Ister (The Danube) and the Rhine.  Heidegger pointed out that ‘’The 
river is both a locality and a journeying.’’ (Heidegger, 1996a, p 43) On reflection, one 
can understand that the river is constantly changing, its composition, speed, position 
etc.  It is not one set ‘thing’.  Moreover, where exactly is the origin of the Ister?  There 
may be one named source, but the river will draw its strength from water and matter 
which are set over a vast area, so paradoxically, the nearer we get to the origin of a 
river, the more elusive and hard to reach it becomes. Heidegger quoted the words of 
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Hölderlin in his book on The Ister: ‘’Yet what one does that river, no one knows.’’ 
(Heidegger, 1996a, p19)      
  This type of thinking by both Heidegger and Hölderlin is resonant of the pre- Socratic 
philosopher, Heraclitus.  (Gosetti–Ferencei, 2004 p17) So, the poet may get us nearer 
to the origin, but Heidegger’s point seems to be that Being will always remain elusive 
for us.  ‘’Being is not something that is actual, but that which determines what is actual 
in its potential for being, and determines especially the potential for human beings to 
be.’’ (Heidegger, 1996b, p 120) This potential ‘for humans to be’ is what Foucault 
discussed in The Hermeneutics of the Subject and his texts on disciplinary modes of 
human control and the development of biopolitics. (see chapter 8).  In the light of 
Heidegger’s Poetics, Foucault’s work will now be discussed below.                     
Part  4:  The Importance of The Cartesian Moment 
In chapter 5 the importance of the work of Descartes in the establishment of the 
‘Cartesian Moment’ is described. In Foucault’s view, the ‘Cartesian Moment’ was a 
turning point when the ‘care of the self’ became of secondary importance to 
‘knowledge of the self’.  It became more and more the case that the fundamental 
access to the truth could now increasingly be found only by recourse to scientific 
rationality. (Foucault, 2005, p 14)   In this age of modernity it is almost universally 
accepted that the ‘’subject’s access to truth is by knowledge (connaissance) and 
knowledge alone.” (Foucault, 2005, p 17)  An important feature of modern life in 
Foucault’s view is that anyone can access the truth, or what is believed to be the truth, 
about someone without that person’s knowledge or agreement.  With respect to the 
constitution and conduct of the modern subject, Foucault developed the theme that 
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effectively repudiated the idea that we should passively accept the revealed ‘truths’ 
about the subjects or groups found in our modern technological society.  In ‘The 
Subject and Power’ Foucault wrote: ‘’Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover 
what we are, but to refuse what we are.  We have to imagine and to build up what we 
could be to get rid of this kind of ‘double blind’ which is the simultaneous 
individualization and totalization of modern power structures.’’   (Foucault, 2000c,        
p 336) 
In ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, Heidegger made similar claims to Foucault. 
(Heidegger, 1977a, pp 3 – 35) What was of concern to Heidegger was not the 
proliferation of technological devices, but his perception that our existence in the 
world is based solely on knowledge; poetic thinking is absent. (Heidegger, 1977a, p 20)  
Indeed, Heidegger criticised the recent development which places man at the centre of 
all things, based on a world evaluated by knowledge gained by representation alone: 
‘’What is decisive is that man expressly takes up his position as one constituted by 
himself, that he intentionally maintains it as that taken up by himself and that he 
makes it as secure as the solid footing for a possible development of humanity.’’ 
(Heidegger, 1977d, p 132)    
In chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis, both Heidegger’s and Foucault’s views on modern 
science are discussed.  Both philosophers accord with the view that knowledge-based 
thinking linked to ideas about scientific rationality dominate our ‘way of life’ today.  It 
is important to realise that this domination by scientific rationality of most of the 
thinking today is accepted and welcomed by many scientists and philosophers. Robert 
Mugerauer developed this theme in Heidegger and Homecoming.  As the age of 
modernity has developed, truth has become solely associated with reason, together 
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with thinking being dominated by a subject/object empirical perspective.  (Mugerauer, 
2008, pp 297-299) 
The ‘Vienna Circle’ was an intellectual group which was set up by leading philosophers 
and scientists in the mid-twentieth century and published an influential manifesto. It 
denied the value of spiritual or religious practices and placed man at the centre of all 
things:  “Everything is accessible to man; and man is the centre of all things. - - -The 
scientific world conception knows no unsolvable riddle.  Clarification of the traditional 
philosophical problems leads us partly to unmask them as pseudo-problems, and 
partly to transform them into empirical problems and thereby subject them to the 
judgement of experimental science.”  (Carnap, Hahn, Neurath, 2003, p 89)  The origins 
of this kind of thinking were discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
The view of the world promulgated by the ‘Vienna Circle’ of course has no place for 
poetic thinking. This state of affairs Heidegger termed the ’oblivion of Being’.  The next 
section will discuss whether this ‘oblivion of Being’ can be at all linked with the virtual 
abandonment of the former practices of ‘care of the self’.  
Part 5:  Care of the Self and the Oblivion of Being 
Before discussing topics such as spirituality and remembrance in terms of Heidegger’s 
poetics and the practices of ‘care of the self’, a number of observations need to be 
made. First of all, in Part 4, I sought to establish that we do indeed live in an age when 
knowledge and rationality are the foundation of modern life.  Secondly, as a result we 
live in a state which is completely oblivious of Being.  Thirdly, it is possible that ‘care of 
the self’ did seek to address the question of Being.  With these points in mind, some of 
the practices of ‘care of the self’ will be discussed in terms of Heidegger’s poetics. 
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Foucault described the concept of spirituality as one of the key elements of the 
practices which were associated with the ‘care of the self’ over many centuries.  
(Foucault, 2005, pp 10 – 19)  Spiritual exercises included remembrance of past events, 
questioning one’s own conscience, meditation, and examination and thought (critically 
rather than passively) about any representation of how the world appears to the 
subject. (Foucault, 2005, p 11) In early Greek life, dreaming was regarded as an event 
when sometimes a hidden truth might be revealed. (Foucault, 2005 p 48)  These 
techniques were developed in order to bring about a change in the subject, in order 
that the truth which lay hidden can be revealed.  
 Foucault wrote:  
Spirituality postulates that the subject as such does not have right of access to 
the truth and is not capable of having access to the truth.  It postulates that the 
truth is not given to the subject by a simple act of knowledge (connaissance), 
which would be founded and justified simply by the fact that he is the subject 
and because he possesses this or that structure of subjectivity.  It postulates that 
for the subject to have right of access to the truth he must be changed, 
transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a certain point, 
other than himself. (Foucault, 2005, p 15) 
There are three key features of Foucault’s analysis of spirituality in terms of ‘care of 
the self’.  First of all, there is a clear distinction between spiritual truth and the truth 
which is granted by knowledge. Secondly, ‘’The truth is only given to the subject at a 
price that brings the subject’s being into play.’’ (Foucault, 2005, p 15) Thirdly, this act 
of transformation of the subject does not merely grant some kind of understanding, it 
also more fundamentally produces a transformation of the subject so that the 
existence as a being-in the-world is changed.  ‘’In short, in the truth and in access to 
the truth, there is something that fulfils the subject himself, which fulfils or 
transfigures his very being.’’  (Foucault, 2005, p 16)  In chapter 3 a full account is given 
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of Foucault’s genealogy in The Hermeneutics of the Subject.  However a key 
observation needs to be made here which is that in order to obtain a better 
understanding of the truth, a subject who is involved in the practices of ‘care of the 
self’ has to be prepared to undertake a journey – a journey which will in all probability 
never reach a final destination as these spiritual exercises were carried on throughout 
life.  In The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault described Ēthopoiosas as a quality 
which enabled an individual to transform his relationship to the world. (Foucault, 2005 
p 237)  A subject who has this ability has the power to develop a new form of ethics, by 
a transformation of the self.   
 Meditation was one of the practices of ‘care of the self’ described in chapter 3.  This 
was one of the ways by which the journey to find the truth was attempted, but this 
search proved to be a lifelong task.   When he discussed in his essay ‘Remembrance’ 
Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘’Andenken,’’   Heidegger described how he understood meditation 
in the light of Hölderlin’s poetry: 
The poet asks about the companion and about the friends and yet he is asking 
above all, though not only, about himself.  Certainly, he is not speculating about 
the “ego” of his own personhood; rather, he asks, away from his ego, about the 
essential place of the self, whose own proper element is the fulfilment of the 
essence of his poethood. (Heidegger, 2000, p 151)   
This passage is quite remarkable, as it could be regarded as a description of some of 
the practices of ‘care of the self’.  The change in the mode of existence which Foucault 
described as a transformation of a subject’s very being, resonates with the description 
of Heidegger’s that we exist in a state of homelessness.  The recognition by a subject 
to be prepared to undertake a transformation in his very being surely has some degree 
of merit in recognising what Heidegger termed ‘the oblivion of Being’.  Clearly, this link 
might be described as tenuous, at best, but those who chose to undertake a 
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transformation rejected the idea that the truth could be granted by ‘knowledge of the 
self’ alone. 
In his discussion of ‘The Historically Grounded Spirit’ Heidegger made it clear that the 
concept of ‘spirit’ in his philosophy was not to be confused with the Holy Ghost of 
Christian Theology, or a concept of the ‘Absolute’. (Heidegger, 1996c, p 127) The poet 
Hölderlin described spirituality as a journey – a journey to the source. (Heidegger, 
1996c, pp 140-143)  However, what Heidegger described in The Ister was much more 
than what one might describe as varying practices to ’live well’. Heidegger explained 
‘’Poetry demands of us a transformation in our ways of thinking and experiencing, one 
that concerns being in its entirety.’’ (Heidegger, 1996c, p 166) The journey which 
Heidegger alludes to is to dwell within ‘the fourfold’ and only then at the conclusion of 
the journey could one be at home.  
In  his essay ‘What calls for Thinking?’  Heidegger described how important memory is 
for the development of a poetic aspect to language and its value in helping to shape 
man’s existence.  (Heidegger, 1993e, pp 376-7)  Heidegger discussed the importance of 
poetic thinking for the true meaning of remembrance: 
Remembrance here does not mean merely thinking of that which has been, 
(namely journeying into the foreign) but simultaneously thinking ahead ‘’to’’ 
what is coming, giving thought to the locality of the homely and its ground that is 
to be founded. Thoughtful remembrance as this multidirectional thinking that is 
directed toward what must be properly said by the poet is a pointing. 
(Heidegger, 1996b, p 151) 
 
The poet is needed in order to draw attention to the origin, that is, the necessity to 
engage with the problem of Being.  In The Hermeneutics of the Subject memory and 
remembrance were associated with issues related to matters of conscience, 
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understanding of the phenomenal world, and reviewing cultural practices of oneself 
and of others. 
Heidegger paid little attention to the ancient practices of ‘care of the self’, presumably 
because these practices did not suitably address the problem of Being.   However, 
Foucault made it very clear that in his work in The Hermeneutics of the Subject that he 
had been addressing Heidegger’s problem of Being and the themes of homelessness 
and homecoming.  In his summary of his lecture course on hermeneutics, Foucault 
declared that: “We are still very far from what would be a Hermeneutics of the 
Subject.  On the contrary, it is a question of arming a subject of a truth he did not know 
and did not dwell within him.”  (Foucault, 2005, p 501)  Foucault claimed that in the 
modern world, the ‘the care of the self’ is of value.  Responsibility for how one shapes 
one’s life is of fundamental importance.  Foucault commented in an interview (‘The 
Masked Philosopher’) on the problem of truth for a subject today:  “I would say at that 
this point that philosophy is a way of reflecting on our relation to the truth.  But it 
must not end there.  It’s a way of asking oneself, if such is the relation that we have 
with the truth, then how should we conduct ourselves?” (Foucault, 1989b, p 307) 
In his essays on language and poetry, Heidegger made the important claim that man in 
the world must ponder on different possibilities of existence. The practices of ‘care for 
the self’ described in chapter 3 of this thesis surely attempted to do that and reach a 
better understanding of the possibilities of how to live well.  This seems to be a very 
close description of the intention behind the practices of ‘care of the self’.  
 In Being and Time, Heidegger wrote in terms which were metaphysical:   
“Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being; and it is 
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so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of.” 
(Heidegger, 1962, p 184)  There is however a problem.  If Being is always unattainable, 
then of what value is a poetic imagination if we cannot arrive at our destination – 
Being.  Häbermas made this point in his essay ‘The Undermining of Western 
Rationalisation’:  “Because Being withdraws itself from the assertive grasp of assertive 
statements, because it can only be encircled in indirect disclosure and ‘rendered 
silent’, the destining of Being remains undiscoverable”. (Häbermas, 1990a, p 140)   
Wittgenstein also made an observation that: ‘‘What we cannot speak about must pass 
over in silence.’’ (Wittgenstein, 1974, p 74 )  However if we consider the metaphor of 
the origin of the river in The Ister, then the fact that we cannot arrive at the true 
ultimate source of all that pertains to its being does not negate the value of the 
journey and our increased understanding as a result.  The practices of ‘care of the self’ 
complemented those associated with ‘knowledge of the self’.  There was some 
recognition that man should not regard human existence to be determined solely by 
knowledge gleaned about the world. The loss of the practices of ‘care of the self’, 
surely have contributed to the domination of technology in our world today.  In our 
age of modernity calculative thinking has replaced poetic reflection and concern about 
man’s relationship to Being.  
The value of Foucault’s work in this thesis is that he engaged with Heidegger’s 
concerns about the ‘oblivion of Being’.  The supplanting of ‘care of self’ by ‘knowledge 
of self’ is a convincing explanation of why man lives in such a technological framework.  
This work of Foucault’s was complemented by his work on science and biopolitics.  
However, Foucault’s work is generally descriptive, what Heidegger set out to do was to 
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encourage poetic thinking and imagination in order to bring modern man closer to 
Being. 
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